The Abu Sayyaf: Terrorism in Sulu Province, Republic of Philippines or a Convenient Presence?

Abstract

The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), a fundamentalist Muslim resistance movement in the southern Philippines, has been strongly associated with terrorist activity in the predominantly Sunni Moslem Sulu Province of the Philippines, by the Arroyo Government and the USA Bush Administration. This paper examines the violence now occurring in Sulu in the context of the social and political changes occurring in that province. The paper argues that the existence of the ASG in Sulu is questionable, although it does exist as an organised fundamentalist Muslim resistance movement in other parts of the southern Philippines such as Basilan and Zamboanga. The paper further agues that the ASG in Sulu is a convenient name given to political opponents of the Arroyo Administration and to local banditry. The violence is not associated with any transnational or global violent Islamic fundamentalist struggle. Rather, it is based in local issues, not the least being corruption.  As well, the violence now occurring in Sulu provides a reason for the Arroyo Administration, with the support of the USA to conduct military operations against political opponents in the guise of being part of the so called Global War on Terror. Because of the precipitate actions of certain members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and of evidence of corruption and collusion with some bandit groups, innocent civilians are often victims of unlawful killings. Three conditions for a return to peace are proposed: first, the withdrawal of USA armed forces from Sulu; second, the cessation of military actions by the AFP in Sulu; and third, the empowerment of local officials and municipal administrators to pursue economic, political, and religious reform in Sulu.

Introduction

The difficulties of a Muslim minority population in trying to co-exist with a majority population in a non-Muslim state are profound. The challenges facing the Sunni Muslim population of Sulu are just as profound as the Muslims of Thailand or Burma/Myanmar. And, although there is no Philippine government policy which specifically discriminates against the Muslims in Sulu (see figure 1.) or indeed the entire Muslim population of the southern Philippines, policies are generally formulated which benefit the majority of the population in the Philippines, who for the most part are Christians.

Moreover, the Arroyo Administration, although engaging in peace talks with the two major Muslim para-military organisations namely the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) finds it necessary to have stationed in Sulu thousands of highly trained members of the AFP engaging in domestic counterinsurgency operations. Furthermore, the Arroyo Administration justifies these counterinsurgency operations as aiding the USA Bush Administration’s so called Global War on Terror.

Methodology

This paper was researched using data drawn from both primary and secondary sources. This included archival text analysis, statistical data from among other sources, Focus on the Global South, and personal communication from key players in various peace Non-government Organisations (NGOs) in the southern Philippines. More importantly, personal experiences were shared, and advice was forthcoming from Muslim leaders and Muslim academics in Sulu Province.  

Literature Review

Amina Rasul, from the Asian Institute of Management Policy Centre in the Philippines, who specialises in minority representation in the Philippines, believes social inequities and violence are inexorably linked. She wrote that where a section of the (Philippine) population feels marginalised, there exists the precondition for armed struggle (Rasul 2003). This is particularly relevant to Sulu, whose culture and ethnicity are manifestly different from the rest of the Philippine population, with the possible exception of the other five provinces of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, (ARMM); Lanao del Sur, Magindanao, Tawitawi, Basilan, and Shariff Kabunsuan.

Unlike Rasul, who does not advocate violence as a means of achieving social equality, Franz Fanon, an anti-colonialist from Algeria advocated insurgency accompanied by violence to achieve social equality. Fanon (1963) wrote, ‘the starving peasant, outside the class system, is the first among the exploited to discover that only violence pays’. Rasul and Fanon believed that inequality and violence were inseparable, especially when it involved minorities or exploited populace, and this theory could very well explain the contemporary violence now occurring in Sulu. However, Eric Gutierrez and Saturnino Borras (2003) have their own interpretation on why there has been an increase in contemporary violence in Sulu. According to them, it is the result of the proliferation of entrepreneurs in violence, whom they describe as those who use their reputations and capacity for violence to compete for the power to make decisions affecting inhabitants of an area. 

Gutierrez and Borras may blame the contemporary violence in Sulu on entrepreneurs in violence, and Rasul may believe that it is directly attributable to social inequality, however, Zachary Abuza, one of America’s leading researchers of insurgency in South-East Asia is in little doubt as to where the blame lies; the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Moreover, this is a belief shared by the Philippine Arroyo Administration and the USA Bush Administration. The Bush Administration has listed two Philippine organisations as enemy combatants in the so called Global War on Terror. One is the ASG; the other is the Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM).   Although Abuza (2005) recognises the ASG as an insurgency organisation in the southern Philippines he nevertheless believes the communist New Peoples Army (NPA) offeres a greater threat to Philippine domestic security.

