Irena Chiru
National Intelligence Academy, Romania

Motto:

Bad assumptions or misunderstandings cannot lead to good policies or programs.

Abstract

There has long been discussion over the relation between mass media and terrorism and much of it concerned the ways terrorists make use of media institutions as instruments for their cause. One solid argument is that all recent terrorist acts have been widely presented to the public and this contributed to an increase of fear and panic among the population but also disseminated the terrorists’ ideas.

In this paper, we propose an inverse perspective: how to imply mass media in counteracting one of the main global threats of this century, terrorism? We consider that mass media have the capacity to provide a significant amount of information in an unforeseen situation, while radio and television have the capacity to directly keep the public in touch to the victims and their families. Equally, the mass media may provide information referring on developments and make recommendations concerning the protection of the civil population.

Romania too, after the global terrorist attacks, structured a new security principle according to which informing the public and communicating with the mass media are two of the pillars of the counter-terrorism communication programs. They are all the more useful, considering that the modern terrorists strategy places civilians in front of the war.

At first sight, in the triangle of terrorism, mass media and government, the media would be implied in the fight against terror, siding with the governmental forces. Still, during the past four decades the majority of the mass media studies have insisted on their role as an essential factor and a weapon for disseminating terror. Moreover, the confluence of interest between the media - that is for unique, scoop news - and the terrorist organisations - that is even for a few minutes or words in the public area of expression (television, radio or newspapers) has raised debates about the possible complicity of today media in terrorist acts. The frequent conclusion stated that terrorism reacts and uses the mass media in the same way as the media take benefit of the terrorist acts.

Considering the high number of approaches to the subject, the differences in interpretation are less significant. The studies on the theme began in the 8^th decade of the last century, but since then they have not received major changes. A short survey of the opinions expressed in this concern is relevant (as annotated by Hickey, 1977, Biernatzki, 2002 and Combs, 2003):

·         Frederick Hacker notes that “if the mass media did not exist, terrorists would have to invent them, In turn, the mass media hanker after terrorist acts because they fit into their programming needs: namely sudden acts of great excitement that are susceptible, presumably, of quick solution. So there’s a mutual dependency” (1978).

·         Walter Laqueur - “the media are terrorist’s best friend …terrorists are the super-entertainers of our time” (1987).

·        Raymond Tanter clarifies the relationship dilemma “since the terror is aimed at the media and not at the victim, success is defined in terms of media coverage. And there is no way in the West that you could not have media coverage because you’re dealing in a free society” (apud Combs, 2003, 138).

• Yonah Alexander - the media provide terrorist groups with useful tools that serve their propaganda and psy-war ends (1978).
• M. Cherif Bassinouni - the psychological effect of a particular violent act may be considerably more significant than the act itself, and that effect may be largely a creation of the media (1981).
• J. Bowyer Bell - the media-terrorist relationship is symbiotic, with the media coverage spreading the effect of a spatially limited act to a wide public (1978).
• Ralph E. Dowling - terrorism is a rhetorical genre, whose violence gives access to the media that its perpetrators cannot achieve through ordinary forms of discourse (1986).
• Walter B. Jaehning - terrorists recognise that their best route to public recognition is through appealing to traditional news values: drama, conflict and tragedy - as fuelled by competition among the media (1978).
• Patricia R. Palmerton - the rhetoric of terrorism is in part depending on media coverage for its impact (1983, 1985).
• Alex P. Schmid and Janny de Graaf - certain elements in the Western media encourage the use of violence and can “to some extent precondition the response of readers to terrorist news” (1982).
• Robert G. Picard (1991[1986]) and Miquel Rodrigo (1991) - although the mass media form an important part of the environment in which terrorists operate there is no credible scientific evidence that establishes “a cause-effect relationship between media coverage and the spread of terrorism. Not only that the mass media cannot be scientifically shown to be the sole source of the complex phenomenon of terrorism, but terrorism cannot even be shown to be “fundamentally” an act of communication. This assumption is based on the grounds that although some terrorist acts clearly are done with the intention of seeking publicity, others are done without that intention, and some are even done in secret (ibid.,  29).

