This essay analyzes aspects of the Arab mass media and American perceptions of those media that have led to specific policies relating to freedom of the press. The focus is on the period since the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, and up to the end of the American occupation of Iraq on June 28, 2004.

In the Arab world, media systems vary somewhat from country to country, but everywhere media professionals operate under some form of restriction and limits to free speech, delineated in law and in unwritten practice. Print media journalists tend to enjoy more freedom in those Arab countries where the underlying political system allows political parties and interest groups to function, as in Lebanon, Kuwait and Morocco for example, but they enjoy much less freedom where the political system prohibits public dissent, as was the case in Iraq under Saddam Hussain. Typically media laws in the Arab world explicitly prohibit attacks on the head of state, defamation of religion, or undermining social peace, and in the restricted environments, the governmental authorities go beyond those constraints. Journalists often test the limits of these restrictions, but many also exercise self-censorship because of the political environment.[1]

Radio and television in most Arab countries have under the tightest government control for decades, but television began to loosen the bonds of censorship in the 1990s when several Arab satellite television channels including al Jazeera were created. During the crisis of 1990-91 when Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait, television viewers all over the Arab world watched it on CNN, because CNN was available on satellite and Arab television was not. Arabs were fascinated to watch crisis and war unfold on CNN but they regarded its coverage and commentary as being from an American point of view. That motivated Arab entrepreneurs to establish new satellite TV channels in Arabic, and these new channels appealed to a wide Arab audience not only because of the language but also because the editorial decisions on content were made by Arabs, for Arab viewers.

These new Arab satellite TV channels, including MBC, LBC, Orbit, and ART as well as al Jazeera, also attracted large numbers of Arab viewers because of the news coverage in Arabic, and because they were much less inhibited in their programming than the older terrestrial channels. Market-driven, they gave pan-Arab audiences what they wanted, and most of them were based in Europe, remote from Arab censors. Al Jazeera, an all-news 24/7 station with excellent news coverage of events in the region, was also the most unconventional and most willing to shatter previous taboos. Its Qatari patrons, long under the shadow of wealthier and more powerful Saudi Arabia, decided to put their small country on the map and challenge Saudi dominance by creating a television channel would compete with the Saudi-owned ones and be provocatively liberal. Thus al Jazeera broke new ground by sending reporters into Israel and Afghanistan to cover the news there, and by hosting talk shows that dealt with previously taboo religious, social and political subjects. For example, in the fall of 1998, when the war in Afghanistan began, al Jazeera reporters had an advantage because they were the only foreign reporters in that country because other news organizations, including American, had refused earlier to go there. . Al Jazeera covered the Intifada live when it began in October 2000, giving it an advantage over all other TV channels.

Some accused al Jazeera of being hostile to Arab interests because it broadcast interviews with Israeli officials. The station's talk shows that broke many Arab taboos angered most of the Arab governments at one time or another. They punished al Jazeera by closing its bureaus and other measures, but they also joined the competition in self-defense, so that by 2004, nearly every Arab government had also set up its own satellite channel.

After 9/11, the U.S. Government and the U.S. Public began to notice Arab media because al Jazeera television carried statements by Usama bin Laden, that were picked up and rebroadcast by American commercial networks. American anger at al Qaida for the 9/11 attack was high, and there was a tendency to blame the messenger, al Jazeera, for carrying Usama's messages. In October 2001, Secretary of State Powell complained to the Ruler of Qatar, Hamad bin Khalifa, about al Jazeera because the Government of Qatar finances it. Powell said that the TV station was helping Usama bin Laden by uncritically broadcasting his messages, but the Ruler rejected the complaint, saying he had no responsibility for al Jazeera program content because it was a private station. This exchange was the first revelation of a new dilemma that Washington faced, as some critics said the U.S. should not ask Qatar to censor al Jazeera because freedom of speech is such an important tenet of American democracy. [2]

American interest in Arab media subsided somewhat after the fall of the Taliban and the muting of Usama's voice in the media. But the US-led war on Iraq revived it, for several reasons. First, Washington had to decide how to treat Arab and other media during the fighting. Secondly, as soon as Saddam Hussain's regime fell, and American officials took over as the occupying power in Iraq, they had to how to treat the large international press corps, including Arab reporters, covering the occupation. Third, they had to face the question of how to deal with Iraqi media, both during and after the occupation.

