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Article No. 4
The Common Enemy Rationale: An Attempt to Apply
Concepts of Cognitive Consistency to the Portrayals of the United
States in the Foreign Press
Joshua Woods
Michigan State University
Acknowledgment
The author would like to convey appreciation to
Vladimir Shlapentokh, senior director of the research project "World
Attitudes toward America After 9/11," which supplied the data for
this analysis. Special gratitude goes to Stan Kaplowitz for his
invaluable aid in the data analysis and to Toby Ten Eyck for his
input. A note of thanks also goes to the reviewer of this manuscript
for offering important suggestions to improve this text.
Abstract
In discussions of the declining U.S. image in
foreign countries, the emphasis is usually placed on either the
shortcomings of U.S. policies and actions, or on the political,
psychological and cultural circumstances in foreign countries. This
dyadic approach ignores the important role of "third parties" in the
development of international attitudes toward the United States. In
this article, an attempt was made to demonstrate a reciprocal
relationship between a foreign country’s press portrayals of the
U.S. and its views of international terrorism. More than 2,000
articles from the mainstream print media in nine countries,
published in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001, provided the data to support this assumption. Related topics,
including (a) the differences between press representations of the
U.S. in the West versus in the Muslim World, and (b) the affects of
press censorship on America’s image in China, are also discussed.
Introduction
In the years since the terrorist attacks on New York
City and Washington, D.C. on September 11, 2001, America’s image has
become increasingly negative in many countries of the world.
According to a survey conducted by the Pew Research Center, the
number of Europeans who rated the U.S. "favorably" declined
significantly between summer 2002 and spring 2004. In France, the
U.S. favorability rating dropped during this period from 63 percent
to 37 percent, in Germany from 61 percent to 38 percent, in Russia
from 61 percent to 47 percent, and in Great Britain from 75 percent
to 58 percent (Pew, 2004). The plight of America’s image in Muslim
nations has been even worse. While attitudes toward the U.S. in
Europe, the Middle East and Asia showed some signs of improving in
2005, America’s favorability rating has remained quite low in most
regions of the world, particularly when compared to the ratings of
other countries. In fact, even China was rated more favorably in
2005 than the U.S. in most of the European nations surveyed (Pew,
2005).
Although few experts refute the fact that the U.S.
is broadly disliked in many countries, there is little consensus
about what has caused this aversion. Most discussions on the topic
focus either on the "nature" of the United States, or on the
particular political and cultural aspects of other nations. Authors
who refer to the United States suggest that the causes of these
negative attitudes are external and produced by America
itself. The authors highlight the deleterious effects of the U.S.
foreign policy, military actions, and cultural expansion. As
suggested by Sardar and Davies (2003), "America is an object of much
fear and loathing, and this opinion is based on concrete experience
with American power over the last five decades." The same emphasis
on U.S. foreign policies and actions can be found in several other
books, such as a collection of essays by Vidal (2002a, see 2002b),
Chomsky’s 9-11 (2001) and Johnson’s Blowback
(2000). Other external factors, such as the role of the
United States in globalization and the expansion of capitalism, have
also been cited as a basis of "anti-Americanism." The U.S. has been
characterized as the global harbinger of "arrogant secularist
materialism," the destroyer of indigenous cultural traditions, a
unilateral bully in international economic affairs, a pusher of
unsafe modified foods, and an ominous threat to the environment,
human rights and worker protection (Bourdieu, 1998; see Barber,
2002; Palast, 2002).
On the other side of the debate, many authors stress
the internal, domestic factors underpinning negative views
of America. They argue that the anger and hostility toward the U.S.
depends less on U.S. actions than on the particular internal
features of foreign countries. While some authors treat
"anti-Americanism" in foreign lands as the result of "irrationality"
(Hollander, 1992; Harris, 2003), or "envy" (Joffe, 2002; Hertsgaard,
2002), others point to the cultural differences between the U.S. and
foreign countries (Huntington, 1993; Revel, 2002; Shlapentokh 1988).
Many analysts also look to the internal politics within the given
country as the driving force behind negative attitudes toward
America (see Thom, 2003; Roger, 2003; Michas, 2002). They argue that
anti-Americanism is a negative ideology (a sort of scapegoat
mechanism) that is used by ruling elites, both political and
religious, to justify their dominance in society, in spite of their
evident failures. The opposition can also use this ideology in its
struggle for political power.