If Abuza, the Arroyo Administration, and the Bush Administration are of the belief that the contemporary violence in Sulu is attributable to the ASG, which is estimated to be around 200 combatants, then this is a belief that is not shared by Victor Taylor[1] or indeed Herbert Docena[2], both of whom are of the opinion that the ASG simply does not exist in Sulu. They acknowledge the existence of the ASG in other provinces of the southern Philippines, but not Sulu. Taylor (2006) argues that almost every person killed in an encounter with the AFP in Sulu, ‘whether known or unknown is identified as an ASG member’. Whereas Docena (2007) argues that the existence of the ASG in Sulu gives the USA Special Forces an argument for legitimacy to conduct military operations in Sulu. 

With the above literature in mind, the following paper will argue that the existence of the ASG in Sulu is questionable at best, or indeed just simply not true.  This in turn begs the question of why so much domestic counterinsurgency activity is being directed at this small Philippine province by the AFP, aided and abetted by USA Special Forces.

The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

Originally formed around the early 1990s in the Sulu Archipelago Province of Basilan, its founders were in the most part former MNLF members. This extreme fundamentalist Islamic paramilitary group uses kidnapping and extreme violence, including beheadings, in an endeavour to pursue its goal for an independent Muslim state in the southern Philippines. Like the Taleban in Afghanistan, the ASG, if successful, would adopt a primitive medieval form of Islamic moral code in government.

In the mid to late 1990s the ASG was responsible for abducting, accompanied by demands for ransom, foreign Catholic priests, tourists, journalists and high profile local residents in the southern Philippines. In May 2000 the ASG kidnapped twenty-one mostly Western tourists from a resort on Sipadan Island, Malaysia. Flushed with success and ransom money, the ASG, in May 2001, again kidnapped tourists from a resort in Palawan, Philippines. Unlike the kidnappings in 2000, these hostages included three USA citizens one of whom, Guillermo Sobero, was beheaded, whilst the other two, Martin and Gracia Burnham were kept prisoners until June 2002 when a rescue attempt by the AFP resulted in the death of Martin Burnham and the release of his wife Gracia Burnham. With the terrorist attacks in the USA in September 2001 and the deaths of Sobero and Burnham the USA declared the ASG to be a terrorist organisation and as such was targeted in the Global War on Terror.

It is important to differentiate between the ASG in Basilan and the ASG group which is present in Sulu. The original ASG in Basilan which had Abdurajik Janjalani as its chairman, had an intelligence chief, Abdul Asshmad, and operations chief, Ibrahim Yacob, and was highly organised. Whereas the ASG in Sulu is, or was at best, comprised of local banditry who saw advantage in being likened to the ASG in Basilan. This in turn would give some credibility to their claim to be fighting for a broader Islamic agenda. As Taylor (2006) points out the Abu Sayyaf in Sulu is ‘a more complex phenomenon in the sense that it does not lend itself to the straightforward assessments made by government and military authorities regarding the group and its members’. With the above in mind the ASG in Sulu will hereafter in this paper be referred to as the Abu Sayyaf.     

The original founder and leader of the ASG, Abdurajik Janjalani, was killed by the Philippine National Police (PNP) on 18 December 1998 in Basilan Province: Sulu Archipelago. Following the death of Abdurajik Janjalani his younger brother Khadafi Janjalani (see figure 2.) assumed the role of leader of the ASG. He was subsequently killed by members of the AFP in September 2006 on Jolo Island; Sulu Province.

After the death of Khadafi Janjalani it was believed that Abu Solaiman assumed the role of leader of the Abu Sayyaf in Sulu Province. In January 2007 Abu Solaiman was also killed on Jolo Island in an armed encounter with members of the AFP (see figure 3). Consequently, in June 2007, four citizens of the island of Jolo received $US10 million (approximately 490 million Philippine pesos[3]) as a reward for information leading to the deaths of Janjalani and Solaiman. This reward money was distributed to the four citizens at a ceremony attended by USA Ambassador to the Philippines, Kristie A. Kenny. 