During the invasion, the United States allowed some American reporters to accompany its forces into Iraq, "embedded" with military units, in order to enable them to cover the story first hand. Arab reporters were not given this privilege, but many of them were pre-positioned inside Iraq and covered the story from there. Few Western reporters were inside Iraq prior to the invasion, and the ones that were mostly spoke no Arabic, so their access to the Iraqi side of the story was limited. As a result, American media presented the war largely from the Pentagon's perspective, while the Arab media presented it from the Iraqi perspective, which was different.

On April 10, 2003, after the U.S. military had taken control of Baghdad, American officials took over the Iraqi television facilities, and immediately changed the programming from Saddam Hussain’s to their own. This began a new era in Iraq’s media history.

Together with the British, U.S. officials took over responsibility for administering Iraq, under the Coalition Provisional Authority(CPA). Although Washington had done little planning for post-Saddam Iraqi media, in February 2003, just before the war, the Pentagon had given a multi-million-dollar contract to the Scientific Applications International Corporation (SAIC) to "quickly establish a free and independent indigenous media network, consisting of radio, television and print media components". SAIC is a large American company based in San Diego that specializes in advanced technologies for the Pentagon, with no experience in the media field, but it created the "Iraq Media Network" with FM and TV stations, and a newspaper. SAIC’s daily newspaper "al Sabah" managed to achieve a good circulation, although some of its journalists were unhappy with American editorial control over its content.

The IMN television channel however immediately ran into difficulties. It took over the TV facilities that had been used by Iraqi television but they were in bad repair; staff ordered equipment that turned out to be incompatible with what existed in Iraq, causing delays. When it finally went on the air with four hours in the evening on May 13, 2003, its programs were regarded as uninteresting by the Iraqi public, who had eagerly anticipated a significant improvement in television now that Saddam was gone and the Americans had taken over. Some program content was confusing, for example presenters referred to the former president as "Hussain", which Iraqis thought meant the 7th century imam since they called Saddam Hussain by his first name. The IMN TV director Ahmad Rikabi, a journalist whose parents were Iraqi resigned in August, saying the Americans had failed to invest properly in equipment or staff. One Iraqi newsreader resigned criticizing the American managers, saying the Iraqi people were "not as simple-minded as they believe." Don North, the senior TV advisor to IMN, said after he quit that the TV station lost credibility with Iraqi viewers because of "an overburdening of news conferences, interviews, statements and admonitions from the CPA that did not go through the filter of Iraqi journalists". The CPA's own surveys showed that Iraqis preferred to watch al Jazeera and other Arab satellite channels, or even the Iranian TV channel al Alam coming from outside Iraq, because the IMN television was too "stodgy" in style and too much like a government-owned station. One report said it was considered the Pentagon's Pravda. [3] In fact, at the beginning of the occupation, Iraqis preferred to watch Iranian television in Arabic over the CPA’s television channel, al Alam, that was on 24 hours a day, had clear reception, and interesting news and commentary programs. [4]

When SAIC's one-year contract was up in January 2004, the Pentagon switched to the Harris Corporation of Florida to manage its media operations. The newspaper al Sabah also had difficulties under Harris, however; in May 2004, employees of al Sabah walked out in protest against too much American editorial control. For television, Harris in turn subcontracted to the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBC), to manage IMN television, which had by then been renamed "al Iraqiyya". Al Iraqiyya improved its audience appeal somewhat but some Iraqis then criticized al Iraqiyya's programs as being Lebanese rather than Iraqi in tone and content. [5] By April 2004, the station had three studios, a satellite hookup and was on the air 18 hours a day. [6] However, because of the scarcity of Iraqi broadcasting talent, only two hours per day of programming was locally produced, while the rest of air time was filled with material purchased from other Arab countries.[7]

