Abstract
Accepting impartiality as the criterion of justice the
question is gone through in this text addresses how John
Rawls’ conception of justice could be transferred into
positive law. In this point of view Rawls’ original position
is interpreted as the origin of the common purpose of
maximisation of individual options in the real life, so
freedom is just a synonym for exactly this certain
quality of existence. Out of that perspective justice is a
manageable problem of optimisation by calibrating common
interests. The model of the Pareto-Optimum qualifies the
task among people in the original position to concede
options to each other until there are no more options to
grant without curtailing another. The author seeks to show
how Rawls principle of difference leads to the rules of
distribution of income anonymous persons would rationally
choose. Linking different discourses in philosophy, social
policy and economy it is striven to outline a draft of
arithmetical justice in redistribution which tries to
actualise common human interests.
Introduction
Possibly disabled to specify the originations one may
intuitively say that the circumstances in the world are
structurally unjust. Making up the balance the presettings
of co-operation in contemporary global society are affected
by massive malfunctions. Basic needs of a sizeable part of
world population can’t be filled within the present social
order. So approximately almost one half of people all over
the world lives in precarious to horrible conditions. About
2,7 bn. people don’t have sanitarian facilities, 1,3 bn. do
not have access to fresh water, same number is in funds of
less than 1 USD a day, 800 Mio. people don’t have medical
care and suffer from hunger (Haub, 2002). As well in the
industrialised countries there is an obvious defect of
division of labour among people to be stated. A contingent
of people is unemployed while there is an infinite amount of
work undone lacking remuneration. Facing the present global
security situation the current institutions furthermore are
obviously not convenient to provide a common system of
attack omission (Hart, 1973), a fundamental purpose of
social order.
On
the other hand the life’s work of John Rawls still leaves
the helplessness behind what inference could be made out of
it concerning the structures of welfare state. This project
subsumes the persuasion that the definition of political
settings validly can be evaluated and created by political
theory. Thereby my reception of John Rawls’ “Theory of
Justice” follows the notion of Condorcets
mathématique social that asks for
anticipatory scientific coordination of the individuals
actions (Dippel, 1981: 156f). According to Quines
ontological statement "To be [...] is to be [...] the value
of a variable" (Quine, 1953: 13) the social question deals
with the problem, which conditions are to charter, so that
certain social variables don’t reach a precarious value.
Thereby a marginal utility as a just level of redistribution
is to be identified. At last I seek to elaborate a
conception of the notion of an arithmetical justice,
which could serve as a basic constitutional form to be
approximated by positive law.
Among scientific disciplines it is the privilege of
political philosophy to make a clean sweep and reconstruct
the social world up from the beginning without care for the
remainings of former erroneous developments.
Adopting Rawls’ “Theory of Justice”
To
pick up the line of argument it is necessary to restart with
Rawls’ concept of justice, bringing to mind to what extent
the thought of the original position could be used to gain
political rules out of it.
If
we look out for fair rules of social interaction, we always
do it here an in the now. Some people live very well in the
actual society, others have to struggle hard just for their
livelihood. How could we find just rules of co-existence
than? Dworkin compared this situation with a round of card
players who try to specify the rules of their game while
they already hold their cards in hands. This is a most
difficult venture and leads - even if majorities are to be
found - not necessarily to fair rules (Dworkin, 1990: 67).
Now those, who deliberate about a just society, can’t
abandon their social positions easily. Karl Mannheim
referred to how obviously thinking is caught in social
positions, whereby he also sees the possibility to make
oneself aware of these social limitations of the knowledge
and thoughts by intellectual abstraction and to control it
in that way (Mannheim, 1969). Thus one can try to imagine
oneself on which rules one would have voted for, before the
cards were distributed. This problem Rawls tries to
illustrate with his thought experiment of the original
position. In my opinion participants of negotiation in this
initial situation are enabled to state substantially more
extensive definitions with practical consequences than the
ones were declared by Rawls. Out of Rawls’ conception of
justice there are statements of two different qualities to
be derived, which refer to each other. In the long run the
found rules are the results of a consideration process,
which each rationally thinking human without knowledge of
its identity would reconstruct by reasonable considerations.