In 1967 the then Secretary General of the United Nations, U Thant, said ‘in times of war the first casualty is truth’. This simple observation could be applied to many local and international conflicts that have occurred since the USA action in the Vietnam War and can just as easily be applied to the contemporary military action in Sulu.     

There is a state of war in Sulu right now. That was the 30 March 2005 media statement of the Sulu Peace and Solidarity Mission of the Mindanao Peaceweavers in response to military action taken in February 2005 by the AFP against members of the MNLF supposedly in company with the Abu Sayyaf. At the time of the action the AFP put the number of MNLF troops at 1000 and the Abu Sayyaf at about 300. The AFP admitted to having 77 casualties and inflicting 137 casualties on the MNLF (the Abu Sayyaf was not mentioned). On the other hand the MNLF admitted to having 5 casualties and inflicting 300 casualties on the AFP (the presence of the Abu Sayyaf was again ignored).[4] If the number of Abu Sayyaf troops in Sulu in early 2005 was estimated by the AFP “at about 300” then this group has been very successful at recruiting, because in May 2003 the BBC News/ Asia Pacific referred to the Abu Sayyaf in Sulu  as ‘a few dozen armed Filipino Muslims whose main occupation is kidnapping for ransom’. In the same article it goes on to say that the Philippine Government is deploying thousands of troops with the aid of U.S.A. advises to eradicate the Abu Sayaff.

In September 2005, Zachary Abuza, one of the USA’s leading authorities on insurgency in South-East Asia put the number of Abu Sayyaf in Sulu at ‘roughly 30-40 armed combatants’. Less than two years later, in an article which appeared in the Weekend Australia: (11 August 2007) it was reported that in a recent combat encounter, the Abu Sayyaf armed combatants on Jolo Island were estimated at 300-400 guerrillas. The estimate of the number of Abu Sayyaf combatants killed in this encounter was given at more than 50, whilst the AFP admitted to losses of 26 of its soldiers. However, to add more intrigue to the incident the MNLF deputy chair Hatimil Hassan claimed it was his forces and not the Abu Sayyaf who attacked the AFP.

According to Taylor the blaming by the Arroyo Administration of all armed clashes with the AFP on the Abu Sayyaf is nothing new, and in fact is common practice. (The reason for this assumption will be dealt with later in this paper). Taylor, writing for the various Philippine media repeatedly makes the accusation that the Abu Sayyaf no longer exists as an organisation in Sulu. Moreover, he makes the point that whereas the ASG in Basilan had/has a vision for a pure Islamic state, the group referred to as the Abu Sayyaf in Sulu used/uses the label as an excuse for banditry. He further goes on to say that the Southern Command of the AFP appear to give a ‘blanket authority’ to pursue any person in Sulu suspected of having anti-government sentiment. More importantly these suspects are assumed to be Abu Sayyaf combatants or Abu Sayyaf sympathisers and are interrogated (see figure 4). Further more, Taylor, in interviews with fellow Suluanos found that it was believed that the Abu Sayyaf ‘becomes a convenient scapegoat’.

There is another school of thought as to who may be contributing to the violence in Sulu, and their motive; local politicians. In April 2007 seven construction workers including two sixteen year old boys were kidnapped on Jolo Island and a 5 million Philippine peso demand for their release was sent to their employer. The seven workers were subsequently beheaded, and their heads, in two sacks were delivered to the AFP headquarters in Sulu. It was claimed by the AFP’s commander of the 104^th Infantry Brigade, Col. Antonio Supnet that the Abu Sayyaf under the command of Albader Parad was responsible for the atrocity (Philippine Daily Enquirer: 21 April 2007). However, Rubelyn delos Reyes, the wife of one of the beheaded workers, claimed that one of the kidnappers called her to apologise for killing her husband explaining that he was instructed by one of the local politicians to carry out this killing. Interestingly, there was a Philippine Daily Enquirer reporter in Sulu at that time and she spoke to Rubelyn delos Reyes about the alleged phone call. In a conversation with Victor Taylor this reporter, who believed the phone call to be genuine, concluded that local politicians are complicating the situation in order to heighten the sense of conflict and violence in Sulu. She also believed that this was being done so that the forthcoming elections (May 14 2007) would either be postponed or, if continued, would be held under very restrictive conditions: voting precincts being clustered, vote-counting being undertaken in the military camps, and son on, so that the forthcoming elections results would be more easily manipulated.[5]

