Winning Arab Hearts and Minds:
An American Media Campaign Failure

Review by Badreya Al-Jenaibi
University of North Dakota

Tatham, Steve. Losing Arab Hearts and Minds. New York: Front Street Press, 2006, 239 pp. (ISBN 0-9725572-3-7).

Steve Tatham, author of the book Losing Arab Hearts and Minds, asks the question—how, when the entire world was sympathetic to America after 9/11, did the most powerful country in the world "convincingly lose the battle for Arab hearts and minds?" (2006, x). Tatham worked in the Middle East for over 12 years, but in 2005, he recognized that there had been a profound change in the Arabian Gulf and prevailing attitudes toward America. The U.S. Administration’s "hearts and minds" campaign to win the support of the Arab world had failed.

Tatham begins the first chapter of his book with the haunting statement of President George Bush on September 20, 2001—"Either you are with us or with terrorism" (p. 1). This ultimatum, according to the author, would become the "harbinger of the war" (p. 1). Almost immediately, a multilateral approach to diplomacy was replaced with a new unilateral philosophy that appeared to support forceful preemptive measures when America was faced with a perceived national security threat. And so the war against terrorism began with bombs dropped on Afghanistan within weeks of 9/11. It appeared, according to Tatham, that the predicted "clash of civilizations" as posited by Samuel Huntington was indeed being realized, and "an indignant American media did little to counter the perception, moving into overdrive as it pored over the question `Why us?’" (p. 1). Certainly, the focus on a small minority of Arab people who seemed to celebrate the attacks of 9/11 did not help, in spite of the fact that most Arab and Muslim people were "horrified" by such attacks. The world’s reaction to the attacks were sympathetic; even unfriendly nations like Iran condemned Al-Qaeda and Bin Laden. Nevertheless, within two years, the support and sympathy for America had decreased significantly. Indonesia’s support for America, the region with the most Muslims, had dropped from a high of 61% to only 15% within 2 years of the 9/11 attacks. When the U.S. went ahead with the invasion of Iraq without U.N. support, formerly moderate opinions would turn against the United States, especially in the Arab world.

When America and Britain went to war with Iraq, both countries understood the need to have an innovative and intelligent media campaign that would influence world attitudes to be supportive of the war. Unlike the first Gulf War, however, CNN and other Western news outlets were not the only voice of news—Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya and Abu Dhabi TV were new and important vehicles for media coverage of the war. Unfortunately, the relationship with Al-Jazeera, although seemingly in good standing before the second Gulf War, was quickly challenged when the Al-Jazeera bureau in Kabul was bombed, whether accidental or not. Unfortunately, the media campaign to win the "hearts and minds" of the Arab world was not managed in an innovative or intelligent way from an Arab audience point of view. "Far from an imaginative and targeted media campaign that would build on past US achievements, the American-led Coalition directed its effort almost entirely to its own domestic audiences and in particular the hugely patriotic US market" (p. 10). It did not take long for other news outlets to recognize there would be no tolerance of views other than the ones presented by the American media. Non-American or non-British journalists were mostly excluded, and as argued by Tatham, the Coalition missed an important opportunity where it could have "reaped a moral advantage from the tragedy of 9/11" (p. 11).

From the beginning of the second Gulf War, it appears America failed to understand the way ordinary Arabs would respond to an invasion of Iraq. The sentiments of Islamic regimes is very different than the "Arab Street." Although not particularly realistic, most Arabs have a perception of Arab unity and brotherhood—"All Arabs are one" (p.23). Because of past historical injustice and persecution from external forces, most Arab people deeply resent outside interference to their affairs, no matter what the circumstance. Poems written before the second war compared it to the Mongul invasion of Iraq in 1258, which has great appeal to the Arab psyche. It also did not help the media campaign that most Arabs saw the attack on Iraq as an issue not about weapons of mass destruction or human rights abuse, and not even regarding the national security of the United States. Most believe there is only one compelling factor of the invasion of Iraq by American troops—the control of the oil resources found there.

