Article No. 13
Women, Political Discourse, and Mass Media in the Republic of
Belarus
We should have no less than 30 to 40% women
in parliament.
--Belarusian
President Aleksandr Lukashenko
They are
dreaming men’s dreams.
--Simone
de Beauvoir
Abstract
This paper examines roles that patriarchal
ideologies and the mass media are playing in incorporating more
women in state decision-making processes in the Republic of
Belarus. While the patriarchal beliefs about femininity that
pervade Belarus’ dominant culture normally could be expected to
obstruct women’s access to national elected positions,
Belarusian President Lukashenko, invoking patriarchal notions
that women are naturally kind, weak, and in need of protection,
in 2004 deployed the media and other state resources to increase
women’s presence in parliament. This paper is part of a larger
project on the same topic.1
Introduction
Prior to the
2004 parliamentary election only 10% of the Belarusian
Parliament’s representatives were women. Just before candidates
launched their 2004 campaigns President Aleksandr Lukashenko
announced, while addressing parliament and the people of
Belarus:
2
We
should have no less than 30 to 40% women in parliament.
Therefore I will use all means to support greater
representation of the female portion of society in
parliament. . . . Male candidates who will compete against
women . . . [should] give up [their intention to run for
office] and let women work. Women should be widely
represented in parliament. Then the parliament will be
stable and calm. Women are always an emanation of kindness.
Then the male Members of Parliament will work properly.
The president’s proposal to support women
candidates for parliament grew out of his assumption that women
are “weak” and must be protected. But Lukashenko wished to
protect potential female candidates not because it is his
responsibility to act as the guarantor of the Belarusian
Constitution, which includes language ensuring equal
opportunities for all citizens regardless of gender, but because
it was politically expedient. He expected, as his remarks above
reveal, that a higher percentage of women in parliament would
stabilize and pacify the assembly, which, since the 2002
election, was supposed to have been Lukashenko’s “pocket”
parliament but had demonstrated unexpected independence. Having
more women in parliament would, Lukashenko says, catalyze male
Members of Parliament (MPs) to work “properly,” by which the
president meant that women would be more likely than men to
carry out his agenda. Lukashenko’s strategy thus reveals the
close connection between the social and legal conditions that
characterize Belarus’ public sphere and the patriarchal
definition of femininity as “weakness,” “dependence on men,” and
an “inability to act on one’s own” in Belarus’ dominant
culture.
Such patriarchalism directly influences the
majority of Belarusians’ ideas about women’s ability to serve as
political leaders. For instance, a national survey conducted by
the “Women’s Leadership Project” of the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) in Belarus shows that 61.1% of the
country’s men believe that “there are enough” women in
parliament while 4.7% thought that there are “more than enough.”
Simultaneously 32% of all men surveyed explained their attitudes
by saying that “women have a different predestination [than
men].” The UNDP report (2005) concludes:
Thus saying that
men have more rights and opportunities in the sphere of public
politics, the majority of this social group considers the
situation normal and do not consider it necessary to expand
female representation in the higher representative body of the
country.
As a result, the numbers of women in national
elected positions declined dramatically after the Republic of
Belarus was established in 1991 as a result of the collapse of
the Soviet Union, which had used quotas to ensure representation
of women and ethnic minorities at all levels of government.
Belarus is not the only country in the former Soviet sphere
where the number of women in national representative
institutions has declined with the abolition of quotas.
Nevertheless, Belarus is a special case because its so-called
transition to democracy and capitalism has been unique in
Eastern Europe.
Presidential Populism
Lukashenko, then a political novice whose
populist anti-corruption crusades earned voters’ favor, was
first elected president in 1994. According to the Belarusian
Constitution, the next presidential election should have been in
1999. However, in 1996 Lukashenko disbanded parliament, which
had been seeking to impeach him, and held a referendum that
extended his presidency to 2001, at which time he successfully
ran for a second term in office. This term should have ended in
2006 but in 2004 Lukashenko used a referendum to lift a
constitutional ban on his third presidential term. Lukashenko
won the last presidential election on March 19, 2006 and,
according to the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), claimed
to have garnered 82.6% of the vote (with turnout at
92.6%). Unlike other countries in Eastern
Europe, Belarus, under
Lukashenko, a former collective and state farm
manager, has eschewed capitalism in favor of market socialism. Lukashenko’s
version of market socialism entails central economic planning,
limited privatization and liberalization, and
considerable
state regulation
of prices, currency exchange rates, and private
enterprise.
Although international entities as ideologically
diverse as the International Federation of Journalists, Amnesty
International, the United Nations (UN), the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the United States
government have criticized Lukashenko’s policies harshly, the
majority of Belarusians approve of them, especially his program
of market socialism. Indeed, populism—giving voters what they
want—is one of Lukashenko’s ruling hallmarks and is largely
responsible for his long hold on the presidency.
