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Article
No. 5
Is
There a Global Public Sphere?
Media Framing of the Russia-Georgia Conflict
of 2008
Olga Baysha
University of Colorado,
Boulder USA
Key Words: Media, framing,
globalization, deliberation, public sphere
Abstract
It
has been argued that transnational communication technologies lead to the
formation of a global public sphere (Volkmer, 2003). Using a framing
analysis, this article examines whether signs of global public deliberation
are present in U.S. and Ukrainian media coverage of the Russia-Georgia
military conflict of 2008. Several popular national dailies and weeklies
are analyzed, as well as niche periodicals of diverse political
orientations. The study shows that U.S. media predominantly blame Russia;
Ukrainian periodicals distribute responsibility among Russia, Georgia, and
the United States. Pro-Russian views, popular in
Ukraine, are ignored by U.S. news outlets. The exclusion of pro-Russian
views from U.S. public discourse leads not to mutual understanding, but to
animosity on the part of pro-Russian Ukrainian media toward the United
States.
Introduction
The
idea of a of a Global Public Sphere
One
of the most controversial paradigms of international communication studies
is the idea of the “global public sphere.” Scholars who favor this outlook
argue that new transnational media technologies, which create opportunities
for global multicultural dialogue, lead to the formation of a global public
sphere (e.g. Volkmer, 2003). This belief, popular
among communication scholars, is in conflict, however, with the perspective
of political theorists who claim that the public sphere is not about
intensified communication per se; it is a “fundamental concept of a
theory of democracy whose attempt is normative” (Habermas, 1992, p. 446). According to the classical definition by Habermas
(1964/1974) -- one of the most prominent theorists of deliberative
democracy -- the public sphere is a realm of social life where the
energy of public opinion is generated to be consequently transformed into
an effective political force able to keep state bureaucracies accountable
to their citizens. To reach its full potential, the public sphere has to possess
two basic characteristics: the discussion of public matters should be
rational, and all citizens should have free access to it. Mass media should
be accessible to the general public and contain rational discussions of
legitimate public concerns (Habermas, 1962/1989).
Among
political theorists of democracy, the idea of the global media environment
as a public sphere has evoked plenty of skepticism. The following critical
questions have been put forward: how can the controversies within
transnational discursive areas be translated into a political action, if
they are not legitimately related to any sovereign state? If those who
participate in public discussions are not fellow citizens holding equal
social status, how can their opinions be legitimately transformed into an
effective political force? Is it possible to come to any kind of agreement
if those who seek it don’t share any common political culture? (Beck, 2003;
Fraser, 2007; Habermas, 2001).
Contemplating
the conditions for the emergence of the global public sphere, theorists of
democracy stress the importance of common political culture as its
indispensable prerequisite. According to Garnham (1992), for example, a
global public sphere should be characterized by the “duty to listen to the
views of others and to alternative versions of events” (p. 368). Bohman
(1997) claims that international peace can be achieved only by means of
such a cosmopolitan public sphere, in which opinions are
“multi-dimensional” and “many-sided” (p. 185). Beck (2003) argues that the
whole meaning of learning in the globalization age should be reoriented
toward “understanding of other cultures,” “dialogical attentiveness,” and
“integrative thinking” (p. 138). Such attention to other peoples’ opinions,
according to these and numerous other thinkers, would pave the way to
formation of a global political culture and, based on it, new cosmopolitan
publics or even citizens of a world state.
While
debating “how responsible globalization can be politically molded and
achieved” (Beck, 2003, p. 129), the theorists cited above all contemplate
future democratic transformations of global scale. Other scholars, on the
contrary, argue that these positive changes have already come into play.
Volkmer (2003), for example, claims that “in western, democratic societies,
whose political systems believe in ‘freedom of expression,’ the global
content discourse provides an additional information source… and refines
political reasoning ‘rationality’ within the national public sphere” (p.
15). According to this model, transnational political reasoning can be
achieved through national media networks incorporated into a global
communication system. The model implies that, unlike ordinary citizens,
journalists and editors have more resources to get access to diverse
multicultural information provided by globally interconnected information
networks. Ideally, media writers would incorporate these multifarious
perspectives into their materials. In such a way, a mediated exchange of
arguments and a global rational discourse would be established.
Suggesting
that global deliberation can be achieved through interconnected global
networks, Volkmer (2003), however, provides
little empirical evidence to ground her propositions. This study has been
designed to empirically test her mediated model of the global public sphere
by examining whether signs of global public deliberation are present
in U.S. and Ukrainian media coverage of the Russia-Georgia military
conflict of 2008.
