Global Media Journal

By looking at Radio Television Malaysia’s (RTM) commissioning process, this study analyzes factors that influence the content of local drama television programming in Malaysia. The study finds that at different phases of the commissioning process, different factors influence the criteria of gatekeeping. The factors include favoritism, self-censorship, and political intervention. Using financial means, the commissioning process ensures that independent producers do not “step over the boundary” set by the network. Under such circumstances, a television producer has little room for creativity. Moreover, the network’s constant pressure to incorporate officially endorsed content into drama television programs also puts an additional burden on the producer. As a result the entertainment factor of these programs takes a back seat.

From 1991 to 1997, as a result of the Barisan Nasional government’s policy to promote local television drama production to fend off foreign programs, particularly those from the United States, the Malaysian drama television industry was booming. During the boom, television networks acquired more programs from local production houses with bigger budgets. However, in 1997, due to the economic downturn in Southeast Asia, the demand for local programs shrank and many television production houses ceased operation. The industry never recovered.

The development of the Malaysian drama television industry is a field seldom researched. As Malaysia is often criticized by the West for suppressing freedom of speech, researchers’ attention is too often on news rather than entertainment genres such as drama. However, this does not mean that drama television programming is exempted from the dominant ideology.

Studying the ideological perspective of the British television drama Coronation Street, Terry Lovell (1981) found that although entertainment is not primarily a vehicle for the transmission of ideas, it produces ideas that can “certainly be locatable in terms of ideology” (p. 47). The question then becomes: How does the dominant ideology prevail through the television production process and through what means. Muriel Cantor (1979) and Todd Gitlin (1979) provided two approaches to understanding the issue. The former sought to identify who plays an important role in creating drama programs; the latter tried to understand the process that favors the dominant class.

Cantor (1979) pointed out that drama television is “not necessarily a reflection of the tastes and ideology of either the creators or those who control the channels of communication; rather, it represents a negotiated struggle between a number of participants” (p. 387). These participants include the television networks, advertisers, the government, social critics, citizen groups, program providers and program creators. While Cantor (1979) identified the participants who take part in creating television drama, Gitlin (1979) described the hegemonic process that ensures the dominance of the mainstream ideology. He pointed out the “interrelated ways in which television messages are integrated into the dominant system of discourse and the prevailing structures of labor, consumption and politics” (p. 251). In his conclusion, he stressed:

One point should be clear: the hegemonic system is not cut-and-dried, not definitive. It was continually to be reproduced, continually superimposed, continually to be negotiated and managed, in order to override the alternative and, occasionally, the oppositional forms. To put it another way: major social conflicts are transported into the cultural system, where the hegemonic process frames them, form and content both, into compatibility with dominant systems of meaning. Alternative material is routinely incorporated: brought into a body of cultural production. Occasionally oppositional material may succeed in being indigestible; that material is excluded from the media discourse and returned to the cultural margins from which it came, which elements of it are incorporated into the dominant forms. (p. 264)

These studies (Lovell, 1981; Cantor, 1979; Gitlin, 1979) clearly demonstrate that television drama is shaped by an underpinning ideology and its process is a complex but worthwhile subject of analysis. However, these studies were conducted in liberal, democratic and relatively homogeneous Western societies. There are very few similar studies done in the developing nations. Such a shortcoming prompts this researcher to question whether the findings—and understanding thereof—provided by these studies could be applied to societies or nations that have different social, economic and political contexts. This paper seeks to address this concern by studying the Malaysian drama television industry.

The culturally pluralistic and politically authoritarian landscape of Malaysia makes it an ideal society for this study. In the 1990s, Malaysia had been in the vanguard of Asian values, which advocated that the Asian media should work for the government instead of serving as the fourth estate. Such a position makes Malaysia distinctly different from Western countries in terms of managing media content. This paper specifically looks at how a Malaysian government-owned television network, namely Radio Television Malaysia (RTM), manages the content of its drama television programs.

The researcher sought to address the issue by looking at RTM's commissioning process for drama programs as well as the issues associated with this process. Qualitative methodologies were used to study the forces that shape the content of Malaysian drama television production at the media organizational level. Specifically, in-depth interviews and documentary research were used to gather the bulk of data for analysis.