Hence, Lukashenko’s support for women candidates
for parliament is surprising because it is a rare instance in
which the president has taken a position that runs counter to
majority opinion: on its face Lukashenko’s promise to
encourage women’s leadership is inconsistent with prevailing
sentiments that women’s natural weakness renders them unfit to
hold high level elective office. Nevertheless, Lukashenko made
good on his pre-election promise and the number of female MPs
elected to parliament tripled in 2004.
The Why and How of Sexual Politics in Belarus
Two
questions emerge out of this situation: 1) Why did the
president decide to increase the number of women in parliament?
and 2) How did Lukashenko succeed in achieving this goal?
The answer to the first question is connected to
problems that Lukashenko was facing prior to the 2004
parliamentary elections. The sitting parliament was not loyal
and predicable enough; it did not “rubber stamp” Lukashenko’s
agenda. Some of its male MPs openly disagreed with the official
point of view—Lukashenko’s—and proposed alternatives to
Lukashenko’s policies. A few even went on hunger strikes.
During this period one of a small number of female MPs broke
with her male colleagues and declared her loyalty to the
president in the independent Belorusskaya Gazeta (2004):
We feel the
energy and power of Lukashenko even while watching him
delivering his speeches on TV. And when he is coming to
parliament personally it is as if everybody becomes smaller and
even his opponents are shaking. What is more, over the years
Lukashenko became more knowledgeable and is able to control what
he is talking about.
This is
probably one of the most supportive texts ever written about
Lukashenko. Significantly, the deference to Lukashenko and
admiration for his political virility that is displayed by this
female MP’s remarks is consistent with patriarchal stereotypes
of women as acquiescent, stereotypes that suggest women both
need and desire to led by strong, authoritarian men such as
Lukashenko. Moreover, the female MP’s obsequiousness contrasts
starkly with displays of independence among male MPs. If we
keep in mind that Lukashenko subscribes to patriarchal
constructions of femininity, as demonstrated by his suggestion
that women are essentially “kind,” it’s not unreasonable to
conclude that stacking parliament with “compliant” women was
appealing because he assumed they would obey him. Of course,
increasing the number of pliable MPs would eliminate “problems”
posed by independents.
In addition to praising Lukashenko in
Belorusskaya Gazeta the female MP quoted above went on, in the
same article, to offer another explanation why the president
wanted to increase the number of women deputies. She said, “If
we are able to reach the percentage of female representation set
by the country’s president we will be able to increase the human
development index immediately.” What she means is that with
more women in parliament Belarus will fare better in numerous
international reports on human development in post-Soviet
territories. The advantages of Belarus garnering higher human
development rankings would be twofold. First, better rankings
would prove indisputably that Lukashenko’s market socialism was
better for the country than liberal capitalism, which in Russia
and other parts of post-Soviet Eastern Europe had led to
declines in the numbers of women in legislative assemblies.
Second, higher human development scores could be used as a
counter-argument to Western opponents who consider the
Belarusian regime undemocratic.
[3]
Thus the conditions and reasons for demanding women’s
greater participation in national elective politics are fairly
obvious. Lukashenko’s international currency would increase if more
women were elected to parliament. Apart from this, the system of
controlled elections that Lukashenko proposed—prohibiting male
candidates from running against women, for instance—would cultivate
victors’ loyalty to him. The winning women personally would feel
grateful if not indebted to the man whose help was indispensable to
their move up the socio-political ladder. Indeed, patriarchal
social attitudes, especially the belief that women should be
dependent on men, and the absence of other legal mechanisms
facilitating women’s upward mobility would highlight female MPs’
perception that their success was due solely to Lukashenko’s
support. This in turn would ensure their allegiance to Lukashenko
and his policies.
The answer to the second question, namely, which mechanisms
increased female representation in politics, is not obvious and
requires additional research. In this paper I can only gesture
toward some of the contributing factors, which are that most
Belarusians unequivocally trust the state and its information
outlets and that the regime provided extraordinary material and
ideological resources to female candidates who campaigned as
Lukashenko loyalists.
As one of the
female, government-supported candidates who won a seat in parliament
explained the reasons for her success: “I was competing with two
men. But they were not working at all. They were not meeting their
voters. And I had a car that would transport me from one meeting to
the other where the people were waiting for me.” The complete import
of this explanation becomes clear only when it is compared to the
testimony of an independent female candidate who lost: “I was
shocked how scared the people in the countryside are. People are not
coming to my meetings and [they are saying the reason is] that the
brigidir [the local authority] was going around and
promising, ‘Don’t even think of going [to the candidate’s meeting].
You will not get a horse and will not be able to plant potatoes.’”[4]
Clearly, the government manipulated the election by providing
approved candidates tremendous material support while using state
employees/representatives to intimidate potential supporters of
independent candidates.