In many cases, the arguments on both sides of the
debate have been magnified and polarized by the authors’ ideological
or political dispositions. To a certain degree, the emphasis placed
on ideology explains why the debate over America’s image has
remained centered on the dyadic relations between a given country
and the United States. Without denying the credibility of this
approach, the goal here is to add a "third party" to the equation.
The main premise of this article argues that a country’s image of
the U.S. is influenced by its perceptions of international
terrorism. Depending on the context, the inverse causal order is
also possible: A country’s perceptions of terrorism may be affected
by its image of the United States.
While most studies on foreign attitudes toward the
U.S. draw on public opinion data, this study is based on a content
analysis of the mainstream press in nine countries (Belarus, China,
Colombia, Egypt, Germany, India, Lithuania, Moldova, and Russia).
Empirical evidence will be offered to support the interrelationship
between a country’s press representation of the 9/11 terrorist
attacks and its image of the United States. Insight on two
additional topics, which are important to the study of global
communication, will also be presented: (a) the differences between
press representations of the U.S. in the West versus in the Muslim
World, and (b) the affects of press censorship on America’s image in
China.
Theoretical Background
Few political aphorisms remain as famous as the
ancient dictum: "My enemy’s enemy is my friend." The underlying
logic of this phrase can be detected in any number of creative
works, from Greek mythology to Shakespeare’s plays to several noted
theories in the social sciences. This aphorism points to the
important, if self-evident premise that people’s attitudes about a
person, group, nation, or object are influenced, randomly or
systematically, by the views and behavior of other people.
The question of how people’s perceptions are
configured in the mind is one of the primary concerns of
contemporary social psychology. Followers of the Gestalt tradition
of psychology, going back to Heider (1946, 1958) and his "balance
theory," maintained that people desire balance in their attitudes
toward sets of other people, objects, or issues. Heider’s theory
(along with the various adaptations of his model) has been supported
by several empirical studies (see Krosnick 1990; Ottati, Fishbein,
and Middlestadt 1988; Newcomb 1961; Aronson and Cope 1968; Jones
1966; Zajonc and Burnstein 1965). Applying this theory to the adage
cited above, social psychologists argue that a person’s negative
attitude toward an enemy predetermines this person’s positive
attitude about the enemy’s enemy. Important for the purpose of
prediction is the contention that a balanced structure, or "triad,"
tends to remain balanced, while imbalanced triads naturally move
toward a state of internal congruence (Eagly & Chaiken, 1998). The
"triads" discussed in this article include the United States,
international terrorism and each of the nine foreign countries in
the study.
One of the problems of balance theory, however, is
that it treats people’s attitudes as simply positive or negative,
and virtually disregards the magnitude of these feelings. Responding
to this limitation, Newcomb (1968) created a model that takes the
intensity of attitudes into account. Newcomb hypothesized that the
tension produced by an imbalanced relationship (and the need for
resolving this tension) increases as the extremity of the attitudes
involved increases. Newcomb’s theory illustrates how fluctuations in
the perceived danger of international terrorism may result in
attitude change toward the United States. Likewise, a shift in a
country’s attitudes toward the U.S. may bring changes in the
attitudes toward international terrorism.
Focusing on large social and ethnic groups and
entire nations, political scientists, specialists in international
relations and social psychologists have applied the concept of
balancing attitudes and the common-enemy rationale to the study of
international relations and other developments including
negotiations, conflict resolution, development of prejudice,
patriotism and nationalism. Several mass media and communication
studies have also drawn on these theories to describe a broad range
of social processes, from media effects (Severin, 1991; Slater,
1999) to the relational ties in global telecommunications networks
(Monge & Matei, 2004).
The richness of this idea lies in its consideration
of "third parties" in the creation and development of people’s
attitudes and beliefs. Sociologists have long understood that
actors—whether political officials or newspaper editors—often
organize their views of one person or object with respect to third
parties (Simmel, 1950; Coser, 1964). As discussed above, many
authors assume that negative attitudes toward the U.S. are produced
by dyadic relations between the U.S. and other countries. In
contrast, the underlying logic of this study suggests that after
9/11 people’s attitudes toward the U.S. were arranged in congruence
with their attitudes toward international terrorism. To explore this
relationship, the following hypothesis can be offered: The more
negative a country’s press representation of 9/11, the more positive
was its portrayal of the United States.