The Context
The
military conflict between Russia and Georgia broke out on August 8th,
2008, after Georgia launched an aerial bombardment and ground attack on
South Ossetia, a self-proclaimed republic striving for independence. The
same day, Russian troops were deployed first in South Ossetia, and then in
undisputed territories of the Georgian state. On August 13th,
Russia and Georgia agreed on a cease-fire, according to which their
militaries were to pull back to the positions they occupied before the
violence erupted.
Georgia
and South Ossetia have a long history of struggle. In the aftermath of the
Russian Revolution of 1917, South Ossetians incited a series of rebellions
against Georgia, “resulting in 5,000 Ossetians dead in fighting and
reprisals and another 20,000 taking refuge” (Kaufman, 2001, p. 88). In the late 1980s, another conflict resulted
in civil war, in which about 60,000 Ossetians took refuge in Russia
(Nygren, 2008). In two referendums, in
1992 and 2006, the population of South Ossetia voted in favor of joining
Russia. Neither of the plebiscites was recognized internationally. However,
by the beginning of the Russia-Georgia military conflict, more than fifty
percent of the South Ossetians already had Russian passports (Nygren,
2008).
From
the beginning of the conflict, the Western media involved Ukraine into the
conflict. Many of their authors claimed that Ukraine would be Russia’s next
target “because “Russians tend to believe that country is their ancient
patrimony” (Pryce-Jones, 2008): “The political
shock waves from Moscow's invasion of Georgia are ripping through nearby
Ukraine, rattling nerves that the next regional flash point may be its
Crimean peninsula” (Alastair, 2008, p. 32); “Russia's aggression toward
Georgia should not be viewed as an isolated incident… It is only a question
of time before Moscow turns up the heat on Ukraine” (Brzezinski, 2008, p.
6); “Russia has scared its neighboring states…Now the Kiev
government has unhesitatingly asked for a path to NATO membership”
(Zakaria, 2008, p. 63), and so forth.
The
popularity of the belief that Russia is ready to conquer Ukraine because
Moscow considers Ukraine its “ancient patrimony” requires
historical explanation. Ethnically, Russians and Ukrainians are very
close: originally, both nations belong to Eastern Slavs; Kievan Rus, an
ancient Eurasian state, was a forebear for both nations. It was the
Mongolian invasion in the 13th century that separated the
Russian and Ukrainian histories: “Russia remained under Mongol rule for
another 150 years, whereas Ukraine gradually became part of the
Polish-Lithuania medieval state” (Bukkvoll, 1997, p. 61). In the 17th
century, the historical paths of Ukrainians and Russians converged again.
From 1654 until the end of the 20th century, the major parts of
southeastern Ukrainian territories were under Moscow’s jurisdiction;
western Ukraine was predominantly under Polish rule. Total reunification of
Ukraine was accomplished in 1939-1940. Centuries of living under different
civilizations had left the mark, however: mainly, western Ukrainians speak
Ukrainian and attend the Catholic or Uniate Church, whereas southeastern
Ukrainians speak Russian and attend the Russian Orthodox Church (Kovalova,
2007).
Given
the intricate nature of the international relations within the territory of
the former USSR, two broad questions arise: Was there any reason for U.S.
writers to call for Ukraine’s defense from Russia by means of NATO
membership (e.g., Pryce-Jones, 2008)? To what extent does the U.S. image of
Ukraine in relation to Russia in general and the Russia-Georgia conflict in
particular correlate to Ukraine’s image of itself? To answer these
questions, the study has employed framing analysis.
Theory of Framing
With
little personal experience in politics, people depend on news media to
understand the political world. This provides media with the power to frame
reality for the public. Researchers argue that “how people think about an
issue, especially a political issue that is inherently ambiguous, is
dependent on how the issue is framed by the media” (Semetko &
Valkenburg, 2000, p. 94). Gamson and Modigliani (1987) defined a media
frame as “a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to
an upholding strip of events…. The frame suggests what the controversy is
about, the essence of the issue” (p. 143). According to Entman (1993), to
frame means “to select some aspects of a perceived reality to make them
more salient, thus promoting a particular problem definition, causal interpretation,
moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (p. 52). In
communication flows, frames manifest themselves by means of framing and
reasoning devices. Framing devices (metaphors, catchphrases, exemplars,
depictions, and visual images) suggest a framework within which to view the
issue, while reasoning devices (roots, consequences, and appeal to
principle) provide justification or reasons for general positions (Gamson
& Lasch, 1983, p. 399).