USA Involvement and Counterinsurgency

Prior to the terrorist attacks in the USA in September 2001 the MNLF, and the  MILF were seen by the USA Government as nothing more than Philippine Muslim organisations whose common aim was to have autonomy, or if possible, independence for the Bangsamoro[6] population of the southern Philippines. However because the attacks were perpetrated by Muslim al-Qa’ida trained terrorists, and because the MNLF in 1970s and 1980s had trained with al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan, and more importantly the MNLF and the MILF had at times been involved in insurgency actions, they immediately came under suspicion. They were not seen so much as a direct threat, but it was possible that they might be sympathetic to the extremist views of al-Qa’ida.  

Consequently, after the terrorist events in the USA of September 2001, the MILF was classified as a terrorist organisation by the George W. Bush administration. However during a visit to the USA in 2003 the Philippine President, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo convinced Washington to remove the MILF from the list of terrorist organisations targeted in the Global War on Terror because the Arroyo administration had just entered into peace negotiations with the MILF. The refusal of the USA to exclude the MILF from the enemy list would have produced a situation where two allies had a conflict of interest insomuch that one was at war with an organisation and the other was engaging in peace talks with the same organisation.

Whereas the MILF was originally on the USA enemy list, the MNLF was not. This may very well have been because the MNLF was given formal recognition and permanent observer status by the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1977. And having been given permanent observer status, the MNLF was allowed to attend all OIC conferences, including the Islamic Summit Conference, and the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers. It is also possible that the action of the USA in not including the MNLF in the enemy list was a pragmatic act. The MNLF was held in high esteem by most members of the OIC, and, furthermore, as Fuller (2003) stated in The Future of Political Islam, ‘a broad range of Islamist leaders immediately condemned the attack [September 2001][7] as a crime and against the tenets of Islam’,

As mentioned, the ASG was included on the USA enemy list soon after the attacks on September 2001, and as such the USA sought permission from the Arroyo Administration to provide support to the AFP in their quest to eliminate the ASG from the southern Philippines. Between January 2001 and September 2006 USA forces, including marines, navy personnel, and U.S. Special Forces[8] have accompanied and advised the AFP in six joint military exercises including operations against the ASG in Basilan, and the Abu Sayyaf in Sulu Province: the total number of USA troops involved in these six operations was 10,128. Because a part of USA foreign policy included the elimination of terrorist organisations, then the pursuit of the ASG in the Philippines was seen as legitimate. Moreover, the Arroyo Administration has a domestic counterinsurgency policy which includes the elimination of the ASG. This in turn is closely related to USA foreign policy, which also broadly supports counterinsurgency actions by states, and in doing so has found common ground with the Arroyo administration.

In 2004 Steven Metz and Raymond Millen completed a study for the Strategic Studies Institute, USA Army War College titled, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21^st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response. The underlying theme of their report was that since the terrorist attacks in the USA. in September 2001 counterinsurgency operations throughout the world must be made a priority in USA. foreign policy. It stressed that where insurgency is seen as a liberating cause it must be reversed and the insurgency must be perceived as being national insurgency. That is, antagonists fighting a national government having some degree of legitimacy and popular support as opposed to liberation insurgency, which can be seen as opposition to outside occupiers. The recommendation by Metz and Millen is highly relevant to the current situation in the Sulu Archipelago.

In the same year, 2004, Robert Tomes, a Senior Advisor to the Technical Director, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), completed a report titled, Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare. Tomes drew heavily on past insurgency/counterinsurgency theorists, Roger Trinquier, Frank Kitson and David Galula. He stressed that for counterinsurgents to be successful, they have to develop and deploy psychological operations units in conjunction with propaganda operations, as well as social service units that foster the impression that the government is addressing underlying socio-economic problems. More importantly, the counterinsurgents need to avoid negotiations until they are in a position of strength. This recommendation also relates closely to the current situation in Sulu.    Furthermore it can be argued that the Arroyo Administration is seeking foreign military support to implement its domestic counter-insurgency policies. And this in turn, it would appear, is exacerbating the violence which many of the Muslims of Sulu are experiencing. Moreover, the majority of Muslims of Sulu believe that any insurgency action anywhere in the southern Philippines is now being described as terrorist action. Insurgency is often accompanied by violence: such is the nature of insurgency. However to describe all violence which accompanies insurgency as acts of terror is simply incorrect.  