Method
This study is based on an international research
project initiated after 9/11 that measured the foreign press’
reaction to several issues surrounding the terrorist attacks.
Articles from the mainstream press in Belarus, China, Colombia,
Egypt, Germany, India, Lithuania, Moldova, and Russia provided the
data. All of the articles were published during three brief periods
in the first months after the attacks (September 12-15; October
8-11; and December 10-21, 2001). The group of countries selected for
the project reflects a "purposive sample" based on several criteria,
including geopolitical significance, nuclear capability, as well as
the researchers’ interest in particular cultural, economic, and
political differences between these nations.
1 Although the countries in
this sample represent distinct regions of the world—the Middle East,
Latin America, Asia, Eastern and Western Europe—generalizations
across these regions should be made only with caution, and even then
will remain impressionistic to some extent. However, our total
sample does comprise a sizeable portion of the world’s population,
and each country plays a unique and oftentimes powerful role in the
regional and global political arenas. Moreover, in the wake of 9/11,
there was a notable similarity in public opinion of the United
States across the countries in these regions, particularly in the
Muslim World and in Western Europe, according to the Pew Research
Center (2004, 2005) and Gallup International (2001).
A multistage sampling procedure was used for
collecting the units of analysis in this study.
2 For each country, we began
by dividing the total universe of newspapers according to
circulation size (stratified sampling). We then selected the top ten
largest newspapers in each country. The size of the newspapers was
determined using circulation data from multiple sources.
3 From this population, we
picked up articles according to several criteria, including the
article’s date of publication and substantive relevance to the U.S.
or the events of 9/11. Any article that contained the views of more
than one person was broken into separate units. The basic unit of
analysis was either the written material produced by the byline
author, or the quotes and paraphrases that the author attributed to
other people. For this reason, the sample contains a total of 2,856
units of analysis, but only 2,369 articles. Sixty-four percent of
these units represented the views of "authors," and 36 percent were
"quotes." The sample of articles from each "high-circulation"
newspaper included almost all of them published during the given
time frame. Although we feel confident that the data are
generalizable across a broader interpretation of the "mainstream
press," it is not representative of small newspapers with
specialized political or ideological positions.
All members of our research team ("coders") are
native speakers of the languages they analyzed and are proficient in
English. In India, five different coders were necessary to examine
the five different languages used in the ten largest Indian
newspapers (Hindi, Gujarati, Malayalam, Urdu, and Bengali). The
inter-coder reliability of the data was tested using Cohen’s kappa,
which equals zero when the agreement between coders is at chance
levels (Cohen 1960, pp. 37-46). Reliability checks were conducted on
four different coder pairs on an average of 8 percent of the
articles in the samples. The articles were selected randomly for the
reliability checks. Each test was applied to a different language
(Spanish, Chinese, German, and English) so that reliability could be
compared across countries. For the German sample of articles,
Cohen’s kappa was .61; for Chinese articles, .60; for Indian
articles published in English, .574; and for Colombia, .510.
Although an exact standard for kappa has not been clearly
established, several authors have accepted similar levels of
inter-coder agreement as reasonably good (see Landis & Koch 1977;
Stemler 2001; Kvalseth 1989; Capozzoli et al., 1999; Rourke et al.,
2001). The kappa coefficients stated above reflect the most rigorous
measure of the study’s inter-coder agreement. In many cases, the
coders selected items that were close in substantive content. By
accepting "close matches" as agreement between coders, the kappa
coefficients were higher, ranging from .70 to .80.
Before moving forward, the limitations of the data
should be noted. First, the mainland Chinese press remained silent
on some of the controversial issues surrounding the events of
September 11. For instance, none of the ten largest newspapers in
China published an article about the "root causes of 9/11," a
popular topic in other countries. One of the strategies we used to
mitigate these limitations was to analyze the most widely circulated
newspaper in Hong Kong, The Apple Daily, where restrictions
on the press were weaker. In addition, we examined a popular
Internet chat room in China, the Peoples Daily Online Forum.