To ensure that viewpoints from different segments of the Malaysian drama television industry were represented, three categories of interviewees were targeted for the study. These three categories are (1) Network executives at RTM; (2) drama television producers, directors and writers for local production; and (3) media researchers or practitioners who studied or observed the local drama television industry. As quota and snowballing sampling techniques were used for this study, at the end of each interview, the interviewee was asked to recommend other people who might be of benefit to this study. As a result, a total of 33 interviewees participated in the study. Before each interview was conducted, the interviewee was informed that his or her identity would not be revealed in the study. This was to ensure the interviewees that their responses would be used only for the study and would not be used against them by the authority mentioned.

Documentary research was used to understand the Malaysian drama television industry. Written materials used in this study included primary documents such as government publications, newspapers and magazines and secondary documents such as dissertations, journal articles, conference papers and unpublished documents.

Once the data were collected through in-depth interviews and documentary research, the process of analysis began. At this stage, the researcher organized the data in ways that helped to formulate themes, refine concepts, and link them together to create a clear description or explanation of the culture of the Malaysian television industry.

Two concepts were particularly important in guiding this research: (1) Television as a producer medium; and (2) the theory of gatekeeping. By using these two concepts, this study seeks to understand the factors that influence the content of drama television.

Several studies (Cantor, 1971; Newcomb & Alley, 1983; Tunstall, 1993) have pointed out the importance of the television producer in shaping the content of drama programming. Cantor (1971) identified the crucial role that producers play in creating programs for the three major television networks in the United States. He stated that the television producer has “both executive and creative authority” for making his program (p. 7). It is controlling the story, casting and editing the drama television program via negotiating with television network executives, scriptwriters, director and other artistes that make the producer important in the process of creating his product. The crucial role of the television producer was also recognized by other scholars.

Horace Newcomb and Robert Alley (1983) positioned the television producer as the auteur of television drama, who controls the creative aspect of the final product. They acknowledged that television is indeed a highly collaborative medium; however, there are two factors that make the television producer unique and crucial in the process of making drama programs. First, the producer often holds legal and financial responsibility for the final television product. Secondly, the producer is the one who is “involved with the project from beginning to end, sees to it that continuity is maintained, that peace is kept among other members of the team, and, most importantly, that the series concept remains secure” (p. xii). With such understanding, they argued, the producers are the “creative centers of their endeavors” and television is in essence a producer medium (p. xiii). Having studied television in a different social context—the United Kingdom—in the early 1990s, Jeremy Tunstall (1993) shared the same viewpoint. He pointed out that British television is a producer-driven medium, requiring “the individual producer to create the TV service that the public has received” (p. 1).

All of these studies have agreed that television producers play a crucial role in shaping the content of drama television; however, this creative aspect of the producer is not without its constraints. To ensure that the program will eventually reach the audience through the television network, the drama television producer needs to ensure that his program caters to the demands from the different segments of the society. To understand these demands, as well as to put this study into a larger context of mass communication study, this research borrows a theoretical framework that is commonly used to study controls of news content: the gatekeeping theory.

For a drama program to be aired through television, it needs to be approached by a network executive. Studies (Cantor, 1971; Gitlin, 1983; Newcomb & Alley, 1983; Tunstall 1993) have found that network executives play the role of gatekeeper to safeguard the interests of the media organization. Network executives tend to screen the content of drama programs with the interests of the media organization in mind.

Knowing the political economy of a media organization is essential for understanding its executive’s decision. In Malaysia, Zaharom Nain and Mustafa Anuar (1998) used political economy analysis to examine the nation’s media industry in the mid-1990s. Tracing the ownership of mass media organizations in Malaysia and their relationship with the government, they found that in addition to censorship and regulation, the Malaysian government also used control of ownership as a means to indirectly control the national mass media industry. However, these studies focused mainly on how the political economy of media organizations affects the content of news production; the issue of drama production was not addressed.

For many Malaysian drama television producers, making programs for RTM is not an option but a necessity. Since the Ministry of Information, which directly controls RTM, started to outsource projects to independent production houses in the late-1980s, the government network has become the major source of income for many local independent production houses. Having two terrestrial television channels with a per-day airtime average of 17.5 hours for TV1 and 13 hours for TV2 to fill, RTM’s demand for local programs is great. As of the year 2000, RTM had aired 1,482 hours of locally produced drama, sitcoms and telemovies in the Malay, Chinese and Tamil languages on TV1 and TV2 (Ministry of Information [MOI], 2001). This made it the biggest buyer of locally produced drama programs in Malaysia.