The blood, the victims, the good or bad heroes, the political crime, the exotic, the mystery, the incomprehensible are current ingredients of the terrorist act, such as rendered profitable and spread by the media by virtue of the impact. “The terrorists have quickly accepted a major lesson: the mass-media are of crucial importance in their campaigns, the terrorist act itself is near to nothing, while the publicity is everything. Nevertheless, media, constantly needing diversity and new prospects, are false friends. The terrorists must constantly innovate. They are somehow the super-entertainment of our times” (Laqueur, 1987, 305).

Terrorists often behave like specialists in communication and a fundamental component of terrorist strategy is he media strategy – that part of the terrorist activity, the reason of which is the deliberate orientation to media conversion. The latter implies particular ways of action, particular targets, particular weapons, which make up as many “recognising marks”. “It is there the core of a message, of an ideology. A kind of marketing of the terrorist groups is also available” (Jean-Luc Marret, 2002, 165).

Elaborating veritable “media” or “marketing” plans, targeting a certain public segment, the terrorist organisation relies on two types of effects (ibid., 166). The first is the effect of saturation, obtained through multiple assaults concentrated over a short period of time, in randomly chosen public places. The result is a generalised state of panic and insecurity resulting from the possibility that such an attack may occur in any place, at any time (the example of Hamas). The second effect is that of targeting particular symbols of the aimed-at entity or particular known personalities. The result, in this case, is decreasing the general morale, but particularly decreasing the confidence in the capacity of the attacked system to keep the terrorist menace under control (the most eloquent in this case is the Al-Qaeda strategy within the last century).

M. Wieviorka and D. Wolton identified a series of risks with respect to manipulating the press by the terrorists through the instrumentality of internal and external conditioning of the mass media institutions (Wieviorka, Wolton, 1987, 83). A first risk deriving from the journalists’ primordial mission – informing – lies in the possibility that the media invent explanations for the terrorist acts or take them over from politically involved sources, without having the necessary leisure and information for developing an adequate idea about what happens. Moreover, the motivations of the competent journalists place them in the subjectivity sphere from the very beginning.

For getting near the terrorist environment, a journalist must show a certain fascination and empathy for the thinking and action manner particular to this environment. The terrorists may use this curiosity weapon as a seduction weapon. The risk of shifting from a neutral statement to an involving one, namely interpretations and justifications, increases proportionally to journalist’s getting near the environment which fascinates him. The terrorists are in fact interested in blocking the communication processes. Consequently they will only give information to a journalist provided that the latter gives the public what they want to be given.

Any other position adopted by the journalist entails wasting hard and costly work, such as the journalistic investigation. The professionals of the event are consequently confronted with a choice: they either report the phenomenon from outside, depending on the official versions, unclear and incompetent, or they start an investigation in the core of the problem which, behind the evident risks, makes them dependent on the manipulating message of the terrorists.

From this situation, another risk results, symmetrically opposed to the preceding one: the temptation to give too much credit to the official message (political, police, special services). Manipulating crops up, in this case, not in relation to the facts, but through influencing the analysis framework, the perspective from which facts are seen in the context in which journalists absolutely need information.

James Curran (2002, 77) made a short survey of the virtually detrimental effects of the accentuated media shifting of the terrorist act:

·      platform for expressing the extremist concepts which bring about violence and undermine the state authority;

·      contagion - through presenting spectacular terrorist acts, the probability that other groups should also adopt the same methods increases;

·      undermining ongoing police operations by presenting their working methods and devices etc. thus endangering the life of the hostages and of the order forces;

·      inducing a pressure over the authorities which limits the power of taking decisions;

·      reinforcing the feeling of power experienced by terrorists, especially in pathologic cases, resulting in an artificial prolongation of the incidents and an increasing of the gravity of the consequences;

·      misrepresentation of the spectacular, thrilling side of the events through the competitive nature of the journalistic activity, the result of which is transforming public violence into entertainment to the detriment of information;

·      footage and certain practices related to it (telephone conversation with the terrorists) make the journalists direct participants to the event and puts them in positions for which they do not have the necessary competence (negotiator, law person etc.).

