Stanley Hoffmann’s book, Gulliver Unbound: America’s Imperial Temptation and the War in Iraq, is about the diplomatic build-up to America’s war in Iraq, the situation in Iraq today, and the nature and consequences of U.S. unilateral policies in the Middle East. Hoffmann is critical of America’s unilateral exercise of power and favors a liberal international order with multilateral institutions. The book is in two parts. The first is an extended interview/conversation between Hoffman his French friend and former student at Harvard, historian Frederic Bozo. The second part consists of two chapters by Hoffmann on the future of the international system and the dangers of empire.

Though Hoffmann was born in France, he has been teaching at Harvard for almost 50 years. In the preface, he declares that he is not a "classical American professor." As both French and (naturalized) American, Hoffman stresses that his ambiguous identity gives him a special vantage point from which to express his views on 9/11 and the war in Iraq.

Hoffmann starts his book with an account of the Franco-American confrontation on the war in Iraq: "For the Americans, France was a kind of thorn in the foot because of its threat of a veto…" (56). Expressing anger over the U.S. treatment of allies, Hoffmann criticizes America for using a "Iraq equals terrorism" formula as a loyalty test for allies, arguing that allies cannot be treated "as tins of polish for American boots." He lambastes the Bush administration for giving little importance to the United Nations, for ignoring dissent from allies and proceeding unilaterally. He describes Bush "as more than a little devious and often vindictive. He doesn’t hesitate to lie, either in domestic or in foreign policy" (55).

Hoffman categorizes Bush’s foreign policy as a rupture from previous U.S. policies, arguing that after the Cold War, George Bush and Bill Clinton continued a policy of "directed multilateralism" until 2001 when George W. Bush switched to "triumphant unilateralism" and a new form of exceptionalism that was based almost exclusively on military power. An exasperated Hoffmann points out that "today everything seems subordinated to the use of force" (24). Hoffmann claims that the line followed by the Bush administration in Iraq has deprived American power of its legitimacy.

Hoffmann describes 9/11 as a "divine surprise" that was "exploited magisterially" by the neo-Conservatives. He argues that the neo-Cons were disappointed the Cold War ended in a "soft way" and the Persian Gulf War did not lead to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. However, they used the events of September 11, 2001, to wage war in Iraq. He is angry at neo-Cons for viewing Europeans as "cowards or softies."

Further, Hoffmann argues that the move from 9/11 to Iraq was made for the purpose of regime change and altering power relations throughout the Mideast. He dismisses oil as a decisive factor for waging the war on Iraq. This argument may seem odd compared to most account of the Iraq war, e.g. Klare (2004). Little (2004), or Baer (2003)—each of whom present compelling evidence that suggests it is difficult to distinguish U.S. military operations to fight terrorism from those aimed at protecting oil assets.

In his wide-ranging commentary, Hoffmann touches on other issues such as US democracy promotion efforts in Iraq, the importance of the resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict in containing terrorism, the chauvinistic tone of American media coverage of the war in Iraq and the multiple dilemmas that Iraqi society presents for American troops without analyzing any of these issues in-depth.

Throughout, Hoffmann castigates the American media for uncritically reporting the administration’s viewpoints on the war in Iraq. He asserts that the Bush administration presented the war simplistically in terms of national security and the promotion of democracy in the Arab world. Hoffman argues that addressing terrorism requires a "complex treatment of its many causes, a long term task which requires self-criticism in the whole of the western world" (24). He stresses the heterogeneity of terrorism: the multiple causes that lead to it, the varied situations in which terrorism is manifested, and the multiple ways in which it is dealt with. Hoffmann also holds American public opinion partly responsible for certain aspects of Bush’s foreign policy: "After Sept. 11, there was the rebirth of a wounded and indignant patriotism, a rallying behind the president who promised a decisive victory…" (65).

Hoffmann catalogues the wrong measures taken in Iraq after the invasion, including the demobilization of the Iraqi army and the purging of the Ba’athist administration leading to the loss of law and order in the country. He points out that the war has led to an escalation of terrorism. He uses excellent imagery to describe the situation in Iraq today: "…it appears more and more like a huge kick into a poisoned ant hill, and all the options seem grim" (101). Hoffmann argues that post-war Iraq has witnessed a return of the Vietnam syndrome: "once again we find confused objectives, a misunderstanding of the attitude of the ‘natives’ toward the ‘liberators,’ confrontations between terrorists of mysterious origins and experience and heavy conventional forces" (138). He points out that Iraqi society is ridden with multiple social and ethnic cleavages and it will not be easy for the United States to transplant democracy there: "Democracy does not come fast, nor does it come from the outside" (103). Instead, Hoffmann argues that democracy in Iraq can only come from "state-building" supervised by the United Nations and the international community.

Finally, Hoffmann suggests that the Bush administration should pressure Israel for evacuation of occupied territories and maintains that the resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict is important to curb terrorism: "In the case of the Middle East, an exit from Iraq, combined with a new effort by the U.S., the U.N., the EU, and Russia to end the Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands and to create a livable Palestinian state, would mark a return to reality, to good sense, and to morality" (115).

In his conclusion, Hoffmann laments that the United States has been slipping from being an "imperfect liberal democracy" toward a kind of "populist authoritarianism." He decries what he perceives as the "decline of the civic spirit" among Americans.

Hoffmann’s book is not an in-depth study of US policy on the Middle East; he does not provide a rigorous methodological analysis nor does he address theories of international relations or communication. Some may consider this a book relating the French perspective on 9/11 and the war in Iraq. At any rate, the value of this book is that it makes accessible to the public an honest, yet probing account of America’s war in Iraq from a liberal humanist perspective. In the process, Hoffman offers several prescriptive suggestions to check what he identifies as disastrous consequences of America’s unilateral exercise of power. Yet, he is optimistic, writing, ". . . the moment will come when the American people will understand that the values of which they are proud are incompatible with the practice of empire, which undermines its authority abroad and its institutions, and that its embrace of unilateralism and preventive war can all too easily inspire other countries (such as Russia) to help turn the world into a jungle" (146).

References

Baer, R. (2003). Sleeping with the devil: How Washington sold our soul for Saudi crude. New York: Crown.

Klare, M. T. (2004). Blood and oil: The dangers and consequences of America’s growing dependency on imported petroleum. New York: Metropolitan Books.

Little, D. (2004). American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.