With this buying power and the kind of affiliation the network has with the Ministry of Information, RTM’s influence on the local television industry is tremendous although it might not be the most popular network in the country. The practices that RTM’s commissioning editor carried out, in terms of what content should or should not be allowed to be shown on television (even though it is not faithfully followed by private networks) is closely monitored. Furthermore, as RTM is the first television network in Malaysia, some former as well as current staff members of the private networks had started their careers at the government network. This early affiliation with RTM inevitably shaped their practice and viewpoint of television production, which they carried forward to their new working environments. All these factors make RTM a good starting point to study the commissioning process, which also serves as the first round of censorship, in Malaysian terrestrial television networks.

Television production houses need to submit three specific documents in order to be considered as program providers for RTM. These three specific documents are: (1) Company profile with the latest audited financial statement, (2) a Finance Certificate (Sijil Kerwangan) from the Ministry of Finance, and (3) a video production license acquired from FINAS (National Film Development Corporation Malaysia).

While the company profile and the latest audited financial statement ensure that the production house intending to provide programs for RTM is a legitimate and able entity, the Finance Certificate proves that the production house has registered with the Finance Ministry’s Government Procurement Management Division to provide services for the government sector. On March 14, 1996, in a dispute with the Finance Ministry and some local production houses, the Ministry of Information Secretary, General Zawawi Mahmuddin, emphasized that “RTM only bought programs which were registered with the Finance Ministry” (“Awarding of contracts,” 1996).

The third document required by RTM, and probably the one most pertinent to the drama television industry, is a Production of Video (PV) license issued by FINAS. To apply for such a license, an applicant needs to submit the following: (a) Documented proof that it is a private limited company with a pay-up capital of RM 50,000, and (b) detailed information about the company, including the members of its board of directors and shareholder backgrounds. After the application for the license is vetted, an interview is set to determine the applicant’s “seriousness” as well as expertise in being part of the industry. The license for Production of Video is renewable annually. The purpose of licensing is to keep track of the industry’s activities. However, it could also be used to take action “against parties found guilty of misconduct” (“Set a standard,” 1996).

With these three documents in place, the Ministry of Information would assess the qualifications of the applicant and register qualifying applicants. While the required documents for application are clearly stated on the RTM website, the network’s criteria for selecting successful applicants are less clear.

Once registered, these independent producers are eligible to send program proposals to RTM. From the time a proposal is made to the time the final product is produced and aired, a producer could face some serious challenges, which sometimes turn into controversies. These challenges emerge at the different phases of the commissioning process, which are chronologically outlined as follows:

For the remainder of this paper, the researcher will trace this process and discuss the issues or controversies associated with it. Through this discussion, the network executive’s gatekeeping criteria as well as the producer’s constraints in producing drama programs for RTM will be identified.

After going through a proposal sent by a registered production house, the network decides the hours of airtime to allocate for a specific program. RTM’s decision on this matter has a direct impact on the company's financial-well being for independent producers. Therefore, over the years, allocation of airtime has been the center of dispute between RTM and production houses. In particular, the Ministry of Information’s decision to award a large amount of airtime to certain production companies prompted heavy criticism in the mid-1990s.

In January 1998, the New Straits Times, an English newspaper closely associated with the UMNO ruling party, published an article by Suraya Al-Attas who criticized the television networks in general and RTM in particular. Touching upon the challenges faced by many television producers after the 1997 Asian economic crisis, including the issue of “unfair distribution” of airtime, Al-Attas highlighted the concerns of several television producers:

That these three production companies [Home Video Distribution (HVD), Wayang Tinggi and Eurofine] have long-term contracts with RTM is apparently no secret in the industry. But even then, most producers are not asking for the impossible from RTM. They do not expect the station to give them hundreds of hours a year, only that they get a fair opportunity.

Says Mohamed Jusoh, Keris Motion executive chairman: “What we’d like to see, especially in RTM, is a fair distribution of slots. And if the station is cutting back, which is understandable given the current economic situation, they should stop buying from other companies, too. (“Give all producers equal chance,” 1998)

Accusations of RTM’s favoring certain companies, including those that were mentioned in the article, were not surprising as their companies were in serious financial difficulty due to RTM cut-backs during the 1997 economic downturn. While these production houses were struggling to survive, a few companies continued to enjoy patronage from the government-owned network. Feeling that they had nothing to lose since their companies were not awarded airtime from RTM and hoping that such open criticism would attract the attention of the higher authority, namely the Cabinet, these producers decided to expose a long-existing problem within the industry.