From a different perspective, M. Wieviorka and D. Wolton (1987, 8) identify, next to the role of media in propagating terrorist menace, another role, which is essential in functioning of a democracy affected by the terrorism: the contribution to determining the representations of the public about menace and the response of the society to the phenomenon:

§  reveals the deficiencies of the political power;

§  informs about police work;

§  questions about the role of the law and of the intelligence services.

The idea of a mutual relation is doubled by a special hypostasis of the media: not as much as a counter instrument but rather as a generator of the terrorist action. It doesn’t, of course, mean that the mass media plan or deliberately suggest terrorist attacks. Nevertheless the implication of the media has frequently been analysed to decide whether the journalistic coverage of terrorism has been decisive in choosing a certain way of action (for example direct bombing versus hostage taking).

As against these different opinions which is the most appropriate interpretation for the role of mass media in the terrorist acts? Is the media only the responsible instrument in informing the public about the actors and the events on the international scene? Or is it “the whore” whose favours are available to anyone who has a gun (Hickey, 1977)? Certainly, recent history and its tragic events (New York, Moscow, Madrid or London) confirmed the above thesis. But at the same time they have made the present situation an unprecedented challenge for the media. The ways these attacks are organised seem to be similar to the way media events are carefully organised and especially directed for target audiences. And the efficiency seems to be guaranteed by the theatre effect that is obtained through rapid and dramatic communication.

Media and Counteracting Terrorism

The third perspective that we propose is an inverse perspective: how to imply the mass media in counter terrorism? If the XX^th century terrorists learned to use the media in their own interest, is there any chance to involve the media as a responsible actor in the fight against terror?

It is well known and generally accepted that the mass media have the capacity to provide a significant amount of information in an unforeseen situation, while radio and television have the capacity to directly keep the public in touch with the victims and their families. Equally, the mass media may provide information referring to the progress of the events and may make recommendations concerning the protection of the civil population.

Therefore the mass media must be an important part in any educational counter terrorism program: (1) as a reliable channel or interface with the citizens, and as an agency through which the public is informed with respect to the events and the vectors interacting in the public interest arena and (2) as a responsible actor often featuring on the scene of the terrorist act. Of course, the success or the failure of such programs decisively depends on the professionalism of the actors and the maturity of the democratic system in which they act. That is why informing also the mass media representatives with respect to the security problems, and forming a security culture, to secure a balanced reaction on behalf of the press, are indispensable efforts.

Counter-terrorism communication programs have originated in understanding that a country which is confronted with the terrorist menace must, of course, prepare not only its soldiers, but also its citizens. And its mass media, we may say. It was particularly after the September 11 attacks, that in most democratic countries the institutions empowered with prerogatives in the field of national security have started informing campaigns which were intended to increase the alerting degree regarding terrorism (for example, United States’ initiative - Antiterrorism. Personal Protection, Guide: A Self-Help Guide to Antiterrorism).[i] The programs aim to help the public in coping with terrorism focusing on a comprehensive explanatory/educational policy for changing the public attitude towards terrorism. They aim to diminish the level of irrational anxiety and strengthen the morale and the sense of personal safety with respect to the threat. Consequently, the communication programs are based on understanding the fact that promoting and defending the national interests must be doubled by knowing, rendering valuable and accepting the latter by the public opinion. Because „it is much less probable that people should come to panic if they know what happens” (Singer, 2001). [ii]

The main benefits of the communication programs aiming at education for security culture are reflected by the strategic goals of this education type. A carefully thought-out campaign (for different segments of public, with different information expectances or needs) may change or improve perception of what security means and of the citizen’s part in building security, thus entailing advantages for the security state itself.

Concretely, by means of these communication programs, the citizens receive information with respect to the terrorist phenomenon: danger sources, terrorist organisations, means and methods used by the latter, implications on a national or local plan, recommendations regarding people’s reaction in case of a terrorist attack. Last but not least, such campaigns also offer the citizens a telephone number which they may use for reporting any unusual situations that are currently associated to a terrorist attack.