4 As we will describe in
detail later, these two publications painted a less favorable
picture of the United States compared to the views published in the
mainland press. For this reason, the Chinese sample was divided into
two groups: a "mainland" representation, and what we call the "Hong
Kong & Internet" response.
Due to logistical limitations, the samples in
Lithuania, Moldova, and Belarus were drawn from only three major
newspapers (as compared to the ten selected in the other countries),
resulting in a reduced number of cases. The results from these
countries have been influenced by some of the obvious challenges of
conducting large-scale comparative studies.
Variables
Each coder surveyed the given press on five major
issues related to the events of September 11. These issues were
selected on the basis of a pilot study of more than 200 articles
from around the globe. They represent the most popular international
news items published in the first four days after the attacks. They
include: 1) the depiction of 9/11; 2) the identification of the
prime suspects; 3) suggestions on how the United States should
respond; and 4) the general descriptions of America itself. For each
of these issues, an extensive list of response options were compiled
(a combined total of 111 alternatives were included in the
codebook). In addition to these four quantitative indicators, the
coders were also asked to give their own qualitative assessment of
each respondent in the sample ("respondents" were either the byline
author of an article, or someone quoted in an article). Answers
ranged from 1 ("completely favorable toward the U.S.") to 5
("completely unfavorable toward the U.S.").
The goal of this study was to use these five issues
to measure how the foreign press assessed two different attitude
objects: 1) the United States, and 2) the terrorist attacks on 9/11.
This objective led us to a rather difficult question. How could we
distinguish between "favorable" and "unfavorable" assessments of the
U.S. and the 9/11 terrorists? To solve this problem, we used the
public statements of President George W. Bush as a reference point.
By "favorability," then, we mean "agreement" with the official U.S.
position, as articulated by the president. While the "official"
stance should not be generalized directly to the views of the
American people, a broad majority of the population supported this
position in the wake of 9/11.
5 The official opinion was
determined using a content analysis of 46 public speeches made by
President Bush after 9/11.
6 "Agreement" with this
position entailed the following: 1) clearly negative terms, such as
"horrible, terrible, evil, or a killing of innocent people," used to
describe 9/11; 2) Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda, or Islamic
fundamentalists named as the prime suspect; 3) support for a
U.S.-led military response to 9/11; and 4) a favorable description
of the United States, using terms such as "freedom-loving,
democratic, compassionate, brave, or determined" (this is an
abbreviated description of a far more extensive list of codes). As
for the fifth issue (the qualitative indicator), the first two
answers in the scale ("completely" and "mostly" favorable toward the
U.S.) were used to measure the level of agreement with the official
position.
Main Results
The five issues discussed above were assumed to
reflect two latent variables: condemns 9/11 terrorism, and
favorable toward U.S. A factor analysis was conducted to
confirm this assumption. As shown in Table 1c, the first latent
variable loads high only on the issues related to condemns 9/11
terrorism: "negative description of 9/11" (.861), "bin Laden
named as perpetrator" (.884), and "support for military response"
(.850). The second latent variable loads high only on the issues
related to favorable toward U.S.: "favorable description of
the U.S." (.682) and "favorable coder assessment" (1.027). These two
hypothesized variables were thought to be both related and distinct.
Based on the factor analysis, the three aspects of
condemns 9/11 terrorism did indeed form a separate factor
from the two items in the variable favorable toward U.S.
Evidence was found that these items do form separate factors. The
general statistical criterion is to keep the number of factors that
have eigenvalues (variances) greater than one. As shown in Table 1b,
two factors meet this criteria (eigenvalues = 3.1 and 1.2). A scree
test also indicates that two factors are appropriate for this
analysis.
7 Moreover, both the
three-item scale and the two-item scale were shown to have
sufficiently high measures of reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = .91,
and .83, respectively).
To construct indices measuring the two latent
variables, we averaged the standardized scores of the observed
indicators that loaded high on each factor (see Table 3). The
Pearson’s correlation between the two variables was .41. This
association supports the theoretical assumption discussed at the
beginning of the article. As shown in Figure 1, the more a country’s
press condemned 9/11, identified Osama bin Laden as the perpetrator,
and supported the idea of a military response, the more favorable
was its perception of the United States. In other words, there is a
strong positive correlation between the two latent variables
discussed above, condemns 9/11 terrorism and favorable
toward U.S.