One company that was constantly being linked to RTM’s favoritism was Home Video Distribution (HVD). While many independent producers struggled to have a few programs a year accepted by RTM, secure with a long-term contract “HVD sent its programs by cartloads” (Personal communication with an RTM network executive, June 29, 2001). According to some independent producers and RTM network executives the favorable treatment of HVD was because of the “good relations” between the then Information Minister Mohamed Rahmat and the production house. The relationship was so good that at one point in the 1990s, an HVD billboard was displayed on the main building of Angkasapuri where the Minister’s office was located. This had prompted some RTM network executives to cynically name it the HVD Building instead of Wisma TV (Television Building). Such a relationship caused bitterness among the independent producers.

During the whole of the 1990s, suspicions of favoritism constantly surrounded RTM’s decisions on the allocation of airtime. It was only in May 2001, two years after Khalil Yaakob, the new Minister of Information, came into office, that a new measure was introduced to counter the problem (“I’ve no comments, says Mohamed Rahmat,” 1999).

In May 2001, Deputy Information Minister Khalid Yunus, after attending a ceremony to commence a drama production, announced that RTM “will introduce [a] specialization concept for its film suppliers where capable companies will be asked to produce certain films only” (“Specialization concept for,” 2001). He further pointed out that “too many companies were currently involved in the same thing such as drama production.” Five months later, RTM introduced a tendering system that embodied the “specialization concept.”

Under the new system, RTM invited tenders for 107 titles of programs. These titles were categorized by combinations of length, language, and genre of program, such as 30-minute English sitcom, 60-minute Chinese drama and 90-minute Malay telemovie. This new measure, however, was deemed “not practical”. The majority of the television producers who competed for the tender did not confine themselves to one category. The specialization concept advocated by the Ministry failed to take off.

In addition, the tendering system brought home a couple of new problems. To ensure transparency in the evaluation process, in particular to prevent favoritism which had long haunted the government network, producers were asked to send in two packages of materials for evaluation: One containing the production houses’ information and the other the program’s proposal. As most production houses tendered for more than one program, RTM ended up with mountains of documents stacked in its offices waiting to be vetted long after the tender was closed. To continue their daily routine while at the same time evaluating the tenders posed a major problem for many already overworked RTM staff members.

While the Ministry’s intention of being transparent in the matter of allocating airtime is clear, the new system appeared to be less than desired. Oftentimes, the decision made was not according to professional merits but based on network executives’ instincts to cut costs. Such consideration prompted independent producers to cut production costs drastically in order to secure airtime from RTM, which resulted in compromising the quality of the program. The new Information Minister, for all his good intentions, appeared to have solved a problem by introducing a new one.

From a political standpoint, the Minister made the right moves toward being impartial in terms of airtime allocation and exempted himself from accusations of favoritism, which had haunted his predecessor. From an industry’s point-of-view, however, the tender system forced production houses to cut costs regardless of how it might affect the quality of its products. Such a move, while serving well for the Minister’s aspirations, unfortunately filtered out production houses that sought to produce quality programs within a reasonable budget. In a society where the decision was often made by the officeholder at the highest level, who had little understanding of the media industry, the political considerations tend to outweigh the concerns for quality programming.

Although the Information Minister was able to exempt himself from favoritism claims, his Ministry continues to suffer from this criticism. One producer has complained that the tendering system is not favoritism-proof. There was talk among television producers that during the tender evaluation meeting for awarding airtime, a certain high-ranking official within the Ministry sent in a list of production houses to be given patronage. Such a request apparently was difficult for the members of the tender evaluation committee to ignore. For Malaysian media practitioners such a story is not surprising. Some independent producers have claimed that favoritism has become part of the RTM organizational culture, regardless of who is in overall charge of the Ministry. As a result, “unfair distribution of airtime” is always a major concern for independent television producers but is seldom brought into public scrutiny.

Once airtimes are awarded to a production house, a series of meetings takes place at RTM between members of the production house and network executives to negotiate the actual content of the drama program. Prior to the first meeting of RTM’s Film Supply Unit’s Private Program Procurement Committee (commonly known as Swasta) delivers the program’s proposal to the executives in charge of supervising the project. In the case of a drama production, there is a panel of five. Of these five, at least three are senior producers who have relevant experience in the area of drama production. In addition, these five panelists are from four different divisions within the network to ensure that all aspects of concern are discussed and resolved during the series of meetings. Depending on where the drama program would eventually be aired, one panelist is from either TV1 or TV2. His concern is to ensure that the requirements for the respective channel are fulfilled as TV 1 and TV 2 are targeted at different demographics. One panelist is from the Drama Unit whose main function is to supervise the artistic aspect of the program. One panelist is from the Research and Development Unit whose main concern is to incorporate government policies or messages into the drama program. Finally, two members from Swasta also attend the meeting. Their function is to record the minutes of the discussion, which also serves as part of the terms for the program procurement and as a liaison between the production house and the network executives. At all times, at least three of the five RTM panelists must attend the meeting with the production house staff, which comprises the producer, director and scriptwriter.