The Iraqi public however was still not very enthusiastic about the US-sponsored television. A viewer survey taken by the CPA in October 2003 found that fewer than one-third of the Iraqi public with satellite TV said they depended on IMN television for news, while 37% preferred al Arabiyya and 26% al Jazeera. Only of those Iraqis with no satellite capabilities, a slight majority (59%) preferred IMN TV while many watched the Iranian Arabic language station.[8]

The CPA established a special media Strategic Communications ("Stratcom") Unit to monitor the reporting and commentary in all media relating to the occupation of Iraq. In one Stratcom group, half a dozen people including Arabic speakers watched the Arab media closely and compiled a "truth matrix" comparing Arab media allegations against CPA information, and drafting guidance for CPA briefers to correct errors. A larger group in Stratcom put out daily information on Coalition successes in development and humanitarian assistance, and on the military front. Many of the people in this unit were former Bush campaign workers, and their target audience was primarily the American media and public. [9] Stratcom supported the CPA briefers, who normally met with the press on a daily basis. One American observer however commented that rather than confine the briefing to two Americans, it would have been more effective and given a better impression to have Iraqi representatives of the Interim Government participate in it, so that the Coalition operations had an Iraqi face. [10]

Arab observers have criticized of the Iraqi Media Network. The dean of media studies at Baghdad University said, "Everyone is watching al Jazeera and other Arab TV stations. There is a war of information going on and the Americans have not been able to fill the gap. Al Jazeera is not intentionally distorting the facts – it’s just rushing into exciting news and making quick conclusions. But at the same time, Americans want to hide things."[11] An Egyptian commentator charged that the CPA "has betrayed all principles of helping Iraqis build a free and independent media." He said in creating the Iraqi Media Network, the CPA has presented the Iraqi public with a "bad model and a rotten structure that every independent journalist in Iraq and in the rest of the Arab world is fighting against – the model of media controlled by the state. This is a breach of one of the most fundamental and basic of liberal values." He added that the CPA violated the principle of freedom of information by restricting access to information and channeling it to favorite outlets such as al Sabah newspaper which it sponsored. [12]

Saddam Hussain had had total control over all Iraqi media. His Information Ministry directly managed all radio and television, and the state news agency that supplied all news to the media; its employees staffed the newspapers, and its "minders" accompanied foreign journalists to ensure their compliance with Iraq's strict press rules. When Saddam's regime fell in March 2003, the American authorities disbanded the Information Ministry and allowed the emergence of newspapers and the establishment of radio and television stations. During the first 12 months of occupation, reportedly more than 200 newspapers, and a few small television and radio stations appeared.[13] Satellite dishes, which had been illegal under Saddam, suddenly flooded into the market and were bought by many people eager to have access to the world unfiltered by Saddam's controls. By March 2004, an estimated one-third of all Iraqi households had satellite access, but none of the private TV stations had been very successful, leaving IMN/Iraqiyya as the only important new Iraqi TV channel, alongside the previously existing Kurdish channel in the north.[14]

Many of the private newspapers that appeared at the beginning of occupation did not survive, and many that did were very weak financially and journalistically. About one dozen "real newspapers" survived and achieved substantial readership during the occupation. By the spring of 2004, reportedly the largest-circulation newspaper with 50,000 copies was the CPA-backed al Sabah, despite the fact that it was regarded as an American mouthpiece, followed with 10,000 by al Zaman that had been published in London by exile opposition journalist Said Bazzaz and moved back after liberation. Third was the London-based regional newspaper al Sharq al Awsat. Several tabloids appeared, such as al Shahed and al Saah, that exploited the new press freedoms and published rumors and conspiracy theories [15] By July 2003, reportedly 85 newspapers had appeared, and by October the estimated number was 210, although they were of varying frequency and quality. Many of them were organs of political parties or interest groups, such as al Mutamar of Ahmad Chalaby’s Iraqi national Congress; Baghdad by (now prime minister) Ayad Alawy’s Iraqi National Accord; Nahrayn of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI); and al Hawza by the followers of the Shiite cleric Muqtada al Sadr. [16]

In June 2003, the CPA issued order number 14 that started by endorsing freedom of the press, but then stipulated that all news media organizations must be licensed, and that the license could be revoked if the organization published or broadcast material inciting violence or civil disorder, violence against the CPA, or advocating the return of the Baath Party, and stipulating penalties of arrest for violators. [17]