Results by Issue and Country
The results by individual country revealed big
differences between the press responses in the nine project
countries. In terms of America’s image, a clear trend in the data
positioned the German press on the "favorable" end of the spectrum
and the Egyptian press on the "unfavorable" end. Interesting
differences were also found in a comparison between the mainland
press in China and the "Hong Kong & Internet" response.
Issue one: The depiction of 9/11. Although
there was some variability in the responses between nations on this
issue, most of the foreign press condemned the 9/11 attacks. In
Germany, Lithuania, Belarus, China, Hong Kong & Internet, Moldova,
and Russia, three-quarters or more of the articles and quotes in the
samples used decidedly negative terms to characterize 9/11. As the
German politician Ursula Kelders (2001) said: "This is so terrible.
I am speechless. The situation is like a horror movie." Egypt and to
some extent India were less negative at 54 percent and 67 percent,
respectively. In an open letter published in the Egyptian newspaper
Afaq Arabia, Ahmad Almajhop wrote, "Oh Osama, you are a
hero! You are a man who has all the characteristics that men need"
(September 15, 2001). This type of commentary, however, was
extremely rare in the overall sample.
Issue two: The prime suspects. There was
somewhat less agreement with the U.S. on the issue of who carried
out 9/11. Many authors were quick to point out that the United
States had several foreign enemies, besides Osama bin Laden, who may
have committed the act, or that the last major terrorist attack on
U.S. soil had been perpetrated by an American citizen, Timothy
McVeigh. Nevertheless, in the wake of 9/11, a majority of the press
representation in all countries, with the exception of Egypt (11
percent), named Osama bin Laden as the prime suspect.
Issue three: The military response. The
percentage of articles and quotes that endorsed the idea of using
military force in response to 9/11 (the official U.S. position)
dropped off considerably in comparison to the previous two issues.
Germany was among the leading supporters of such actions, though
even here the level of endorsement of the U.S. position was limited
(30 percent). Clearly on the opposite pole, not a single article or
quote in the Egyptian press supported a U.S.-led military response
to 9/11.
Issue four: Descriptions of the United States.
In the first days after the attacks, even as the United States faced
the world as a victim, many authors described the country in
unfavorable terms. Some of the popular words and phrases used in the
Egyptian press included "religiously prejudiced," "unfair or
unjust," and "arrogant." Russian respondents often used terms such
as "vulnerable," "arrogant," and "warlike," while the Indian press
emphasized U.S. indifference to terrorism prior to September 11. The
Colombian and Chinese press were somewhat less critical of the
country. Positive comments about the U.S. economy as well as the
term "compassionate" ranked among the five most salient images of
the U.S. in the mainland Chinese press. "Compassionate" also made
the top-five list in Germany, along with "healthy democracy."
Popular terms in the Lithuanian press included "brave," "freedom
loving," and "determined." Taking into account the hundreds of
statements in the Lithuanian and German press, 78 percent of
descriptions of the U.S. in both countries were favorable. On the
other end of the spectrum, this indicator dropped to 20 percent in
Russia and 25 percent in Egypt.
Issue five: Coders’ assessment. Similar
findings were seen in the coders’ evaluations of the press
materials. Seventy-seven percent of the Germans were judged as
"completely" or "mostly" favorable toward the United States. In
Egypt this indicator dropped to 16 percent, demonstrating once again
the polarity of the German and Egyptian cases.
Mainland Chinese press versus the Hong Kong &
Internet response. On all five of the issues discussed above,
the mainland Chinese press was more favorable toward the U.S. than
the "Hong Kong & Internet" sample. Fewer of the authors and editors
appearing in the Hong Kong newspaper (The Apple Daily) and
the Chinese Internet chat room (The People’s Daily Online Forum)
condemned the 9/11 attacks, identified bin Laden as the prime
suspect, supported a military response and used favorable terms to
describe the United States. These findings support previous research
on the censorship of the Chinese press. The large party organs in
China are thought to be heavily censored, while the press in Hong
Kong and some online media are known for having more freedom to
express dissenting views (Zhao, 1998; Zhao & Schiller, 2001). These
differences in the level of censorship may explain why the mainland
press was consistently more favorable toward the U.S. than the "Hong
Kong & Internet" sample.