At the end of the meeting, the producer is to sign and acknowledge the minutes taken, which outline the specific requirements that must be obliged. One participant recalled the experience of such an endeavor:

Whatever is discussed is always written down. Everything! So that there is no escape. And then everything, whatever the discussion, there will be somebody, some sort of a secretary, which is why we need to have two from the requisition [Swasta]. One will actively participate, the other will just [be there] to jot down everything. So everything, whatever the discussion, we do not type it but as we discuss there and then, we write out in black and white. At the end of it, we will ask the producer to look through everything that was jotted down and he will have to sign [and acknowledge the agreement]. (Personal communication with an RTM network executive, June 30, 2001)

The meetings between the RTM network executives and the production house usually take place in one of the conference rooms located at RTM’s Wisma TV (Television Building). It is the only time and place that both parties meet and discuss the project. Any interaction between the two parties outside of the meeting place must be done in writing through Swasta. According to an RTM network executive, this is to prevent direct contact between the production house staff and the panelists, and thus to forestall any accusations of favoritism, faultfinding or bribery from the production house as well as from their colleagues. Apparently, the rumor of favoritism has prompted the network to take extra precautions against any such accusation.

The meeting between RTM network executives and production house staff covers everything from casting to storyline to budgeting, but the most important aspect of the discussion is to ensure that the program adheres to RTM’s internal censorship criteria. The majority of the criteria are in line with the National Censorship Board’s (Lembaga Penapis Filem-LPF) guidelines. The remaining are drawn from two sources: First the experience that RTM network executives have as civil servants and television producers within RTM; secondly the aspiration of the “people higher up” at the time.

The past experiences—within their own agency and with other social institutions, particularly the Censorship Board—of RTM network executives often serve as additional reference for deciding what should and should not appear in locally produced drama television programs. In the early 1980s, Lowe and Kamin (1979) used the term “inventory of decision rules” to describe RTM’s written and unwritten criteria that “form the sum total of the organization’s knowledge as to what is acceptable or not acceptable for transmission” (p. 8). In general, the written rules are easier to grasp. They come in the form of government documents, such as censorship guidelines or directives from high-ranking officials. Although these documents are sometimes vague and open to interpretation, at least they are tangible. The unwritten rules, by comparison, are much more intangible, yet they play a greater role in shaping the content of current RTM drama television programming. Lowe and Kamin (1979) aptly described these unwritten rules:

For the most part these rules are stored in the memories of the producers and their heads of departments. One can safely assume that most of these rules are not meant to be applied with equal force all the time. Although this might not have been the intention, in effect this is what happens with rules. As far as is known there have been few written rules which were lifted officially. So, apart from the attrition of a bad collective memory, most of the rules are continuously applied through self-censorship. Films that have been postponed indefinitely have not been directed to be shown again although the original object that caused the postponement no longer holds in the present situation. (p. 23)

Two decades after Lowe and Kamin completed their study, it appears that unwritten rules still control the scene. When asked if there were any documents that recorded these mandates, one senior RTM network executive pointed out that such rules would be impossible to document as there are too many of them. In addition, some of them might change due to the context of the story or the timing of the production, which would make it even more difficult to put in writing.

In addition to the use of collective memories, the aspirations of the political leaders make up the other part of what is acceptable for the government television network. Understanding what “the people higher up” want is an important part of Malaysian civil servants’ collective psyche. RTM network executives usually learn of these “aspirations” through two means: First, through internal circulars or directives, and secondly through observing policymakers, in particular speeches in the public forum by the Minister of Information and the Prime Minister.

In December 2001, during a conversation with this researcher, a television producer, who has occasionally supplied programs for the government television network and befriended some of the RTM staff, reported that an internal “circular” was at the time current among the RTM network executives to inform them that a “certain shade of green” and a particular type of headdress (kopiah) for male Muslims had been banned by the network in all programs. The television producer pointed out that the rationale for such a ban is that the authority feared that showing this “certain shade of green” and the kopiah on national television might remind the audience of the opposition party, PAS. The PAS party flag uses this “certain shade of green” and its male politicians often wear the kopiah. The television producer added that “It is really silly and embarrassing,” however, such a story indeed illustrates the mentality of the authority in RTM (Personal communication with an independent producer, December 26, 2001).