It is enough to know that there will be at least one further
person, with who one has to find obligatory rules. From this
result the formulation of declarations in first and second
order as quasi-objective human interests evolve - which
exhibit only theoretical content - and practical claims,
each asserted by political rules for its security. As Rawls
suggested these claims in later real situations can’t be put
into question by national right, as long as their owners act
according to the found rules.
The
notional persons who meet in the original position wear a
veil of ignorance, an imposed uncertainty about their later
positions taken in the society and unknowing their
characteristics as well. In view of the position of the
involved in the original position one can say there is a
desire for certain basic goods that belongs to a state of
being reasonable. These uncertain people would agree to
rules, which correspond to such interests, which they all
share with each other equally. And because therein they
agree in their interests, they will find a consent for
certain basic rules easily. The participants of this
situation of negotiation are conscious about that the rules
in which they agree henceforth are obligatory and final
principles. They were found in consideration of possible
consequences and serve to adjust later relations between
people. In the lack of information about the own social
position each participant of negotiation at the same time
already attend to the interests of the other and vice versa.
All agreements made there are fair, because they are
impartial.
The
rules free and reasonable people in such situation would
decide are plausible: First of all they would accept that
they have common interests as well as conflicting. A clash
of interest consists e.g. of how the goods produced in
co-operation are distributed. Under the described conditions
of this thought experiment reasonable persons without
identity would try to guarantee that even the worst
position, which results from the agreement for one is still
acceptable. The two well known principles, Rawls expatiated
– everyone could agree to:
1.
The principle of equal liberty, according to which all
people are on an equal footing. Everyone has equally
requirement on most extensive basic liberties, which are
compatible with the interests of all others.
2.
The difference principle, which means that an inequality is
justified if even the least one in the society obtains an
advantage out of it (Rawls, 1975: 336).
The
quasi-objective interests of people
To
transform these to principles into a political agenda there
has to be added a systematisation of human interests before.
In contrast to the following category of an agreements’
quality the first one just as a preliminary idea helps to
become aware of ones own domain of interests. Practical
impact on the reality on earth makes only the next
consideration quality of second order. Rawls’ idea of the
original position refers to the notion that among anonymous
participants certain interests are common, to which everyone
would agree according to rational reasons. Here the
objectivity of these interests is understood in the sense of
impartiality. First of all it has to be accepted that life
drafts and goals of individuals can’t be generalised,
especially against the background of different values and
life-styles. Thus needs simply cannot be universalised. The
only statement, which is generally applicable to such
different subjects with certainty, is the following. In the
difference of their interests the single request they all
have in common is to achieve most possible options,
so they can go for their own subjective aspirations
optimally. So, one could recognize this even as another
preceding principle that the people in the original position
would agree to: All rules have to serve to impartial
maximization of individual options. This insight precedes
that one - later in the real life - possibly will not need
all options, which were granted by resolution in the initial
situation. But it is much easier to refuse some of them then
one would have to fight for them against the others
laboriously. The hermit, who according to fair
distributional rules is entitled to more income than he
would like to have, can give it away easily. But someone -
disadvantaged by social inequity - will hardly convince a
court referring to the Rawls’ concepts of justice to
guarantee him benefits if this is not according to law. Of
course egos liberty always confines at the one of alter. But
it is vague to assume that the ambitions of the individuals
aggregate to the wealth of the public. Instead there is a
concentration of power and property arising, which only can
balanced to the interest of the society by a steady
feedback. In situations of negotiation with those, which
possess less and are more dependent on co-operation
therefore, more profit can be drawn out. Generally
inequality between people is inclined to strengthen. The
quite creative effecting principles of the competition and
co-operation must be shifted into certain equilibrium, so
that the liberty of the individual does not get into a
contradiction for equality. To clarify this relation the
term of general and particulate interests is to be
specified. General interests are to describe by their
relevance for everyone, they are independent from
restrictive characteristic of the person, e.g. sex, nation
or property. The last applies to particulate interests,
which prove themselves by the fact that theoretically a
certain number of other persons is conceivable, who pursue
an exactly contrary interest. Concerning this relation the
participants of negotiation in the original position would
decide for an absolute priority of the general
compared to the particulate interests. So a consent
within the initial situation is only possible in view of the
implementation of general interests, particulate interests
are only to be found in the real world, which have to be a
subject to political negotiations the right there.