In September 2003 for example Bremer shut down al Mustaqilla, a newspaper that had been a strong critic of the CPA, and that crossed the line by calling for Iraqis to harm their compatriots who cooperated with the Americans.[18] This occurred without incident. But on March 28, 2004, Ambassador Bremer shut down the Iraqi newspaper al Hawza, published by associates of the Shiite cleric Muqtada al Sadr. Although only an eight-page broadsheet that was known for printing rumors, especially anti-American ones that fit with the strong criticism al Sadr expressed about the occupation, the paper was a symbol to his followers. Immediately after the shutdown, hundreds of his supporters were in the streets protesting the action, and by evening the demonstration had swollen to thousands. A letter from Ambassador Bremer justified the closure by citing examples of false reporting, including a February item that said an explosion that killed fifty policemen was caused by an American missile, when it was actually a car bomb.[19] The Bremer letter did not mention incitement, but CPA spokesman, Dan Senor, told the press on March 30 that al Hawza had been shut for 60 days because it repeatedly used rhetoric designed to incite violence against U.S. soldiers and the Iraqi people. [20] The closure of al Hawza seemed to become a rallying point for al Sadr's followers, as demonstrations and violence escalated, with al Sadr calling for more resistance to the occupation and the confrontation with the CPA took on a military dimension.

On March 20, 2004 CPA administrator Bremer issued order number 65 establishing the Iraq Communications and Media Commission, modeled on the American FCC, in anticipation of the hand-over of sovereignty to the new Iraqi Interim Government on June 30. The ICMC's nine appointed members would have the power to license broadcasters, draft media laws and help develop professional ethical standards for all media. The ICMC would work with the Iraqi journalists to develop a code of ethics and a mechanism for self-regulation. The CPA intended to leave it to the ICMC to decide who would own and operate two national television channels, but it was intended that the CPA's al Iraqiyya television would become a publicly funded Iraqi station. The ICMC would also decide whether foreign ownership would be permitted and whether they could have religious or party political affiliations.[21] Ambassador Bremer also named the CEO and three commissioners to the ICMC, selected from a list supplied by the Iraqi Governing council.[22]

By the spring of 2004, relations between Washington and al Jazeera had deteriorated to the extent that the Guardian newspaper called it an "escalating, multimillion dollar regional media war between al Jazeera and the U.S. Government", provoked by al Jazeera's "tough reporting on the Iraqi occupation." [23]

On April 27, 2004, Secretary Powell complained to Qatari Foreign Minister Shaikh Hamid bin Jassim bin Jabir that al Jazeera was inciting Arab audiences to violence against U.S. troops and their allies in the Iraqi government, and that al Jazeera’s news coverage intruded into good US-Qatari relations. On the same day, State department spokesman Richard Boucher said "We have very deep concerns bout al Jazeera's broadcasts because again and again we find inaccurate, false, wrong reports that are, we think, designed to be inflammatory…that make the situation more tense, more inflamed and even more dangerous." Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld at about the same time had publicly accused al Jazeera of "vicious, inaccurate and inexcusable" reporting, and other US officials in Iraq said that al Jazeera had falsely accused US forces of deliberately attacking Iraqi civilians. [24]

The Iraqi Governing Council had also become angered at the coverage of Iraq by both al Jazeera and al Arabiya. In September 2003, the Council banned both stations for two weeks from covering Council activities, for giving publicity to rebel groups. In November, the Council punished al Arabia by suspending permission for it to use the satellite uplink channel from Baghdad, because it had broadcast an audio tape in which Saddam Hussain attacked the Council. In late December 2003 the Council banned al Arabia reporters from Iraq for two months, for "incitement to murder" for playing a taped message from Saddam Hussain, who was then still in hiding and calling for resistance. Then in the spring of 2004 the Council punished al Jazeera again by banning its reporters from Council meetings. Muhammad Othman, a Kurdish member of the Council, explained: "In the current security situation, we simply can't have people on television calling us liars, thieves and traitors and offering rewards in heaven if we are shot." [25]