In its endeavour to eliminate all anti-government sentiment in Sulu, (the province is 90% Sunni Muslim) the Arroyo administration has justified its domestic counterinsurgency policies by claiming that the Abu Sayyaf is responsible for the majority of violence and crime in that province. Such is the inordinate number of AFP troops in Sulu and the power they exercise, that the role and authority of the Philippine National Police (PNP) is undermined. In September 2006 the Manila Times reported that 6000 Philippine military personnel were in pursuit of the remaining 200 Abu Sayyaf members in Sulu. Seven months later, and after hundreds of Abu Sayyaf members were reportedly killed, the BBC news reported in April of 2007 that the number of Abu Sayyaf terrorists in Sulu had dwindled to around 200. This begs the question, just who were the hundreds of people killed in this 7 month period? It would appear that practically every person killed in an encounter with the Philippine military in Sulu is either identified as an Abu Sayyaf member or an Abu Sayyaf sympathiser. 

Conditions for peace:

(a) USA Armed Forces withdrawal from Sulu.

In 1992, the USA closed down the Subic Naval Bay Complex and Clark Air Force Base, along with three support bases and a number of communication and intelligence facilities. Although as many as 15,000 USA troops a year had been stationed at these bases their withdrawal from the Philippines had little or no effect on Sulu Province. Although there was periodic violence in the form of insurgency from the MNLF, The USA saw this as a Philippine domestic issue. However, after the events of 2001 in the USA, and the categorising of the ASG as a terrorist organisation, Sulu became an area of interest. In April 2003, BBC News reported that Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo had given approval for USA troops to be stationed in Sulu: a situation which continues to this date. Although in all fairness it must be mentioned that the USA forces have also been involved in humanitarian and civil construction programmes in Sulu, as well as military operations.

The deployment of USA military forces to Sulu only seeks to remind many Suluanos of the last time that USA military forces were in Sulu and involved in counter-insurgency operations: the Bud Dajo massacre in Jolo on 07 March 1906. On this date USA troops killed approximately 1,000 Filipino Muslims, including women and children (see figure 5). The then President of the United States of America, Theodore Roosevelt, described the 1000 or so slaughtered Muslims as nothing more nor less than an unimportant collection of pirates and highwaymen. Ironically, in October 2003, George W. Bush addressed the Philippine Congress claiming that the USA had delivered democracy to the Philippine people in the early part of the 20^th century. President Bush failed to mention that about 120,000 American troops were deployed resulting in the deaths of more than 200,000 Filipino civilians and soldiers. He also failed to mention that the USA, at that time, was continuing the colonialisation of the Philipines just as Spain had done for almost three centuries. Therefore it is vitally important that USA troops leave the Philippine Government’s domestic counter-insurgency opperations in Sulu province to the AFP. Moreover the enforcement of law and order in Sulu must be left to the PNP.     

 (b) The cessation of military actions by the AFP.

‘If you win the people you win the war’. This statement was made by General Juancho Sabban, Commander of the 3^rd Marine Brigade stationed on Jolo Island, and reported on Voice of America by Douglas Bakshian in February 2007. General Sabban went on further to say that the military operations on Jolo Island are all about winning public support. This statement by General Sabban is in stark contrast to a speech delivered to the Philippine House of Representatives on 06 February 2008 by the representative for Sulu, Yusop Jikiri. In his speech he called for a thorough investigation into what the Sulu Provincial Governor Abdusakur Tan called a massacre but what General Rafael (Commander of the Anti-terror Task Force in Sulu) referred as a legitimate operation. The incident referred to was the killing of four adults and four children in Barangay Ipil, Jolo, by members of the AFP. According to General Rafael the AFP soldiers were searching for a civilian, Rosaly Lao, who was allegedly kidnapped by the Abu Sayyaf. In the incident at Barangay Ipil, it was alleged that shots had been fired at AFP soldiers by the occupants of a house in which the victims resided. This incident was widely reported in almost all Asian media: at the time of writing of this paper the investigation is still proceeding.