Researchers argue that frames can
be located in several points of the communication process: in the minds of
media makers and the audience, in media content, and in culture (Entman,
1993; Scheufele, 1999). Because frames are related to culture, their use
looks so natural that the process of social construction remains invisible
and can be regarded as a mechanism of reproducing political status quo
(Lewis, 1999). As Gorp (2007) argues, “the notion of a cultural stock of
frames more easily leads to the idea that there are more frames than those
that are currently applied” (p. 63). Alternatives to the existing frames
can lead to different problem definitions, causal interpretations, moral
evaluations, and treatment recommendations. It follows that critical media
analysis needs to distinguish the currently applied frames from their
alternatives in order to be able to explain their persistence.
The framing theory, which was
originally elaborated in the field of cognitive psychology, has been widely
adopted in recent years not only in communication studies but also in other
disciplines: sociology, economics, linguistics, public-relation, and so
forth. It is this diversity of approaches to framing research and different
meanings of the word ‘‘frame’’ adopted within these approaches, that
ultimately brought to theoretical vagueness and “the absence of an
unequivocal conceptualization” (Gorp. 2007, p. 60). To avoid
misunderstandings, this paper will stick to Gamson and Modigliani’s (1987)
conception of “frame” as “a central organizing idea or story line” (p. 143)
that provides meaning to phenomena or events. It will also follow Entman’s
elaboration (1993), according to which this “story line” should promote
particular problem definitions, causal interpretations, moral evaluations,
and treatment recommendations.
This
study focuses on three research questions in regard to the Russia-Georgia
crisis:
R1.
What are the most popular frames that different U.S. media employ in
covering the crisis?
R2:
What are the most popular frames that different Ukrainian media employ in
covering the crisis?
R3:
Are there any consistent differences in the use of media frames by U.S. and
Ukrainian media outlets?
If the
mediated global public sphere envisaged by Volkmer (2003) indeed exists, it
would mean that, as applied to the issue under our analysis, popular
arguments on the Russia-Georgia conflict presented in the Ukrainian public
sphere would be also contemplated in U.S. mediated discourse, because the
geopolitical interests of both countries are potentially affected by the
outcome of the crisis (Friedman, 2008).
To investigate the research
questions, the
author analyzed the content of Ukrainian and U.S. popular print media. To
embrace the range of ideas presented in the U.S. public sphere, the popular
national dailies The New York Times and The Washington
Post, as well as the traditional weeklies Time, U.S. News and
World Report and Newsweek, were selected for analysis. To check
for less mainstream views, the conservative National Review and the
leftist Nation were included in this analysis as well.
The Ukrainian public
sphere was represented by the traditional national dailies Segodnya,
Gazeta po-Kievski and Den, as well as by the popular weeklies
Mirror Weekly and 2000. To include views that are more
extreme, regional newspapers of diametrically opposed political
orientations were also analyzed: Crimska Pravda (Crimea, Southern
Ukraine; represents the views of pro-Russian publics) and Visokiy
Zamok (Galicia, Western Ukraine; represents the views of Ukrainian
nationalists).
None of the selected
news outlets – both U.S. and Ukrainian – was an official mouthpiece of
government politics (basic information of the media is presented in
Appendixes A and B). Only editorials and stories containing opinions and
commentaries were investigated. No hard or brief news items were included
because the particular importance of commentaries in the process of public
opinion formation (Habermas, 1964/1974, p. 53) and because editorials have
been shown to be generally representative of newspapers’ specific framing
of issues (Nacos, 1990).
The coverage
under analysis was limited to three months of the crisis aftermath, from
August 8, the day the crisis began, until November 4, the day of the U.S.
presidential elections – an event that marked the potential beginning of a
new stage of U.S.- Russian mediated dialogue. No sampling was involved. All
the articles related to the crisis within the abovementioned window of
coverage were analyzed qualitatively. Mechanical reckoning of the key words
was avoided in order not to lose sight of more subtle cultural nuances
regarding how the crisis was depicted and explained by different U.S. and
Ukrainian news outlets. Commentaries of U.S. media were taken from the Proquest
database. Articles from Ukrainian periodicals were picked up from their
Internet versions. The unit of framing analysis was the article. Each of
them was coded based on the country, media outlet, frame, and date. The
results were analyzed using cross-tabs calculations; the significance of
differences was established with the help of Chi-Square test.
All
the Ukrainian articles were published in either Ukrainian (Visokiy
Zamok, MirrorWeekly, and Den ) or Russian (2000,
Segodnya, and Crimska Pravda). The results reported here have
been translated into English accurately and precisely because the author is
a native Ukrainian-Russian speaker.
In
total, 303 commentary stories related to the Russia-Georgia military crisis
were analyzed. Tables 1 and 2 summarize the data.
Table 1. Number of
conflict-related articles in U.S. media
|
NR
|
USN
|
Time
|
Newsweek
|
Nation
|
WP
|
NYT
|
Total
|
|
3
|
4
|
6
|
6
|
6
|
71
|
49
|
145
|
Note. NR = National
Review; USN = U.S. News and World Report; WP = The Washington
Post; NYT = The New York Times.