The Americans in the CPA insist that when they accuse an Arab broadcaster or newspaper of lying, their accusation is based on accurate information. They may be right. Yet some third party observers have sided with the accused. For example, when British journalist Arthur Neslen reported in the Guardian in April 2004 that U.S. military spokesman BG Kimmitt denied an al Jazeera statement that Americans had deliberately killed women and children in Falluja, he added: "The al-Jazeera reports of US snipers firing at women and children in the streets of Falluja have now been corroborated by international observers in the city. Perhaps it is natural that a military force should seek to suppress evidence that could be used against it in future war crimes trials. But it is equally natural that a free media should resist….on the ground, the US is acting against the flowering of Middle East media freedom, which al-Jazeera initiated." [26]

On April 12, 2004, General John Abizaid, commander of Central Command, denounced "the Arab press, in particular al Jazeera and al Arabiya" for carrying false reports that the US marines in Falluja were deliberately targeting civilians, saying "we absolutely do not do that and I think everybody knows that." The two stations denied the charges. Salah Negm, the chief editor of al Arabiya, said his editors relied on eyewitness reports, accounts from its reporters and US army briefings, and they were doing their job properly "to the best of the information available to us." [27]

Yet many Americans believe, as the conservative commentator Rush Limbaugh says, that "The real problem that we face is al-Jazeera and the Arab media….They are pure, 100% advocates. They are propaganda arms for the pro-Arab side and totally against the United States….They just broadcast lies about American atrocities and so forth. They were one of the major problems of Fallujah." [28] Such extreme condemnations of al Jazeera by Americans who do not watch it and do not speak Arabic are regarded as unfair stereotypes by experts who have actually monitored its broadcasts. Yet the American complaints have some merit and may have had some effect on the station's programming. There were reports at the end of April 2004 that management of al Jazeera had ordered staff to tone down "excessive violence" in their coverage of Iraq, because if repeated it might "desensitize people" to the negative aspects of war, and editors should strike a balance between that danger and presenting the truth. [29]

The American authorities in Iraq have carried out two separate functions simultaneously as a result of the American-led occupation of Iraq that prevailed between March 2003 and June 2004. On the one hand, as supreme power in the country (together with the British as junior partners), they determined the character of the Iraqi media system that replaced the one Saddam Hussain had implemented. They allowed the amount of press freedom in Iraq that they wanted to allow, and they set limits to it when they wished. They also set rules for other media representatives operating in Iraq, including both Arab and Western ones.

On the other hand, the American occupation administrators also carried out a public diplomacy and public relations policy that was aimed at target audiences in the United States as well as elsewhere, including the Arab world. The Pentagon in particular devoted considerable personal and financial resources to this latter task, motivated in large part by political considerations of the Bush administration to demonstrate to the world the benefits of the American policy of invasion and occupation.

To some extent, these two purposes interacted with each other, as the CPA rules on Arab media behavior (the first purpose) were seen as part of the overall success or failure of the invasion and occupation (the second purpose). Thus for example criticism was made of the CPA for restricting Arab media freedom as being inconsistent with the Bush administration's declared goal of bringing democracy and freedom to Iraq and the region. The Bush administration sought to draw a sharp contrast between the rule of Saddam Hussain and that of the CPA, and in the treatment of Iraqi and other Arab media there were vast differences. But Washington's strong criticism of al Jazeera diminished, for some observers, the strength of Washington's claim to be a steadfast supporter of freedom of the press.

The US Government espouses free speech and a free press as a general principle, but in practice asserts that there must be some limits. The war on terrorism, and the war and occupation in Iraq, have brought about occasions when American officials have faced the challenge of deciding how far to go to permit and support free speech in Arab media or to protest and act against what it regards as specific media transgressions. Clearly the media situation in Iraq was entirely different under American occupation from what it was under Saddam Hussain. The American spokesman, MG Kimmitt, declared in April 2004 that Iraq was then "the freest press environment in the entire Middle East." [30] He may have been correct, since the restrictions on media imposed by the CPA and the Iraqi Governing Council were arguably not as severe as those extant in law and in practice elsewhere in the region. The occupation ended June 30, 2004, however, and it remains to be seen how the Iraqi media situation will evolve under Iraqi sovereignty, and how the debate among Iraqis will develop and affect their new media system.