Unfortunately the incident referred to is not an isolated case involving innocent civilians who have become casualties when the AFP suspects Abu Sayyaf activity or presence in a particular barangay.[9] The approximately 6000 members of the AFP stationed in Sulu have to accept some responsibility for the continuing unrest in that province. When violence does break out in Sulu, as it does quite often, then instead of the PNP force pursuing the suspects, the military launch an operation. As Victor Taylor points out in his numerous publications if the military forces confined themselves to their camps, there would be much less violence in Sulu Province. He further goes on to say that the AFP in Sulu should react only if and when violence breaks out and the PNP are unable to contain it. Moreover, Taylor asserts that the AFP wittingly uses the Abu Sayyaf label as a convenient excuse to rationalise operations launched in which there are civilian causalities. And the term Abu Sayyaf becomes a convenient phrase to justify violent actions undertaken by the AFP in Sulu.  

The ethnicity of the majority of soldiers stationed in Sulu is another issue why there is suspicion and mistrust by the majority of Suluanos of these soldiers. The AFP in Sulu is mostly made up of personnel from other provinces. And apart from former MNLF paramilitary members,[10] most AFP personnel are almost entirely Christians. As well, the isolation which the AFP imposes on itself helps to strengthen the impression of segregation, insomuch that the AFP is housed in camps away from the general populace, and their compounds are surrounded by razor-wire. Even more salient is the mannerism adopted by the AFP when their soldiers leave their compounds and visit barangays; fully armed and in complete combat attire. 

 (c) The empowerment of local officials and municipal administrators to pursue economic, political, and religious reform.

In 1996 the Ramos Administration signed an historic peace agreement with the MNLF. Although the agreement referred to all the Muslim population of the southern Philippines, Sulu, because at the time of the signing ranked last on the Human Development Index (HDI)[11] in all the provinces in the Philippines, had more to gain economically.[12] Sulu is a source of cheap labour to multi-national corporations who wish to exploit its natural resources, as is the whole of Mindanao. Due to the poor economic conditions in Sulu at this time, it is impossible to see local ownership of industries, which could replace the multinationals, happening in the near future. The Philippines is a third world developing country and its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is low by world standards. Moreover, Sulu is one, if not the poorest province in the Philippines, and it is unlikely that the National Government would, or indeed have the surplus to invest in the necessary infrastructure needed for local ownership of industries. Therefore, the partial answer to Sulu’s economic woes may lie in the implementation of the clauses in the 1996 GRP/MNLF Peace Agreement referring to revenue sharing of Sulu’s natural resources.   

Unfortunately political corruption in the Philippines since its independence in 1946 has all too frequently occurred. President Ferdinand Marcos having won elections in 1965 and 1969 then used the imposition of martial law to ensure that he won subsequent national elections. In 1978 the first national election under martial law was held. Of the 165 members elected only 15 were from opposition parties, resulting in accusations of voting irregularities. Eventually, after massive civil unrest, Marcos was forced from office. The Philippines then enjoyed some semblance of democracy under Corazon Aquino and Fidel Ramos. However corruption then returned under President Joseph Estrada forcing him from office and resulting in his arrest. The incumbent president of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, has survived impeachment proceedings and at present is considered by a majority of Filipinos the most corrupt president the Philippines has had since independence. Moreover, Arroyo granted clemency to Estrada and had him released from detention. With a record of corruption or inferred corruption at the highest national level it is not difficult to imagine that corruption at lower levels of government also occurs.

Taylor believes that political leadership in Sulu has abdicated its duties, insomuch that the burden of governance has had to be taken on by others, in many instances by the military leadership in the field. Taylor also believes that for good governance to be achieved in Sulu, reform must start with the Chief Executive of Sulu: the Provincial Governor.  

In Sulu which is overwhelmingly Muslim, Islam plays an important role in the lives of the majority of followers. Since 1946 successive Philippine Administrations have imposed a uniform set of laws that are in accordance with the Philippine Constitution, which for the most part are in accordance with Christian values. It can be argued that the Philippine Constitution has to override the Koran. That is, courts of law must be Christian.[13] However, for peace and stability to return to Sulu the Philippine Administration has to fashion policies for Sulu that are more in accordance with traditional Sulu traditions, values and religious belief. It is widely believed by a majority of Muslims in the world that Islam is the religion of peace. And not only is Islam a religion, it is also a way of life. And there is nothing to suggest that the Muslims of Sulu do not share these beliefs. Therefore, an extension of the powers of the Shari’ah Courts in Sulu to adjudicate in some cases of unlawfulness may have merit, insomuch that the Muslims of Sulu would see that Islamic beliefs and customs do have a place in Philippine democracy.