Table 2. Number of
conflict-related articles in Ukrainian media
|
VZ
|
GPK
|
Den
|
CP
|
SGD
|
2000
|
MW
|
Total
|
|
26
|
19
|
24
|
16
|
37
|
20
|
16
|
158
|
Note. VZ = Visokiy
Zamok; GPK = Gazeta Po-Kievsky; SGD = Segodnya; CP = Crimska
Pravda; MW = The Mirror Weekly
Results
Research
Question 1 asks what are the most popular frames that U.S. media employed
in covering the crisis.
Analysis
of the articles published in U.S. news magazines reveals four main ideas or
“story lines,” in accordance with which the Russia-Georgia conflict is
reported and explained. For the convenience of further discussion, these
media frames have been conditionally assigned the following names: (1)
“Russia is an aggressive empire,” (2) “Russia is a difficult but valuable
partner,” (3) “Washington carries out fallacious foreign policy,” and (4)
“Georgia miscalculated Russia’s response.” The results are presented in
Table 3.
Table 3
Framing of the Russian-Georgian conflict
by U.S. media
|
Frames
|
NR
|
USN
|
Time
|
NW
|
Nation
|
WP
|
NYT
|
Total
|
|
Russia
is an aggressive empire
|
|
|
100.0%
|
66.7%
|
62.5%
|
30.8%
|
13.3%
|
60.3%
|
33.3%
|
47.1%
|
|
Russia
is a difficult but valuable partner
|
|
|
0.0%
|
33.3%
|
25.0%
|
46.2%
|
13.3%
|
19.0%
|
36.4%
|
25.7%
|
|
Washington
carries out fallacious foreign policy
|
|
|
0.0%
|
0.0%
|
12.5%
|
15.4%
|
46.7%
|
8.6%
|
21.2%
|
16.2%
|
|
Georgia
miscalculated Russia’s response
|
|
|
0.0%
|
0.0%
|
0.0%
|
7.7%
|
26.7%
|
12.1%
|
9.1%
|
11.0%
|
*p<0.05
Note. NR = National
Review; USN = U.S. News and World Report; NW = Newsweek;
WP = The Washington Post; NYT = The New York Times.
“Russia
is an aggressive empire.”
In brief, this media frame can be retold in the following way: After years
of economic decline following the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia is
restoring its might along with its traditional imperial aggressiveness
toward independent neighbors. Russia doesn’t tolerate democracy and freedom
on its borders; therefore, pro-Western Ukraine might easily become its next
target. To resist this totalitarian assault, the civilized world should
shun Russia and defend the fledgling democracies of Georgia and Ukraine by
accepting them into NATO. Here are some examples of the typical claims of
this story line: “Restoration of the old Russian
Empire, where surrounding countries are either vassals or clients (Walsh,
2008a, p. 16); “Moscow's ruthless attempt to suborn, subdue and subordinate
(Brzezinski, 2008, p. 26); or “The bear is back on the prowl (Walt, 2008,
p. 28). As Table 3 shows, among periodicals, conservative National
Review employs this media frame in the highest percentage of its
stories. Leftist The Nation uses it least often.
“Russia
is a difficult but valuable partner.” This media frame can be summed up as follows:
Although Russian actions against Georgia are unacceptable, cooperation with
strong, wealthy and increasingly influential Moscow is vitally important
for U.S. global interests. That is why Russia, instead of being excluded
from the global community of democratic countries, should be incorporated
into it even more. Here are some examples of the basic claims of this
version of the Russia-Georgia story: “To deal
effectively with challenges such as terrorism, proliferation, energy
security, and Iran and North Korea, Russia is part of that equation”
(Walsh, 2008b, p. 14); “What Richard Nixon
said 40 years ago about China – that ‘…we simply cannot afford to leave
China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its
fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbors’ – applies equally
now to Russia” (Haass, 2008, p. 9). As Table 3 shows, Newsweek is
most likely to exploit the idea of cooperation; National Review
totally ignores it.
“Washington
carries out fallacious foreign policy.” In this version of the story, the USA is assessed
partial responsibility for the Caucasian conflict from two different perspectives:
(1) The conflict probably would not have happened if the United States had
provided Georgia with more support, taking into account that Georgia is a
devoted U.S. partner; and (2) The tension between Russia and Georgia is a
logical outcome of provocative U.S. foreign policy in the former USSR
region. The different perspectives imply different solutions: either
supporting Georgia by means of NATO or revising foreign policy tactics.