Romania’s Experience

At first sight, such counter-terrorist preparation programs for the population of Romania may seem an unjustified initiative. Nevertheless, evoking the attacks of March 11, 2004 in Madrid, September 1–3 in Beslan and July 7 in London - which proved that September 11 was not an isolated case and that terrorist attacks can blow targets indirectly and undiscriminating– has decisively changed the perspective.

In Romania, the security culture is directly related to developing a stable democracy. It may be generated by informing and indirectly making the population responsible regarding the values, norms and rights which may guarantee laying the social and individual life on a basis of liberty and democracy values. Thus, the security culture represents more than a social behaviour exercise. It is built upon a coherent legislative system, upon an efficient control of the tendencies to restrict the individual rights and liberties which may be adopted by the political power and the state institutions and upon a powerful civil society, active and responsible, which should shape the citizens’ behaviour, with respect to promoting both national security and the citizens’ interests.

Romania too, after such attacks, structured a new security attitude principle, stating that individual security is to be found within any security system based on the fundamental human rights and liberties. This principle is however completed by the necessity of explaining the position of citizen not only as a beneficiary of security state, but also as an effective, contributive participant, since individual security is part and result of the collective one, and an intelligence service can only be efficient, in full legality, if the citizens which it serves support it in its measures.

Romania on the Map of Terrorism and the United States’ Troops at the Black Sea. A Communication Project for Appropriate Representations

In May, the Romanian Parliament approved, by 257 votes for and one vote against and 29 abstains, the request of the interim president regarding the entry and stay of USA forces on the Romanian territory for the entire period of applicability of the agreement between Romania and the USA signed on December 6th 2005.

The presence of American troops on the Romanian territory is considered to be a decisive contribution to the extension of security and projection of stability towards the Middle East, as integral part of the global effort to fight against terrorism. By virtue of these security objectives, Romania contributes to the fight against international terrorism. According to the Romanian officials, the stationing of the American troops brings benefits to Romania: “The privileged military relations with the Washington authorities will lead to the strengthening of bilateral cooperation at all levels and will generate greater trust in the business environment. Other consequences of this decision will be the development of high level political dialogue between the governments of the two countries, and, at European level, the assertion of Romania as a leading actor with an active role in deepening trans-Atlantic relations” (Romanian Prime Minister Călin Popescu Tăriceanu).

The US Government will send its first military troops to Romania and Bulgaria starting this summer. In Romania the USA will have military bases and training centres at Mihail Kogălniceanu, Babadag, Cincu and Smîrdan. The number of military to be employed in Romania-based units will not go over 3,000. The main purpose of the exercises to be developed is to ensure the regional stability and to maintain presence in the Caucasian and Black Sea area.

As compared with all these official arguments, the Romanian mass media proposed a different discourse. In opposition to the diplomatic dissertation, the Romanian mass media (especially the newspapers) have underlined the terrorist risk rather than the advantages that Romania may obtain. Paradoxically, the presence of the American troops would bring more insecurity that security for the Romanian people. Romania would become a target on the terrorists’ map of action simply because it directly contributes to the fight against terrorism.

This fear was somehow emphasised by Washington’s official request addressed to the Czech Republic and Poland to play key roles in the expansion of its anti-missile protection system by placing a radar station and interceptor missiles on their soil. The United States, which already has a network of early warning satellites, radars and interceptor missiles in Alaska and California, wants to extend its defence umbrella to Europe by 2011 to deal with the threat of possible rocket attacks from Iran or North Korea. According to the Czech Republic’s Prime Minister, Mirek Topolanek, the deployment of the US missile shield in Central Europe would "not only reinforce the security of the Czech Republic but also its allies" and the US project is "strictly defensive", in line with NATO plans. Once again and paradoxically, the comments in the Romanian press rather underlined the dangers that come together with the “international defence umbrella” than the benefits.