Tatham devotes an entire chapter to criticizing the Fox News Network and its conservative presentation of news, especially leading up to and shortly after the war with Iraq began. For example, he describes that the news media failed to disclose the contradictory information about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. "Despite abundant evidence of the administration’s brazen misuse of intelligence in this matter, the press repeatedly let officials get away with it" (p. 37). This lack of unbiased news reporting seemed to go along with Fox’s mentality, for the most part. Bill O’Reilly commented that his show was unhappy to see reports that were sympathetic to Iraqi people because he had no sympathy for them. Steve Doocy described war protestors as "knuckleheads," and Bob Sellers declared that he had every intention of being biased when he said, "Am I slanted and biased? You damn well bet I am" (p. 35). The bias of Fox News is not trivial, according to Tatham. Herman and Chomsky’s analysis of media describes it well—market share. Fox News is the leading cable news provider, and most Americans no longer rely on network news, but on cable news services. Combined with this media influence was the still recent emotional responses from the 9/11 attacks; it did not take much more to convince the majority of Americans that the President’s case for war was valid. By the time President Bush stated, "Confronting the threat posed by Iraq is crucial to winning the war on terror" (p. 39), a large portion of Americans agreed. And for those who disagreed, they were either ignored or denigrated by U.S. media services.

Initially, just before the war started and shortly after, America’s intention to engage Arab audiences was clear. Several military leaders and administration officials appeared on Al-Jazeera, including Secretary of State Colin Powell and Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice. It did not take long, however, for good relations between Al-Jazeera and the American administrators to begin to unravel, especially after images of American POWs were released over Al-Jazeera airwaves and tapes of Osama bin Laden, which some believed contained secret messages to Al-Qaeda sympathizers, were also aired. At the same time, Al-Jazeera and other Arab news reporters were frustrated because they were unable to obtain enough and/or quality information from Coalition sources, even though they had been promised full access. Many reporters, unable to get the required information, removed themselves from Coalition news sources. Unsurprisingly, many reports coming from Arab journalists were lacking in specific details and facts because they were not provided access. Added to the lack of access was the outright hostility shown to Arab journalists even though they were polite, based mostly on the perception that Coalition forces had of their news broadcast stations. To be sure, Al-Jazeera was not without bias. For example, one host, Yuis Al-Quaradawi, although condemning the 9/11 attacks, called for a jihad in response to attacks on Iraq. Other critics of Al-Jazeera, appropriately most likely, were angered by the apparent sympathy given to Osama bin Laden in the station’s news casts. Other programs were outwardly critical of President George Bush. One program went so far as to present a program just before the invasion speculating on the connections between the Bush administration and oil companies and the war. Nevertheless, "even this is debatable and in essence no different from some of the more controversial output of the BBC’s" programming" (p. 127). Graphic images caused even more controversy, though, such as the presentation of dead Iraqi bodies along with the caption that read, "Liberated by US bombs"(p. 129).

Regardless of the bias of Al-Jazeera, which is sure, the effort to engage the Arab people in a positive response to America itself did not materialize. The objective to win the "hearts and minds" of the Arab world was ambitious to say the least, but the strategies used were an utter failure. How could America help Muslims reject extremist ideas? "Surely one of the most obvious is to engage with the Arab media and not demonize them or try to clone them in one’s own mold" (p. 212). Immediately after 9/11, President Bush proclaimed, "you are either with us or with the terrorism." Most people in the Arab world were neither for or against America, but this attitude helped to dichotomize the situation. Bush further dichotomized the situation by assigning either good or evil to the various actors involved. The American media further fed the fears of the "Arab Street," and there was no real collaboration between Arab media and Western media to help alleviate the differing perceptions. I agree with Tatham’s assessment that instead of ostracizing Al-Jazeera, western officials and sources should have worked harder to maintain positive relations. After all, the role of the media in forming attitudes is pervasive and powerful. Whether or not America "wins" the war in Iraq, it certainly lost an important moment when it could have won the hearts and minds of Arab people, at least a little. Instead, many are deeply resentful and angry regarding what they see as American occupation in Iraq.

Tatham provides a detailed and comprehensive investigation of Arab and American news outlets, Arab and American journalistic experiences and their relationship with the military, and a variety of other factors to explore why America lost its campaign to win "Arab Hearts and Minds." He provides significant and powerful examples all throughout the text to support his argument, and he does so with a variety of viewpoints. He shows a sensitivity to Arab values and perceptions that are much more sophisticated and knowledgeable than most Western writers, in my opinion. I only hope that the next president of the United States will pay attention to such investigations, and perhaps he or she will do a better job at winning the minds and hearts of Arabs in the future. If not, I worry, like so many others, that the Middle East landscape will dissolve into violence and chaos. Tatham’s book provides important lessons on how America could do better in its effort to win over Arab hearts and minds, an effort critical to the future of world peace.

Tatham, Steve. Losing Arab Hearts and Minds. New York: Front Street Press, 2006.