Such a circular, silly or otherwise, that informs the RTM network executives of what is to be excluded on the government network, usually comes unsigned. However, it is commonly known that this anonymous yet authoritative document is issued by the “people higher up” in the Ministry of Information. In addition to the circular, a directive is also used to update the RTM staff on materials that are deemed undesirable. Lowe and Kamin (1979) noted the function of the “directive” within the context of RTM as follows:

Directives which are issued are passed on to producers orally and without attributing them to any source. Such anonymity allows influence to be exercised over the producers without having to take responsibility for the decision. Anonymity also avoids the needs to give reasons. It would be enough to refer to some authority “higher up”. Such anonymity avoids having to reply to arguments from producers. This obviates the need to provide logic or reasons to support the directives. (p. 23)

One such directive was issued in 2001. According to an RTM network executive, it was to assist the ruling Barisan Nasional government, in a discrete manner, to “win the heart of the rakyat (citizens) in the 2004 election through all forms of programming, including drama and sitcom, by showing that the Malaysians are happy with the government” (personal communication with a RTM network executive, June 29, 2001).

These directives very often are issued at the internal meetings of RTM. Over the years the Ministry of Information has put in place a series of internal meetings to ensure that the intention of the Barisan Nasional government is effectively delivered through the chain of command to every civil servant in RTM. These meetings (see Table 1) usually are scheduled after the Cabinet meeting so that all levels of the network’s employees would be notified of the latest information within a reasonably short period of time, so that an “informed decision” could be made accordingly.

Routine Route to Deliver Directives from Cabinet to RTM’s Network Executives

Day of week	Level of meeting
Wednesday morning	Cabinet meeting chaired by Prime Minister
Wednesday afternoon	Post-Cabinet meeting chaired by Information Minister
Thursday	Directorate-level meeting chaired by Director General RTM
Friday	Executive-level meeting chaired by Managing Director TV

This post-Cabinet meeting is chaired by the Minister of Information and attended by all the director generals and their deputies who head the respective departments, including the Department of Broadcasting (RTM), National Film Department (Filem Negara), National Film Development Corporation (FINAS), National News Agency (BERNAMA), and Department of Information Service. It is through this meeting that “whatever the directives from the Prime Minister would be [are] conveyed to these Director Generals” (Personal communication with an RTM network executive, June 5, 2002).

As for the directorate-level meeting, it is chaired by the Director General of RTM and attended by all the directors (or managing directors) of the respective agencies, including the managing director of Television Malaysia. The managing director of Television Malaysia would then chair the executive-level meeting with the respective unit controllers (see Figure 1).

The purpose of this weekly executive meeting is on one hand for the controllers to update the Managing Director on the activities within their units; on the other hand it is for the Managing Director to inform the controllers of the “directives from upstairs.” The respective controllers would then return to their units and relay the directives to their subordinates, either through a unit-level meeting or individually. As one RTM network executive pointed out, if the government deemed it necessary to instill certain messages into television programs, this would be the most common way of doing it (although occasionally the Minister might pass down a directive without waiting for the weekly routine if he thought the situation warranted it). Through this routine, verbal directives are given to all the RTM network executives, including the panelists who scrutinize the independent producers’ drama projects. With the panelists from different units (Drama, Research and Development, Network and Swasta) all being informed of the directive, it is unlikely that upcoming programs could ignore the aspirations of the political leader.

In addition to informing them by directive, the authority also expects the civil servants to be observant and understand the need of the government at the time. Being sensitive to the policymakers’ aspirations is an unwritten but important part of an RTM network executive’s job description. Newspaper coverage on current affairs, especially on domestic issues relating to government policies, becomes a crucial means to tap into such sensitivity, one of them pointed out:

You must sense that you are in a government institution; everything we do [we] must follow the policy. Therefore, from time to time, change of policy or change of people [policymaker such as the Minister of Information], we must be aware of it, must be very sensitive [to this kind of thing]. …Whatever the government policy, it is best that you are in sync with it, through drama or anything. For instance, for a period of time, we must include Muhibah [or racial] unity, that kind of thing, so the theme [of the story] must somehow relate to that…other times it is the government’s Seven Year Plan, so you must find a theme that goes along with that. After all, we are a government organization. (Personal communication with a former RTM network executive, July 2, 2001)

In 1996, then Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad himself openly adjured television practitioners to be sensitive to what the government wanted. He said that “although the current levels of censorship conducted by television networks generally meet the Government’s requirement, they are sometimes lacking in sensitivity towards the problems faced by the Government.” He further illustrated his point:

For example, while we discourage illegal racing, there was a film glorifying such activity in other countries. The staff assigned to vet and censor the films should be aware of efforts taken by the Government, particularly in nation-building. (“Broadcast stations to vet,” 1996)

During the process of approving an independent drama producer’s project, RTM network executives have to ensure that the program meets many requirements. Some are written, but many are not. One of the unwritten rules, deemed so essential that it needs no justification from the authority, is to ensure that whatever content on air does not put the UMNO-led Barisan Nasional government in a bad light. Such mentality makes it virtually impossible to address social issues in local drama television. As a political force in power for more than four decades, the authority tends to see any depiction of social problems on screen as criticism of the Administration. To avoid being interpreted as badmouthing the government, many producers learned that the best way to ensure “safe passage” through the network executives is to produce one of the two relatively trouble-free genres: a love story or a family drama. In fact, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad himself has urged local television producers to produce more “family-oriented programs” and stated, “It will be better to show family dramas, series on development and other such shows” (“More family-oriented shows,” 1991).

Another incentive for independent producers as well as RTM network executives to produce love stories or family dramas is that the government’s policy or a political leader’s aspiration could easily be incorporated into the storyline without placing it in the larger context of society. For instance, at one point, an independent producer was asked to look into occupations that are listed in the Labor Department’s document but are unfamiliar to the general public and incorporated the information into the storyline (personal communication with a network executive, June 30, 2001).

The function of the RTM panelists apparently is to safeguard the interests of the country in name but of the ruling party in fact. The system in place has ensured that regardless of the panelists’ personal viewpoints, the Barisan Nasional government’s sentiment prevails. Also, as the largest buyer in the Malaysian drama television industry, the RTM network putatively interacts with independent drama producers’ negotiations but in fact does not. As one executive plainly pointed out, independent drama producers could bring forth their story, but “we will change it, channel it to suit the requisition of the station and the needs of the country (Personal communication with an RTM network executive, June 30, 2001).

Once the script and matters such as casting and budget are agreed upon by both RTM and the production house, a letter of intent is issued by RTM’s Swasta. An independent producer should be able to use this document to apply for a loan from a financial institution. However, many independent producers have pointed out that most of the banks in Malaysia consider television production a high-risk enterprise. Therefore, are unwilling to issue loans for such projects. This is because the letter of intent from Swasta merely reflects the intention of the government networks at the time but by no means is it a guarantee to the independent producer that RTM would eventually purchase the product. Hence, as far as an independent producer is concerned, from the point when the letter of intent is issued until the network accepts and airs the program, there is always a possibility that his investment might not see a return. One apparent hurdle is the Censorship Board. Although RTM network executives during the process of approving the script have been taking the Censorship Board guidelines into consideration, there is no telling what the final outcome might be. Sometimes even RTM network executives “don’t understand” the Censorship Board’s decisions. However, since it is a government television network, its executives have to ensure that the Censorship Board’s decision is adhered to. This often means the producer has to bear the consequences, regardless of the fact that the drama program had been scrutinized and approved by RTM.

In addition to the Censorship Board, there are also instances when the government network rejected the end product, which had been approved earlier, based on other grounds. In the 1990s, one of the potential problems that often caught a producer off guard at this stage of dealing with RTM, had less to do with the content of the drama program and more with the personal life of the actor or actress who took part in the project.

Once a producer completes the drama production—adhering to all of RTM’s requests and without running into any unthinkable scenarios—two VHS copies of the program are to be sent for final assessment: One to the Censorship Board and the other to RTM. These assessments take the form of pass, pass with cut, or ban and the independent producer rarely argues against these decisions. After all the necessary adjustments, the final print is sent for technical assessment and scheduled for transmission. However, the producer’s struggle is not yet over. Getting the payment from the television networks is also another problem that independent producers have to face.