Certainly, the current interpretation offered by the Romanian media has influenced people’s representation about “the United States troops at the Black Sea”. The more so as people cannot know such a subject directly, but mostly by means of the press, television and radio. And in addition to influencing people in this respect, media interpretation shapes the people’s representation concerning all the proximate themes (such as “security in Romania” or “the risk of terrorism”, “the North-Atlantic Alliance”) and generally Romanian external affairs. This brings the potential risk of generating and supplying stereotypes. This latter assumption does not need but the well-known arguments:

·        first because mass media have an incontestable role in shaping the representations about reality;

·        second, because media selective depiction of reality apparently provides the most salient information for people on risks, hazards and disasters, also on terrorist acts;

·         third, because most people have little real understanding of what goes on and what affects the production of news. The news is read as reality.

The implied problems may vary and be surely counterproductive for security: unjustified panic, anxiety and fear. B.P. Foreman (1953) summarised the facilitating factors for panic, and two important factors - besides people’s lassitude – are relevant for the current argument. It is the lack of information considering the dangerous situation and the rumours that decisively facilitate panic (and in Foreman’s interpretation, these two are separated from the starting factors - the danger itself).

In this respect, our communication project is meant to counteract false representation that can lead to exaggerate reactions such as fear and panic. We are firmly convinced that:

1. unless people have a good understanding of what actually happens, there is little point in trying to extrapolate from past situations to how the citizenry and the mechanism of the social system might be used to counter terrorism;

2. bad assumptions or misunderstandings cannot lead to good policies or programs;

3. in certain situations, having an informed and prepared population may represent a defining advantage.

This communication program would mediate the relation with the public and thus assures reactions (or at least the premises of some reactions) supporting the security and the measures taken by the state authorities. In our opinion it should contain two levels of intervention: one for the relation with the mass media and one for the relation with the citizens.

The program would comprise:

1. A preliminary analysis that should adequately evaluate the present situation: the media representations, and the social representations concerning the campaign theme;

2. The objectives: to correctly inform the public, to explain in rational terms and to educate the public (attitudes and behaviours). It seems essential to explain the decision in the larger context of Romania’s geopolitical interest;

3. The target-public – the mass media, the citizens;

4. The communication channels – mainstream mass media (with high audience or specialised in news);

5. The message – an unbiased one that should present the advantages but also the disadvantages, the opportunities and also the threats. The main and representative “voices” for the message are the experts on political and geopolitical issues, security analysts who should explain the decision in the larger context of Romania’s geopolitical interest;

6. The schedule, the budget and the post program evaluation procedures.

Concretely, such an initiative would take the form of a nationwide debate concerning the presence of American troops on Romanian’s Black Sea shore. Its conclusions will offer an insight of the extent to which such a decision is accepted and also of the implications that are assigned voluntarily or not.

It must be noticed that the mass media are a target public, and maybe the most important one because they assume a high position in guaranteeing success with the other public (the citizens). Therefore, another special part of the program should address particularly to the media in the form of a training campaign. A campaign that approaches broader aspects such as national security and also specific ones - directly subordinated to the main campaign theme. In our opinion there are two important ideas the media should reflect on: publish the official “side of the story” and separate official information from the journalists’ opinions.

Conclusions

False representations usually lead to misunderstandings and to incorrect and harmful decisions. Moreover, when it comes to external affairs and national interest, the importance of appropriate representations needs no arguments. A theme as “the United States’ troops in Romania”, together with all its implications and connected themes will certainly be included in the public debate. But without official information - conceived and transmitted in proper forms (as suited and available to public opinion), the representations will develop along the popular beliefs and stereotypes. Exaggeration of risks and accentuation of some aspects (most probable stress of the negative implications) are frequent mechanisms in social representations. And without supplementary information, the representations are considered reality. But in this case, unjustified exaggeration of the terrorist risk can bring but disadvantages.

The importance of preparing the population has been tested countless times (for example, during the terrorist attacks such as hostage takings) and it is incontestable. Preparing the population must aim at the two sizes of the security, on both the offensive side, and the defensive side. In other words, the population must be informed and prepared through the communication programs, to apprehend possible dysfunction or vulnerabilities which may indicate the preparation of a terrorist action, but must be simultaneously prepared to react in crisis situations caused by terrorist actions (for example, managing the panic or giving first aid). This brings a new approach to the potential conflict between “communicating” versus "keeping the secret”. To illustrate, we cite a significant (contrary example) assertion of an American censor during World War II: „I shall tell them nothing until everything has finished and then I shall tell them who is the winner" (Knightley, 2001, apud Biernatzki, 2002).