Another explanation for the tripling of women MPs is that the state
media was one of the resources available to government-endorsed
candidates. The state media has extraordinary influence in Belarus
because of the material and ideological conditions of its production
and availability/delivery. The Belarusian state media reaches larger
audiences and is more accessible than the non-state media, whose
operations are severely curtailed by the government. For instance,
the state “mouthpiece,” Sovietskaya Belorussiya (some refer
to it as “Lukashenko’s newspaper”), whose founders include members
of the presidential administration, has the highest circulation in
the country because the government forces organizations and
businesses to subscribe to it. In addition to being more available,
state newspapers are also cheaper. They are delivered to the
country’ most remote villages regularly and are displayed in
advantageous spots in shops and newspaper stands. Moreover,
international radio and television stations, such as Russia’s HTB
(NTV) and the U.S.-financed Radio Liberty, have limited delivery
capabilities in Belarus while Western, non-Russian print media
generally are not available except to diplomats.
Nevertheless,
the most important ideological factor in the production and
dissemination of state media is the general trust that Belarusians
express toward everything produced by the state. This phenomenon is
partially rooted in the country’s Soviet past. However, from my
point of view such confidence in the state is forcefully, albeit not
always skillfully, promoted by the current regime. Regardless the
reason, the public’s faith in the state extends to the state media,
which has the legitimacy of an official document. Indeed,
Lukashenko actively promotes a symbiotic relationship between the
state and its media outlets. For instance, when the president met
with the staff of one state media company he made it clear that
their role is to promote government perspectives and policies: “Any
group has a director. Your director is the state and you express the
point of view of the state. You should not conceal this.”[5]
Aside from this
deliberate imbrication of state and media, the media’s greatest
power derives from its role in producing social reality. Social
“reality” is not given; it is constructed. Mass media are one of
the mechanisms that provide material for the social construction of
reality. Hence, our perception of the world is to a great extent
mediated by the topics, heroes, genres and “facts” supplied us by
the mass media. As the media deliver (in print and broadcast) this
content they simultaneously occupy the position of a social (versus
an individual) speaking subject. This allows the media to label—to
interpret—events that they cover and, in so doing, shape the
audience’s perception of “facts.[6]
Consequently, the mass media construct rather than merely
report/reflect reality. The media produce a story of reality by
narrating it.
Conclusion
The power and influence of the state media in Belarus stem from
material support provided by the government, the symbiosis of state
and media that facilitates transference of the audience’s trust in
the state to the media, and the mass media’s ability to construct
social reality. These factors increase the credibility of the state
media among the general public to the degree that when the media act
to fulfill Lukashenko’s wishes the media have so much influence that
the audience’s deeply ingrained patriarchal convictions can be
overridden. This occurred in the 2004 parliamentary elections when
Lukashenko, inspired by his own patriarchal beliefs, successfully
deployed government resources, particularly the media, to increase
by threefold the percentage of women in national leadership
positions. Paradoxically, then, Lukashenko invoked patriarchalism
to obtain a result—increased representation of women in national
government—that on its face appears to enhance women’s status but
actually exploits women to shore up his position as Belarus’
“daddy,” as the president known among both supporters and the
opposition.
Keywords:
Republic of Belarus, women and leadership, mass
media, parliamentary elections
References:
Belorusskaya Gazeta
26 June 26 2004.
Наумова С.
А. Политика и общественная деятельность.
www.gender.by
Sovietskaya Belorussiya
Newspaper 17July 2004.
About the Author
Natalia Koulinka is a graduate
student at
Belarusian State University in Minsk, Belarus.
1
I would like to acknowledge the kind help of Olga
Zubkovskaya in reviewing and commenting this text.
2
The official name of the Belarusian
Parliament is “National Assembly.” It has two chambers, the
Chamber of Representatives and the Soviet of the Republic.
The Chamber of Representatives (lower) is elected, while the
president appoints the members of the Soviet of the
Republic. In this text I refer only to the lower chamber.
[3]
It might be reasonable to note here that the
percentage of female representation in government bodies
serves as one of the coefficients in calculating an index of
democratic development.
[4]
This is a potent threat because huge numbers
of Belarusians, especially those who live on agricultural
collectives, depend on subsistence farming for survival.
[5]
I will not discuss here how as a result of
this situation the mass media became an instrument of the
state.
[6]
I am not commenting upon the role of language
in the construction of social reality. See, for example,
Блакар Р. М. Язык как инструмент социальной власти (теоретико-эмпирические
исследования языка и его использование в социальном
контексте) // Язык и моделирование социального
взаимодействия: Сб. ст. / Общ. Ред. Петрова В. В. – М.:
Прогресс, 1987. – С. 88-121, and Лакофф Дж., Джонсон М.
Метафоры, которыми мы живем // Язык и моделирование
социального взаимодействия: Сб. ст. / Общ. Ред. Петрова В.
В. – М.: Прогресс, 1987. – С. 1126 – 170.
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