The
general interests and their political protection
The
identification of practical claims in the original position
precedes the insight that in the real future world the
members of the society do not have the same preconditions
(resources and talents) to struggle for their own interests
themselves even if the procedures of intermediation of
interests are constituted fairly. That’s why the
participants of negotiation already in the initial situation
would insist on fixing general interests as much as possible
as inalienable fundamental rights. These have to be
consistent among each other, so they exhibit an objective
quality, because they are shared intersubjectively as the
participants of this mediative state would have granted it
themselves mutually. This constellation of interests
corresponds to the idea of the Pareto-Optimum. It stands for
a situation of distribution, where nobody’s position could
be improved without worsening the one of another (Gaertner,
1993: 18ff). Alike the task among people in the initial
situation is to concede options to each other until there
are no more options to grant without curtailing another.
The
outcome of basic rights is to be awarded to everyone up from
birth, because they are due to common impartiality and serve
for the implementation of the five following options. So the
declared rights are precious to each individual, they don’t
question another general interest, but maybe at worst only
future particulate interests. Therefore it is important to
designate these interests, but they don’t attain practical
impact until they are worded each in political rules.
•
The right for intact basic life resources would be agreed to
among the participants in the initial situation. Because
with the veil of ignorance none finally knows, what time one
would be born in, so one would like to be sure that this
fundamental option as a right to life is guaranteed.
•
The claim for mobility as being at liberty to choose and to
enter any place of residence in public space – this as a
general interest would be decided, too.
•
The award of universal rights of integrity, sovereignty of
the person as well as the freedom of opinion, religion and
information likewise belong to the options, which everyone
would include for oneself as it is meant by Locke already in
his contributions (Bouches/Kelly, 1997: 16, Waldron, 1997:
52f, Tompson, 1997: 85ff).
•
The goal of maximum economic options includes the claim to
property and a quota of participation on profits from any
co-operation.
•
The claim for being involved in the power, which is
exercised over one, as well is of interest of everyone. It
would get effectiveness by the political predefinition of
majority democracy.
But
some of the included rules, which do not refer to plausible
liberty rights, need to be discussed more detailed
Practice rules of social co-existence
The
definition of these rules of procedures is necessary for a
fair negotiation between particulate interests. They are
important to the persons in the initial situation, because
they don’t know their later particulate interests yet, but
they would like the intermediation of them to be based on
fair principles.
•
The participants of the initial situation would therefore
end up at the regulation that particulate interests should
be decided by vote of the majority procedure, in cause a
consent solution becoming difficult by increasing difference
between the interests. Democratic models of intermediation
between interests in global extent – like Hösle argued
(Idem, 1997) - surely would be specified. Thus the principle
of equality as well as the fundamental right of
participation in political power would be taken into
account.
•
Because the veil of ignorance also hides the affiliation to
a certain generation, the relation between generations is
quite crucial, and therefore regulation is needed. So there
is - like already mentioned by Rawls – a demand on the
principle of sustainability for justice between generation,
i.e. only resources may be used, which can be regenerated in
the same time. Thus, the accumulation of debts or the
practice to leave environmental costs or risks to subsequent
generations as well is to be prohibited (Suchanek, 1995).
•
But the main challenge is to deal with the social question
as an urgent task of the intermediation in the original
position.