Conclusion.

This paper has attempted to address the central questions of whether the Abu Sayyaf actually exists in Sulu and whether the GRP with the assistance of the AFP, and supported by USA military personnel are using the Abu Sayyaf label as a convenient excuse to pursue domestic counterinsurgency policies as well as gain electoral advantage. With that in mind there is no doubt that violence in Sulu has increased since 2001. Whether this has been as a result of opportunities taken by bandits under the guise of defending Islamic beliefs, or a belief in what some may call justifiable insurgency, has yet to be determined. However what has been determined is that the number of AFP personnel in Sulu is disproportionate to the alleged number of Abu Sayyaf members in that province. Moreover, it has also been determined that USA forces engaged in operations in Sulu are there as part of the Global War on Terror having listed the Abu Sayyaf as enemy combatants. What has not been established is a credible threat to the USA by the alleged 200 or so Abu Sayyaf members in Sulu Province. Finally it is problematic whether there would be any USA forces or indeed AFP personnel in Sulu if that province’s population was not approximately 90% Sunni Muslim. It is all too simple to believe that Islamists are the enemies of the Christian West. It is also inherently wrong.

References

Balana, C. ‘Dreams of 2 Zambo teeners end in Jolo’. Philippine Daily Enquirer, 21 April, 2007.

BBC News/Asia Pacific. (17/05/203) Hostages Escape Abu Sayyaf. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3036035.smt. [03/2008]

BBC News. (09/04/2003) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/2931119.stm, [04/2008].

Docena, Herbert (2007) ‘Focus on the Philippines, Special Reports No.1 January 2007’. Focus on the Global South.

Docena, Herbert (2007) ‘Focus on the Philippines, Special Reports No.2. November 2007’. Focus on the Global South.

Fanon, Franz, (1967). The wretched of the Earth. London: Penguin.

Fuller, Graham E. (2003). The future of political Islam. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Gutierrez, Eric & Saturnino Borras (2003). The Moro conflict: landlessness and misdirected state policies. Makita City: AIM Policy Center.

Levien, Harold. (1967). Vietnam, myth & reality. Sydney: Bridge Printery Pty. Ltd.

Mindanao Peace Weavers. Philippines. (2005). Sulu: State of War, Calls for Peace. Available at http://www.justpeace.net.ph/report_of_the_sulu_peace_and_sol.htm. [03/2008]

Pagtabangan Basulta. Philippines. (2006) Developing a Culture of Peace for Sulu; Available at   http://www.yonip.com/main/articles/DEVELOPING%20A%20CULTURE%20OF%PEACE%20-%20Title%Page%20and%20Contents.pdf [03/2007].

Rasul, Amina. (2003). Poverty and armed conflict in Mindanao, in ‘The road to peace and reconciliation: Muslim perspectives on the Mindanao conflict’. Makita City: AIM Policy Centre.

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S Army War College. Carisle, PA. (2004). Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21^st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response. Available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/insurgency21c.pdf [10/2007]

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. Washington. (2004). Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare. Available at  http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/04spring/tomes.pdf

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB625.pdf, [21 April 2007].

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S Army War College. Carisle, PA. (2005). Balik-terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf. Available at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB625.pdf, [21 April 2007].

Symons, Emma-Kate. (2007). ‘Resurgent Abu Sayyaf kills 26 troops’. The Weekend Australian, 11-12 August 2007.

Voice of America. (02/2007) Southern Philippine Island Plays out Drama in War on Terror, Available at http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2007-02/2007-02-22-voa32.cfm?CFID=296256166&CFTOKEN=15371545,  [04/2008].

FIGURES

Figure 1. Sulu: capital Jolo. Sulu Archipelago.

Figure2. Khadafi Janjalani

Figure 3. Body of Abu Solaiman

Figure 4. Abu Sayyaf prisoner/suspect. Injuries to face may indicate
interrogation methods.

Figure 5. USA soldiers at scene of the Bud Dajo massacre, 1906

About the Author

Bob East BA (hons) is currently a Doctoral Candidate in the Faculty of Arts (International Relations), University of Southern Queensland, Toowoomba, Australia.