Here are some examples of typical claims of this media frame: “2,000 Georgian soldiers made up the third biggest
coalition force in Iraq… The main airport road in Tbilisi is named George
W. Bush Street” (Walt, 2008, p. 28); or “The Bush administration
unnecessarily antagonized Russia by expanding NATO and withdrawing from the
anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty” (Cockburn, 2008, p. 11). As Table 3
demonstrates, for the most part, the theme of Washington’s responsibility
for the conflict is used by the New York Times. Conservative National
Review and conservative-leaning U.S. News and World Report do
not employ it in their stories.
“Georgia
has miscalculated Russia’s response.” This story pins sole responsibility for the conflict
on Georgia’s president, Mikhail Saakashvili. The main argument fits into
one sentence: he has dared to send troops into South Ossetia without
properly estimating U.S. support and Russian response. Here are some
examples of the typical claims made within this story line: “Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili's…
underestimated the Russian response, and he overestimated what the United
States and others would do on his behalf" (Haass, 2008, p. 9); or
"It was John McCain's pal Michael Saakashvili who set the ball
rolling…The Georgian President Michael Saakashvili sent forces into South
Ossetia in violation of an earlier agreement” (Cockburn, 2008, p. 6). This
view is employed most conspicuously by the leftist The Nation, while
National Review, Time, and U.S. News and World Report never
once incorporate it into their stories.
Research
Question 2 asks
what are the most popular frames that Ukrainian media employed in covering
the crisis.
Qualitative
analysis of media stories related to the Russia-Georgia military conflict
published by Ukrainian media reveals six main story lines according to
which the conflict is reported and explained: “Russia is an aggressive
empire,” “Washington seeks world dominance,” “Georgia commits genocide
against Ossetians,” “Russia is a difficult but valuable partner,” “Western
media wage information wars against Russia,” and “West exercises double
standards.” and Table 4 represents the findings.
“Russia
is an aggressive empire.” In many ways, this media frame resembles the
perspective of U.S. periodicals: Russia yearns to revive its super-imperial
might; it doesn't tolerate democracy and freedom; it understands only the
arguments of force. Here are some examples of typical claims of the
frame’s Ukrainian version: “Russian policy is the
policy of bayonet, multiplied by the ‘gas diplomacy’” (Rakhmanin, 2008a);
“Russia demonstrates a morbid desire to become a super-state” (Balyuk,
2008); or “The aim was not only to humiliate Georgia and its ‘impudent’
president, but also the whole West, and especially the USA” (Timots, 2008).
As Table 4 demonstrates, there is a distinct split of the Ukrainian
public sphere with reference to this frame: While western Visokiy Zamok
employs it in 61.8% of its articles, southern Crimska Pravda and
pro-Russian 2000 do not use it at all
“Washington
seeks world dominance.”
This media frame assesses U.S. responsibility for the Caucasian conflict,
much like the frame “Washington carries out fallacious foreign policy”
employed by U.S. periodicals. But, unlike U.S. media, Ukrainian outlets
focus not on tactical issues of U.S. foreign policy but on its strategic
line. Basically, they claim that by all possible means, the USA strives to
keep its global domination. Rising Russia interferes with these plans, so
it should be weakened by establishing and supporting puppet pro-U.S.
regimes on Russian borders. Here are some examples: “The military defeat of Georgia became a sonorous slap
in the U.S. face with its plans to surround Russia with a sanitary
Table 4.
Framing of the Russian-Georgian conflict
by Ukrainian media
|
Frames
|
VZ
|
GPK
|
Den
|
CP
|
SGD
|
2000
|
MW
|
Total
|
|
Russia
is an aggressive empire
|
|
|
61.8%
|
33.3%
|
30.8%
|
0.0%
|
2.9%
|
0.0%
|
29.4%
|
20.9%
|
|
Washington
seeks world dominance
|
|
|
2.9%
|
0.0%
|
3.9%
|
29.0%
|
5.9%
|
16.8%
|
0.0%
|
9.7%
|
|
Georgia
commits genocide against Ossetians
|
|
|
0.0%
|
11.1%
|
3.8%
|
32.3%
|
32.4%
|
33.3%
|
17.6%
|
19.9%
|
|
Russia
is a difficult but valuable partner
|
|
|
20.6%
|
50.0%
|
57.7%
|
6.5%
|
55.9%
|
22.2%
|
47.1%
|
34.7%
|
|
Western
media wage information wars against Russia
|
|
|
1.9%
|
0.0%
|
3.8%
|
16.1%
|
0.0%
|
8.3%
|
0.0%
|
5.6%
|
|
West
exercises double standards
|
|
|
12.8%
|
5.6%
|
0.0%
|
16.1%
|
2.9%
|
19.4%
|
5.9%
|
9.2%
|
*p<0.05
Note. VZ = Visokiy Zamok;
GPK = Gazeta Po-Kievsky; CP = Crimska Pravda; SGD =
Segodnya; MW = The Mirror Weekly;
cordon” (Buryak, 2008); “Yushenko’s and Saakashvili’s
regimes have the same puppeteer” (Verbitskaya, 2008); or “The long ears of
the American donkey stick out of all the anti-Russian Georgian tricks”
(Buryak, 2008). As
Table 4 shows, the distribution of this frame in Ukrainian media shows that
territorial (cultural) and ideological factors play a decisive role again:
Most actively, the theme of U.S. responsibility for the conflict is
exploited by the southern Crimska Pravda.