As for American policy toward freedom of the press, that will also be debated into the future. One American analyst stresses that the most important battle going on in Iraq and the Middle East is a battle for hearts and minds, which is the essence of guerrilla war. He points out that while the U.S. government was successful during the initial phase of the war, allowing embedded reporters to cover the fighting from the US point of view. But he says that during the occupation the Americans have "shown less skill in countering enemy propaganda", as Iraqi fighters have succeeded in shown projecting a negative image of America in Arab and other media, and even drawing analogies to earlier conflicts in Vietnam, Somalia and Lebanon.[31] American prestige among the public in the Arab world is at an historic low, due at least in part to Washington's failure to deal effectively with Arab media.

[1] For details on Arab media developments described in this section, see William A. Rugh, Arab Mass Media, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004

[2] Rugh, op.cit, pp.233-34

[3] Anne Alexander, MEIonline, 2/6/04; The Economist, 12/11/03; Katrin Dauenhauer and Jim Lobe, Inter-Press Services, 8/13/2003. Alexander implies SAIC got the sole-source contract because of personal connections, noting that Deputy Defense Secretary Douglas Feith is a former SAIC vice president, and that Ahmad Chalaby has close ties to SAIC board members.

[4] Sabrina Tavernise in the New York Times, 4/29/04

[5] Stephen Schwartz, Tech Central Station, 5/3/04 (http://www.techcentralstation.com); Nicholas   Pelham in Financial Times, 5/4/04; and Christian Science Monitor 5/21/04

[6] Rowan Scarborough, Washington Times, 4/28/04

[7] Edmund Sanders, Los Angeles Times, 3/25/04

[8] Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, report 3/29/04 (www.rferl.org.reports)

[9] Christopher Marquis, New York Times,4/29/04; Jim Krane, Capital Hill Blue, 4/5/04.

[10] Max Boot, Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, in the Los Angeles Times, 4/27/04

[11] Dr. Hamida Smaysam, quoted in the Los Angeles Times, 4/27/04

[12] Ibrahim Nawawy in al Ahram weekly (http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/686/re10.htm) 

[13] Alistair Lyon, Reuters, 3/27/04

[14] Edmund Sanders, Los Angeles Times, 3/25/04

[15] Hassan M. Fattah, Prospect Magazine, March 2004 (www.prospect-magazine.co.uk) 

[16] Anne Alexander, MEIonline, 2/6/04

[17] CPA Order No.14, "Prohibited Media Activity" (www.cpa-iraq.org/regulation/20030610_CPAORD_14)

[18] Hassan M. Fattah, Prospect Magazine, March 2004

[19] Jeffrey Gettleman, New York Times, 3/29/04

[20] CPA briefing by Dan Senor and BG Mark Kimmett, Federal News Service 3/30/04

[21] CPA Order No.65, Iraqi Communication and Media Commission", (www.cpa-iraq.org/regulation/20040320_CPAORD65)

[22] He appointed as CEO Dr. Siyament Othman, born in Irbil, a former Amnesty International and UPI executive, and as commissioners Dr. Awni Karoumi, a theater director born in Mosul, Mahdi al Rahim, a banker born in Baghdad, and Dr. Amal Shlash, an economics professor from Baghdad; CPApress release 4/21/04

[23] Christian Parenti, The Guardian, 4/23/04

[24] Paul Richter in Los Angeles Times, 4/28/04, and Rowan Scarborough in the Washington Times, 4/28/04

[25] Jack Fairweather in the Daily Telegraph, 3/4/04; Christian Parenti, in The Guardian, 4/23/04; and Jalal Talabani oped in the Washington Post 12/4/03

[26] Arthur Neslen, The Guardian, 4/21/04

[27] BBC Monitoring Service, 4/14/04

[28] transcript, "Arab Media: The Big Problem", EIB, 5/20/04

[29] Claire Cozens, in The Guardian, 4/30/04

[30] Coalition Provisional Authority briefing , 4/20/04 (www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040420-0643)

[31] Max Boot, Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, in the Los Angeles Times, 4/27/04