In March 1996, the local drama television industry was stunned by a call from the Film Directors’ Association of Malaysia for the government to look into the issue of unfair distribution of airtime on the government television network. The allegation came a week after a meeting between the Deputy Finance Minister Affifuddin Omar, representatives from television professionals’ organizations (including Film Producers’ Association, Film Directors’ Association), and senior officers from HVD. The meeting apparently was held because the Deputy Finance Minister had “received a report which stated that bumiputera (sons/daughters of the soil, which includes Malays and other indigenous groups) film suppliers only received 11 percent of contracts while HVD, which is a non-bumiputera company, was granted 46 percent of the pie” (“Favoritism charge against RTM,” 1996). To make things worse, Keris Motion, a rival bumiputera-owned production consortium, forwarded statistics to the Deputy Finance Minister stating that HVD had been “receiving payments amounting to RM40 million within a year from RTM when, in fact, it was supposed to get only about RM5.97 million a year from the station” (“Favoritism charge against RTM,” 1996). The move to involve the Ministry of Finance in the matter of RTM’s favoritism might seem unusual but the accusers apparently knew how the system worked. While it was within the rights of the Ministry of Information to award airtime, as a government television network the payment was released by the Ministry of Finance. By pointing out that a non-bumiputera had been allocated “46 percent of the pie” while bumiputera companies had only 11 percent (contrary to the government stipulated 60 percent bumiputera and 40 non-bumiputera ratio) these bumiputera companies successfully involved the Ministry of Finance in this matter.

The Ministry of Finance’s involvement, however, introduced a new challenge for the producers, an outcome probably unexpected by these bumiputera companies. To ensure that the government network rectified the problem, the Ministry ceased to release payment for programs that were already aired by RTM. Columnist Siri Bintang described the consequence, “As a result, all program suppliers, non-bumis and bumis alike, are feeling the pinch as hundreds of thousands of ringgit are indefinitely stuck. If the situation persists, producers will be badly affected as they surely need to replenish their working capital (“Shrinking the pool of players,” 1997).

Beyond the concern of the Ministry of Finance, which serves as an agent to enforce the 60-40 quota, the matter of late payment is another problem that independent producers constantly face. Many said that it is not uncommon for their production houses to wait as long as six months to a year after the program is aired to get paid. However, this phenomenon is not unique to the television industry. On July 4, 2001, Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi openly requested “government agencies to ensure prompt payments to contractors and suppliers of government projects” (“Pay contractors on time,” 2001).

Drama television programs are of great concern to the Malaysian government. As a result, the entertainment factor of these programs often takes a back seat. It is unlikely that RTM network executives sitting on the panel are unfamiliar with the art of storytelling and entertainment. After all, many of them had years of experience as producer-directors before RTM drama programming was outsourced to independent production houses. However, in a position where the role of a civil servant overpowers the capacity of a creative mind, these network executives’ hands are tied. They are unlikely to push for creative boundaries in a significant and meaningful manner.

The concerns from the “people higher up” always play an important role in the decision-making process. While some of these decisions are made to echo the Cabinet’s call to better the society, some are for the self-interest of particular individuals in power. Favoritism from the “people upstairs” means that the middle-management-level RTM network executives have to, at some point, “close one eye” on the allocation of airtime to particular production houses. In Malaysia, the television industry is not exempt from cronyism and corruption.

As for the television producer, under such a system he has little room for creativity. Producers who “step over the boundary” may receive punishments such as major re-editing of finished programs, loss of airtime, banning of the project or even being blacklisted. These punishments could easily shut down the production house and render the producer jobless. The producer simply must be extra cautious in shaping the content of drama programs to avoid financial loss. Knowing where the boundary lies is therefore crucial. However, the boundary is often vague and inconsistent. Moreover, the authority’s constant pressure to incorporate officially endorsed content puts an additional burden on a producer. In doing so, producers become the first and harshest faultfinders of their own work.

“Play safe” is the term commonly used to describe the strategy of producers wishing to avoid trouble. The strategy is simple: Exercise self-censorship. Indeed, in Malaysia self-censorship is actively encouraged. In 1996, when asked if guidelines formulated by the government would produce self-censorship by the public, the Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad responded, “It is good for individuals to also exercise self-censorship.” He added, “We have always practiced it. For example, we do not talk rudely to people” (“Broadcast Stations to Vet”, 1996).

While the main thrust of this paper is to outline the selection criteria and commissioning process of RTM, it is important to point out that the Malaysian private television networks share similar attributes. Although by comparison, the private networks, TV-Tiga, NTV-7 and ASTRO, are slightly more lenient, they are under the same constraints. The Minister of Information regularly meets with the private networks’ top management officers to ensure that all the television networks are equally aware of the authority’s concern at the time. The rules apply to all networks, regardless of whether government- or privately-owned.

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About the Author

Dr. Tee Tuan Foo is Associate Professor in the School of Communication and Information, Electronic and Broadcast Division, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore 637718. He completed his Ph.D. at Ohio University in 2004. He can be contacted at 65-9367-8885 and tttfoo@ntu.edu.sg

Gitlin, T. (1979). Prime time ideology: The hegemonic process in television entertainment. Social Problems, 26(3), 251-266.

About the Author