“Georgia
commits genocide against Ossetians.” Like the theme “Georgia miscalculated Russia’s
response” employed by U.S. periodicals, this media frame places guilt
squarely upon the shoulders of Georgian president Michael Saakashvili.
However, the difference in perspectives is radical. While the U.S.
“Georgian Imprudence” story is basically about Saakashvili’s rashness, its
Ukrainian analogue overtly accuses him of a politics of genocide towards
the Ossetian people. Here are examples of some typical claims: “Georgian missile volleys destroy everything and leave
no one alive in the target zone. Such a way to restore constitutional order
is unacceptable” (Silina, 2008); “The fascist actions of Saakashvili and
American hirelings are being taken against peaceful citizens” (Grach,
2008); or “Georgian Fuhrer Saakashvili is similar to Hitler, who also cried
out about his ‘striving for peace’ before waging war” (Lozunko, 2008). The
distribution of this frame in Ukrainian media differs from previous cases:
the claim of Georgian guilt is supported not only by the pro-Russian Crimska
Pravda, 2000, and Segodya but also by the pro-Western Mirror
Weekly and Gazeta Po-Kievski.
“Russia
is a difficult but valuable partner.” Like its U.S. analogue, the Ukrainian frame also
stresses the idea of partnership with Russia. However, there is a
noticeable difference in how it is constructed in U.S. and Ukrainian
versions. While U.S. media basically concentrate on Russia’s importance for
the United States’s geopolitics, Ukrainian periodicals tend to focus on
global security as a whole. They often tend not to take anybody’s side,
warning against dangerous political games and calling for unity and
cooperation in the face of real challenges: terrorism, poverty, illnesses,
and climate change. Here are some typical examples: “It’s important to refrain from black-and-white
judgments, because the situation is very complicated and the terms
‘aggressor’ and ‘victim of aggression’ don’t apply here (Silina, 2008); or
“There are other global processes in the world...
Let’s hope that when fighting against these threats, both Russia and
Georgia will be on one side” (Silina, 2008). As Table 4 shows, this perspective has become dominant in
Ukrainian coverage of Russia-Georgian conflict.
“Western
media wage information wars against Russia.” This is the first among two media
frames that appear to be endemic to the Ukrainian public sphere – they have
no analogue in U.S. media. The story conveyed in this frame is about a
supposed information war that Western media wage against Russia. Here are
some typical claims: “For almost the whole day
they [Western media] did not notice punitive action by Georgia against
South Ossetia but, as if under command from a control center, they got into
gear only after Russian columns moved to prevent genocide” (Lozunko,
2008); or “U.S. media bring back to life Russia’s image as an enemy, which
is important since the mythology of the ‘fight against global terrorism’
has exhausted itself” (Darenskiy, 2008). As Table 4 demonstrates, Crimska
Pravda is most likely to exploit this frame.
“West
exercises double standards.”
Similar to the previous one, this frame appears only in the Ukrainian
information space. It doesn’t accuse any one country in particular, but the
whole Western world. The name assigned to the frame illustrates its main
idea: Russia would not dare to behave so boldly but for the Western
duplicity in respect to issues such as energy policy, the Chechen war, and
Kosovo’s independence. Here are some typical examples of the frame’s
claims: “Wasn’t it known that the precedent of
Kosovo was directly projected on the South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and more than
150 other frozen conflicts?” (Silina, 2008); or “The decision to recognize
the Albanian drug dealers’ den [Kosovo] as an independent state was a total
idiotism. However, the West did it, unchaining the Russian bear [as
revenge]” (Yeryomin, 2008). As Table 4 shows, the division of the
Ukrainian public sphere into two distinct parts on the basis of cultural
and ideological differences is not so radical in this case: both southern Crimska
Pravda and western Visokiy Zamok equally support the claim.
Research
Question 3 asks
whether there are any differences in media-frame employment between U.S.
and Ukrainian weekly news outlets.