The events of 9/11 occurred at a time when China and
the United States were redefining their political and economic
relations. As suggested by Fung (2005), "In the wake of 9/11, the
Chinese authorities attempted to restore Sino-American ties by
suppressing anti-Americanism in the media and maintaining a coherent
and consistent international foreign policy image." For this reason,
if the Chinese leadership eased restrictions on the press, the image
of the U.S. would likely deteriorate.
Clarifications
There are several aspects of this study that require
further explanation. The first point relates to the causal direction
of our model. As discussed above, there was a positive correlation
(.41) between the two latent variables, condemns 9/11 terrorism
and favorable toward U.S. It should be noted, however, that
while these data present clear evidence of an association, the
causal direction of the model may go either way, depending on the
social and historical context. In the first weeks after 9/11, it is
likely that the dramatic terrorist attacks caused a sense of common
fate in many countries, resulting in increased positive attitudes
toward the United States in the foreign press. The inverse
relationship, however, is also possible. That is, a smaller level of
identification with the U.S. could cause a smaller level of
condemnation of 9/11 and international terrorism in general. In the
months and years following the 9/11 attacks, the United States
responded with "overwhelming force" against those it identified as
terrorists. The strong military response, according to several
authors, was one cause of the decline in the U.S. favorability
rating in many nations. If it is true that the foreign press
co-orients its image of international terrorism in terms of its
image of the United States, then an increase in negative attitudes
toward the U.S. would stimulate a decrease in a foreign country’s
identification with and support for the U.S.-led war on terror.
As a second clarification, the press response in
some countries deviated significantly from what our model predicted.
The favorable toward U.S. score of the mainland Chinese
press (-.03) was somewhat less than expected, while its condemns
9/11 terrorism score (1.21) was higher than any other country
in the sample. As can be seen in Figure 1, China is located farthest
from the regression line that links these two variables. Its press’
unexpectedly high level of condemnation of terrorism may be
explained, at least in part, by the state censorship in China,
where, as discussed above, the phenomenon of "a thousand papers with
one voice" still exists (Zhao, 1998, 166). With the suppression of
critical reporting, and the authoritarian government’s decidedly
negative attitude toward terrorism, any type of favorable or even
neutral remark about 9/11 was likely prohibited. It should also be
pointed out that the question of who carried out the attacks was
rarely breached in the mainland Chinese press, and the mentioning of
any possible perpetrator of the attacks, besides the official U.S.
suspect, was probably also limited by the censors. The same type of
state interference may explain the similar results found in Belarus
(see Figure 1).
The Egyptian press represents another clear outlier
compared to the other countries in the sample. Not only was it the
least favorable country to the U.S., but even controlling for this
unfavorability it was noteworthy in its refusal to condemn
terrorism. It is probable that many Egyptians, unlike the authors
from other countries, identified with those who were being blamed
for the attacks. President Bush’s passionate response to 9/11, which
contained religious overtones, not to mention the historically
conflictual relations between the U.S. and the Middle East, probably
accounts for the fact that the Egyptians were unwilling to agree
with America’s prime suspect, its portrayal of the 9/11 attacks, and
its plans for a military response.
Third, while the common threat of international
terrorism has the power to bring countries together, there are
several other factors that can tear them apart. Russia is an
interesting case in point. It might be expected that the dramatic
attacks by Chechen terrorists in Moscow and other regions of the
country would lead to increased identification between Russia and
the United States. To some extent, this happened. Several analysts
have pointed out that for a brief period following 9/11 the problem
of terrorism bolstered Russian-American relations.
8 President Vladimir Putin’s
initial reaction to 9/11 was, by all accounts, sympathetic, and his
solidarity with the U.S. was quite strong. Russia quickly became a
member of the international anti-terrorist coalition, several
measures were taken to allow U.S. troops in Central Asia, and
official relations between the U.S. and Russia were warmer than at
any time since WWII. However, there were many other factors that
countered this increasingly warm relationship. Actions such as the
expansion of U.S. influence within countries formerly controlled by
Moscow, the inclusion of Baltic countries in NATO, envy of U.S.
economic success, the Russian nationalists and communists’ dislike
of American society or capitalism, and the necessity of the Kremlin
to find a scapegoat for its failed economic reforms have all caused
conflict and controversy between Russia and the United States.