Like in all other aspects of co-existence - which were
already discussed - the individual in the initial situation
has to calculate towards an equilibrium of costs and
benefits, and to balance which securities one wishes for
oneself necessarily. Concerning the financial income the
participants of negotiation would agree to a certain rule of
distribution. Thus, if someone has possibly an income of any
amount, this makes him unequal compared the others. In
accordance with Rawls’ second difference principle everybody
would have to gain an advantage out of it. The question of
the exact definition of the share’s extent is subject to the
consideration of those who don’t know whether they will be
the one benefiting from shares of other ones income or vice
versa. So the amount of share would be located somewhere
between 0 and 100 percent of the income. If the one with
some income had to deliver more than 50% of ones income,
then one would consider this amount of share as unfair, as
all others together would get more from this income, than
oneself, although one invested efforts in it. That’s why the
one with an income may be interested to let the amount of
share converge near 0%. But as involved people in the
original position the aware of the two different possible
situations - either the dispensing or the benefiting – one
would choose a rate of share at 50%. In this ambivalent
role potentially to be however beneficiary of other’s
profits and keeper of the own income in the same time a
probability of 1:1 would exist to find oneself on the one or
the other side of the average income in the real life. In
such prospects each rational individual would vote for the
following code of distribution: "I am ready to divide the
half of any income I obtain among all others, if everybody
does it in the same way.” So everyone should share with
everyone, but keeping the main portion of his or her
economic efforts. In such a way of distribution the two
principles of Rawls can be seen as fulfilled. However real
people may regard this conception as strange, because any
principle of efficiency and causation of the production of
value seem to be ignored, as people suddenly participate on
an income, they didn’t made any contribution to - so what is
the point of justice in this rule? All the economic
achievements, so income, - afforded by many generations
before – are not to be regarded as the product of a
particular individual, but always as a result of
co-operation with mankind as a whole.
Nevertheless the distribution of income is determined in a
way that the individual is incited to be economically
active, which is to everybody’s benefit. This leads to a
justification of a relative basic income, unconditional but
not as a social security at any costs. This suggested rule
of redistribution thus is a consistent compromise between
the justice principle of achievement and the justice
principle of equality as both are ranked equally which
easily can be shown arithmetically.
If
we assume that the income one earns (xi) –
because someone else is willing to pay for – represents his
or her produced results according to a principle of
achievement the distribution mode for the individual's
outcome (ŷ) would be the following.
I : ŷ
=
xi
And
if a distributive mode keeps to the justice principle of
equality one's outcome would consist of the average income
of all individuals (x
).
II : ŷ
=
x
Both modes in a synthesis would be a consistent compromise
of the two equal rules in one equation.
So
one shares his or her income and gets the half of the
average income back.
To visualize
that a redistributive share of 50 percent of the average
income was not found just intuitively or arbitrarily the
following model calculation may be helpful. There be the
assumption that the redistributive rate can reach a value
between 0 and 100 percent – 0 percent by exclusive validity
of the achievement principle and 100 percent by exclusive
validity of the equality principle of justice. The Rawlsian
attenuation of the notion of absolute equality by
introducing the difference principle is due to the insight
that a strict equal distribution of all profits of
cooperation reduces the amount of goods to share in cause of
decreasing economical incentives. So if one assumes that
value creation is decreasing by increasing redistributive
share one could draw a curve of all hypothetically possible
levels of a redistributive welfare state.
Graph 1: Amount of Basic and earned income by redistributive
rate
The
dark part of the columns within the picture above represents
the share of the average income, which accrues of the basic
income.
As
a general formula for the income to be expected in any
welfare state with a redistributive rate (1 ≥r ≥ 0)
and a basic income (Eg = r x ) is
as following:
So
it is obvious that an optimum can be allocated at a rate of
50 percent where the “advantage of the least advantaged”
(Rawls, 1975) is maximum – known as a so called “takehalf-solution”.
This leads to a substantiation of a relative basic income,
which is unconditional but not existence-securing. For the
final allocation of a just level of redistribution there is
an empirical gap to fill. So the outlined ideal correlation
between value creation and redistribution has to be analyzed
by empirical macro economical data, because an optimum of
basic income depends on it.
In
an era of globalisation there is no way in thinking the
welfare state as something else then global. A global
welfare system which guarantees for every inhabitant of the
world at least an unconditional basic income of nowadays
about 200 US$ per month minimum (1) would secure economical
inclusion and satisfy basic needs of everybody.
Endnotes
1.
Calculation based on data from Berlin-Institute for World
Population and Global Development (Haub, 2002).
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