As
Table 4 shows, contrary to the conception (popular in the USA) of a united,
democratic, pro-Western Ukraine scared of aggressive Russia, the Ukrainian
public sphere is culturally and ideologically split into two distinct
parts: “pro-Western” and “pro-Eastern.” This is reflected in how different
media frame the Russia-Georgian crisis: pro-Western public opinion,
expressed by the Visokiy Zamok, Gazeta Po-Kievsky, and Den,
tends to lay responsibility on Russian imperial ambitions; the pro-Eastern
view, represented by the Crimska Pravda, 2000 and Segodnya,
confidently places the blame on Georgian nationalism supported by the
United States’ hegemonic ambitions. The U.S. public sphere is not so deeply
divided on the issue. The confidence in Russian guilt expressed by
conservative National Review is shared, to varying degrees, by the
popular media (U.S. News and World Report, Time, Newsweek)
as well as by leftist The Nation.
There
is also a difference in how U.S. and pro-Western Ukrainian media
construct the frame “Russia is an aggressive empire”: in its U.S. version,
the theme of “scared Ukraine” and the necessity of its defense by means of
NATO is a popular one (37 percent of the articles which employ the frame
“Russia is an aggressive empire” examine this idea); in its Ukrainian
analogue, only two percent of the whole number of articles appeal to NATO.
The reasons for such difference will be discussed below.
The
study has revealed an interesting difference in the way Ukrainian and U.S.
media contemplate the United States’ responsibility for the crisis: While
U.S. periodicals tend to stress tactical mistakes in U.S. foreign policy,
Ukrainian pro-Russian newspapers accuse the United States of working to
maintain global dominance and install puppet regimes on Russian borders.
This perspective is not present in U.S. media. Several commentaries touch
upon the “provocative” nature of U.S. policy towards Russia (expanding NATO and withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty). However, they do not explore the topic of “puppet” and
“marionette” regimes, which is popular in the pro-Russian segment of the
Ukrainian public discourse.
The
study has revealed the same difference in highlighting of key points within
the story of Georgian responsibility in its U.S. and Ukrainian versions.
While U.S. media tend to stress Saakashvili’s rashness and inability to
foresee the consequences of his actions, Ukrainian periodicals accentuate
the inhumanity of Georgia’s “politics of genocide” toward the Ossetian
people. Given the long history of Georgian-Ossetian tense relations, it is
a surprise to discover that U.S. media ignore the theme, while even
Ukrainian Mirror Weekly, which obviously does not share pro-Russian
views on the conflict, acknowledges that Georgian military methods of
“restoring constitutional order” are unacceptable. Taking this finding into
account, it is no wonder that the story about Western media that wage
information wars against Russia are popular among pro-Russian writers.
Taken
together, U.S. and Ukrainian media present quite different pictures of the
conflict. While U.S. periodicals predominantly depict Russia to be the only
villain, Ukrainian news outlets (depending on their cultural orientation)
distribute blame between Russia, Georgia, the United States, and the entire
Western world.
Discussion
and Conclusion
The
difference in Ukrainian and U.S. views on the Russia-Georgia conflict is
impressive with regard to the image of “pro-Western” Ukraine created by
U.S. media. As the results of the analysis demonstrate, Ukraine is sharply
divided on the issue. Such a gap in attitudes reflects the “divided
identity” (Kovalova, 2007) of the country, exposed by numerous
investigations. The most recent of them, conducted in the aftermath of the
Russia-Georgia crisis, confirms that this gap has not narrowed: Russia is
called an aggressor by 72.9 percent of respondents in the west of Ukraine,
while 73.2 percent of respondents in the Crimea call Russia’s military
actions in Georgia ‘a peacekeeping operation’ (Rakhmanin, 2008b).
Even
more striking against the background of a “pro-Western” image of Ukraine in
U.S. media are the poll figures reflecting the attitude of Ukrainians
toward NATO membership. Only 18.2 percent of respondents want Ukraine to
become a NATO ally, while 51.4 percent of them say they are ‘strongly
against’ NATO membership (Rakhmanin, 2008b).
Talking
about the “pro-Western” orientation of Ukraine as well as the necessity to
defend it by means of NATO, U.S. media not only ignore a significant part
of Ukrainian public opinion, but also misinform their own readers, creating
a picture that does not correspond to the real world. The formation of the
idea that “Western media wage information wars against Russia” in the
Ukrainian information space is a direct consequence of the exclusion of the
pro-Russian public opinion from U.S. media discourse. This miscommunication
testifies against the proposition of Volkmer (2003) that intensified global
information flows inevitably enrich the content of discourses in democratic
societies. The results of this study show that the Ukrainian media
discourse is more diversified in its ideas about the origins and reasons of
the Russia-Georgia crisis despite the fact that the USA’s rating on press
freedom is higher than that of Ukraine (Reporters Without Borders, 2008).