In their turn, the mass media are a port-parole in the counter-terrorist preparation of the population. Responsible media, of course. Journalists bear a heavy responsibility as they control a powerful instrument that, when used appropriately, informs the citizenry with accurate, reliable information necessary for an open society. Journalists also act as a watchdog against oppression and a voice for the otherwise voiceless. Still, media’s words and images can also be an instrument of evil purposes, whether intentional or not.

As they become media events, terrorist acts, even the potential ones, need special regulations. Journalistic standards of ethics, while not universal in their content, already exist in many areas of the media. But while almost all journalistic standards include the responsibility to report truthfully and accurately, surprisingly few overtly list a responsibility to “minimise harm.” Once more, a balanced mass media reaction may also counterbalance what A. P. Schmid calls “the intrinsic escalate imperative” which demands that the terrorists should commit most bizarre and cruel acts to gain attention. This is the main „perverse effect” of the media coverage of the terrorist phenomenon, among other numerous effects, roles and functions of the media within the social system.

In an open society, it is impossible to guarantee that the antiterrorist strategies and actions will not be blocked or interrupted by certain  more or less responsible journalistic practices. “As terror is directed towards the media and not towards the victims, its success is defined in terms of media related coverage. And there is no way in the West that you could not have media coverage because you’re dealing in a free society” (Combs, 2003, 138).

Nevertheless, in systems characterised by a solid political culture and mature democratic practice, media contributions to the antiterrorist fight are significant. This statement is not an a priori truth, it is not a lemma of the public space, nor is it a prophecy either. Where no universally valid laws and concepts exist, but only variables and abstract notions, where the pluralism and the democratic game constantly establishes and re-evaluates the dimensions and definitions of the latter, the only supporting point of all the involved entities is the regulatory principle. The above statement represents this regulatory principle of the system, without which no homeostasis may exist.

Therefore, a communication program concerning counter-terrorism should be supplemented with the recommendation that the mass media should avoid the sensational and the exaggeration in covering such events. Excluding the mass media censorship is, beyond any ethic and legal considerations, a practical and functional necessity for a system which wants to be democratic. Otherwise the system is not functional.

Media coverage is the „terrorism oxygen”, as in the well-known words of ex Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. There is considerable difference of opinion as to whether the measures to deprive terrorists of “the oxygen of publicity” - on which they strive - are attacks on that legal tradition or simply reasonable precautions taken by government faced with crisis situation. As one commentator noticed, “nobody calls it censorship when Mafia spokesman are not allowed to explain, over the airwaves, why it is advisable to pay protection money” (Combs, 2003, 142).

But the same media transmission is also the oxygen of the public space and, implicitly, of democracy. Restricting the freedom of the press by means of the legal norms gives way to variants which may lead to censorship. That is why media censorship may bring to a suffocation of the terrorism, yet it brings, at the very same time, a suffocation of the liberal democracy: killing the whole body to eliminate one parasite.

As a functional alternative, particular to a democratic society, the self-regulation seems to be, in specialists’ opinion, the most reliable solution. This very idea is reflected by a resolution of EU Parliamentary Assembly concerning the journalistic ethic: „Besides the rights and duties stipulated by the legislation in force, the media assume, in front of the citizens and of the society, a moral responsibility which must be taken into account nowadays, when the information and communication are highly important for both developing the personality of the citizens and for the evolution of the society and of the democratic life” (Resolution no. 1003/1993 of UE Parliamentary Assembly concerning the journalistic ethic). Hence, applying the solution of self-regulation may create the premises for resolving both the interests of the press and the national interests.

Keywords: terrorism, the role of mass media, education for counter-terrorism, communication for counter-terrorism.

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*** Resolution no. 1003/1993 of UE Parliamentary Assembly concerning the journalistic ethic.