Conclusion
There can be few analytical tasks more complicated
than tracing the origin of one country’s attitudes toward another.
The task is especially difficult in the case of the U.S., a country
with high visibility in foreign affairs, no military or economic
equals in the world, and countless international contacts and
relations. In recent years, the attention given to America’s image
abroad has been devoted to investigating the causes of
"anti-Americanism." The literature on this subject encompasses a
polarized debate that focuses either on the shortcomings of U.S.
actions in the international arena, or on the political,
psychological and cultural circumstances in foreign countries. This
dyadic approach ignores the important role of "third parties" in the
development of international attitudes. In this article, an attempt
was made, drawing on balance theory and related concepts, to show
that in the case of 9/11, the more a country’s press identified with
America’s negative image of the enemy, the more it evaluated the
U.S. in favorable light. This finding stresses the importance of the
U.S. government’s portrayal of international threats. A failure to
convince other countries about the imminence of a global threat or
the credibility of the U.S. strategy to reduce it will ultimately
lead to a negative view of America abroad. However, the common enemy
paradigm, with its realist logic, must be counterbalanced by an
appreciation of other attitude determinants, such as moral impulses,
culture, and human emotion. Any analysis of attitudes or behavior
serves itself best by scuttling the old debate between realism and
idealism, and searching for predictors among both cognitive
interests and personal affect.
Table 1: Factor Analysis
1a) Correlation Matrix
|
|
Negative description of 9/11 |
Laden named as perpetrator |
Support for military response |
Favorable description of US |
Favorable coder assessment |
|
Correlation |
Negative description of 9/11 |
1.000 |
.757 |
.697 |
.254 |
.172 |
|
Laden named as perpetrator |
.757 |
1.000 |
.837 |
.413 |
.455 |
|
Support for military response |
.697 |
.837 |
1.000 |
.421 |
.348 |
|
Favorable description of US |
.254 |
.413 |
.421 |
1.000 |
.713 |
|
Favorable coder assessment |
.172 |
.455 |
.348 |
.713 |
1.000 |
|
Sig. (1-tailed) |
Negative description of 9/11 |
|
.006 |
.013 |
.239 |
.317 |
|
Laden named as perpetrator |
.006 |
|
.001 |
.118 |
.093 |
|
Support for military response |
.013 |
.001 |
|
.113 |
.162 |
|
Favorable description of US |
.239 |
.118 |
.113 |
|
.010 |
|
Favorable coder assessment |
.317 |
.093 |
.162 |
.010 |
|
1b) Total Variance Explained
|
Factor |
Initial Eigenvalues |
Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
|
Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings(a)
|
|
Total |
% of Variance |
Cumulative % |
Total |
% of Variance |
Cumulative % |
Total |
|
1 |
3.067 |
61.343 |
61.343 |
1.877 |
37.542 |
37.542 |
1.990 |
|
2 |
1.215 |
24.301 |
85.644 |
2.009 |
40.185 |
77.727 |
2.574 |
|
3 |
.318 |
6.361 |
92.005 |
|
|
|
|
|
4 |
.279 |
5.584 |
97.588 |
|
|
|
|
|
5 |
.121 |
2.412 |
100.000 |
|
|
|
|
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.
1c) Pattern Matrix
|
|
Factors |
|
"Condemns 9/11 terrorism" |
"Favorable toward U.S." |
|
Negative description of 9/11 |
.861 |
-.118 |
|
Laden named as perpetrator |
.884 |
.158 |
|
Support for military response |
.850 |
.062 |
|
Favorable description of US |
.096 |
.682 |
|
Favorable coder assessment |
-.075 |
1.027 |
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood. Rotation
Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.