The diversity of ideas presented in the Ukrainian media space could be
better explained not in terms of democracy but from a cultural perspective:
instead of being nationally unified, Ukraine falls into two distinct parts,
pro-Eastern and pro-Western. Their explanations of the crisis are mutually
exclusive, and there are no signs of attempts to find a common language and
understand the opponents’ arguments by means of transcending initial
preferences. However, Ukrainian publics at least have access to information
about what their opponents think. We can hardly say the same about media
consumers in the United States. Contemplating the possibility of deterring
Russia by means of inclusion Ukraine into NATO, U.S. periodicals do not
provide any information about what Ukrainian people think of this, thus
disabling their readers from making rational judgments on the issue. On the
other hand, being excluded from the discourse, pro-Russian Ukrainian
publics are not able to participate in the discussion on this issue, which
is of vital importance to them. This finding definitely testifies against
the existence of the global public sphere. The more appropriate term would
be “global information battlefield,” where intensified communication flows
lead not to multicultural dialogue and mutual understanding but to even
greater animosity among alienated publics.
The
aim of this study is not to judge who is guiltier – Russia, Georgia, the
United States, or any other party – in creating or escalating the military
crisis of 2008. Neither does this study purport to identify whose version
of the events – U.S. (leftist or conservative) or Ukrainian (Eastern or
Western) – deserves more credence. Instead, the paper claims that
substantial parts of global discourse on the Russia-Georgia military crisis
are missing from the national public spheres under consideration, an
absence that cannot be interpreted as an attribute of a global public
discourse. Although this finding testifies against the existence of a
global public sphere, the research demonstrates, however, that national
media, operating in a highly interconnected contemporary world, can produce
effects of a global scale. In the case of international conflicts (like the
Russia-Georgia one) such an effect, as this study demonstrates, can be the
“spiral of ‘anti-other rhetoric” (Le, 2006, p. 162). It is possible that in
case of more peaceful issues of international co-existence the effect could
be quite different. Will it be the formation of a global deliberation? More
empirical research is needed to explore this question.
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APPENDIX A.
U.S. media
|
Medium
|
Circulation
|
Type of
Revenue
|
Additional
information
|
|
National
Review
|
Biweekly
155,000
|
Non-profit
/ Subscriptions and donations
|
Niche /
Conservatives www.nationalreview.com
|
|
U.S.
News & World Report
|
Biweekly
2,036,185
|
Subscriptions
and advertising
|
Mainstream
www.usnews.com/
|
|
Time
|
Weekly
3,360,135
|
Subscriptions
and advertising
|
Mainstream
www.time.com/time
|
|
The
Washington Post
|
Daily
673,180
|
Subscriptions
and advertising
|
Mainstream
www.washingtonpost.com/
|
|
The
New York Times
|
Daily
928,000
|
Subscriptions
and advertising
|
Mainstream
www.nytimes.com/
|
|
Newsweek
|
Weekly
2,720,034
|
Subscriptions
and advertising
|
Mainstream
www.newsweek.com/
|
|
The
Nation
|
Weekly
179, 160
|
Subscriptions
and donations
|
Niche /
Leftist
www.thenation.com
|
APPENDIX B.
Ukrainian media
|
Medium
|
Circulation
|
Type of
Revenue
|
Additional
information
|
|
Visokiy
Zamok
|
5 times
a week
113,000
|
Subscriptions
and Advertising
|
Regional
/ Nationalistic
www.wz.lviv.ua
|
|
Gazeta
Po-Kievski
|
5 times
a week 371,250
|
Subscriptions
and advertising
|
Mainstream
http://mycityua.com
|
|
Den
|
5 times
a week
62,500
|
Subscriptions
and advertising
|
Mainstream
www.day.kiev.ua
|
|
Mirror
Weekly
|
Weekly
57, 515
|
Subscriptions
and donations
|
Mainstream
www.zn.ua
|
|
Segodnya
|
Daily
180,000
|
Subscriptions
and advertising
|
Mainstream
www.segodnya.ua
|
|
2000
|
Weekly
332,000
|
Subscriptions
and advertising
|
Mainstream
www.2000.net.ua
|
|
Crimska
Pravda
|
5 times
a week
48,819
|
Subscriptions
and donations
|
Regional
/ pro-Russian
www.kp.crimea.ua
|
About the Author
Olga
Baysha is from Kiev, Ukraine. Her undergraduate degree is in Philology from
Kharkov State University in Ukraine and her master’s is in Technical
Communication from Colorado State University. Ms. Baysha has extensive
television reporting and editing experience. She can be reached at Olga.Baysha@Colorado.Edu
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