Table 2: Foreign Attitudes toward 9/11, the United
States, and the War on Terrorism
(% of units)
|
|
China |
Belarus |
Hong Kong & Internet |
Lithuania |
Germany |
Moldova |
India |
Colombia |
Russ ia |
Egypt |
|
1) Negative description of 9/11
|
99 |
97 |
83 |
86 |
73 |
86 |
67 |
76 |
78 |
54 |
|
2) Laden named as perpetrator |
93 |
92 |
87 |
80 |
84 |
63 |
79 |
66 |
60 |
11 |
|
3) Support for military response
|
35 |
28 |
28 |
25 |
30 |
12 |
15 |
3 |
11 |
0 |
|
4) Favorable description of the U.S.
|
52 |
36 |
35 |
78 |
78 |
55 |
37 |
53 |
20 |
25 |
|
5) Favorable coder assessment |
27 |
51 |
25 |
59 |
77 |
41 |
40 |
44 |
41 |
16 |
Table 3: Standardized Average Scores by Country on
the Two Latent Variables
|
Project Countries |
"Favorable toward U.S." |
"Condemns 9/11 terrorism" |
|
Germany |
1.77 |
0.30 |
|
Lithuania |
1.26 |
0.44 |
|
Colombia |
0.20 |
-0.60 |
|
Moldova |
0.17 |
-0.15 |
|
Belarus |
-0.01 |
0.96 |
|
China |
-0.30 |
1.21 |
|
India |
-0.31 |
-0.32 |
|
Russia |
-0.71 |
-0.42 |
|
Hong Kong & Internet |
-0.78 |
0.55 |
|
Egypt |
-1.28 |
-1.98 |

Figure
1: Scatter Plot of Countries on the Two Latent Variables: "Condemns
9/11 Terrorism" and "Favorable toward the U.S."
Country Key
1. Germany 8. Russia
2. Lithuania 9. Hong Kong & Internet
3. Colombia 10. Egypt
4. Moldova
5. Belarus
6. China
7. India
Notes
1. Russia, India and China are three
of the largest foreign countries that possess nuclear weapons, and
have strong geopolitical influences. Germany and Lithuania represent
Western and Eastern European culture and politics, respectively.
Moldova and Belarus, though regionally similar to Lithuania, were
selected as nations where vestiges of the communist past remain.
Columbia was selected as the representative from Latin America, and
Egypt represents the Muslim world.
2. Due to the nature of content analysis
research, rigorous probability samples
are rarely drawn. Nearly 80 percent of the articles published in
Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly from 1971 to 1995
used non-probability samples (Riffe & Freitag, 1996, cited in Riffe
et al., 1998). In some ways, our study avoided this problem by
drawing a near census of the materials published during the
project’s targeted time frame.
3. The Audit Bureau of Circulations
(January-June 2001,
www.auditbureau.org ), the International Year Book: The
Encyclopedia of the Newspaper Industry – 2001, and the
Chinese Journalism Yearbook – 1999.
4. For examples of how the Chinese
Internet has been used by public opinion researchers – and even by
the Chinese government – to gauge public opinion in the country, see
Xinhua News Agency 2002; Liu et al., 2001.
For more about what "types of opinion" can be found on the Chinese
Internet and how the Internet is monitored and restricted by the
government, see Zhao and Schiller 2001; Link et al., 2002; Zhao
1998.
5. The president’s determination to
punish those involved in the
attacks on 9/11 was almost unanimously backed by the people; 62
percent and 31 percent of Americans advocated the start of a
"long-term war" or the "punishment of specific terrorists,"
respectively. Only 5 percent said that America "should not take
military actions" (Gallup Organization, 2001). Eighty-nine percent
of the Americans were either "very confident" (50 percent) or
"somewhat confident" (39 percent) in President Bush’s ability to
handle the events that resulted from 9/11 (Gallup Organization,
2002).
6. The speeches were published on the
White House website September 11-25, and October 7-21, 2001 (see
www.whitehouse.gov ).
7. The scree test is based on the idea
that if a factor (or latent variable) is important, it will have a
large variance (or
eigenvalue). In other words, when the eigenvalues are plotted on a
graph, the slope of the line should be particularly steep at the
substantive factors, and relatively flat along the less important
factors. As shown in Table 1b, the difference between factors 4 and
5 is greater than the difference between factors 3 and 4, which
means that factor 3 is in the scree, and it is appropriate to keep
only the first two factors.
8. See, for instance, an interview with
Nikolai Zlobin (2003), Director of Russian
and Asian Programs at the Center for Defense Information in the
United States, in the Russian newspaper Izvestia.
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About the Author
Joshua Woods is a doctoral student in sociology at
Michigan State University and the co-director of the World Attitudes
Project, a study of international press coverage of the United
States. His latest book is "America: Sovereign Defender or Cowboy
Nation?" (co-editor, Ashgate, 2005).
|