Dialogue: the Kurdish question in the Middle East

 Hussein Tahiri
Monash University, Australia

Abstract

Kurdistan was divided, for the first time, between the Ottoman and Persian empires in 1514. After World War I it was sub-divided among Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria.

Since then, Turkey has adopted an assimilation policy towards the Kurds. Any manifestation of Kurdish identity has been suppressed. The Kurds have reacted by resorting to armed struggle. So far, neither Turkey has been able to assimilate the Kurds and eliminate the Kurdish insurgency, nor the Kurds have been able to get recognition by using force.

In Iran, though the Kurdish identity has not been denied, there have been systematic attempts to deny the Kurds of their social, cultural and political rights. Decades of suppression has not pacified the Kurds. Also, decades of Kurdish armed struggle to get autonomy has achieved no result.

The successive Iraqi governments were unable to eradicate Kurdish desire for self-determination through suppression and genocide. Decades of armed struggle by the Kurds failed to produce any positive outcomes. It was only after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003 that the Kurds, by default, were able to form a Federal Kurdish State in Iraq. 

The Kurds in Syria have been deprived of their basic rights. Although there has been no armed struggle in Syria, there has been occasional violence.

An overview of Kurdish history demonstrates that the states ruling over Kurdistan will not be able to eliminate Kurdish nationalism through suppression and violence. The Kurds too cannot gain their rights through armed struggle. Therefore, there is a need for dialogue.

Dialogue: the Kurdish question in the Middle East

For about two centuries the Kurds have been fighting for their rights, first against the Ottoman and Persian empires and then the Turkish, Iranian and Iraqi governments. So far, none of them has been able to subdue the other. Yet, both the Kurds and the states ruling over Kurdistan are persisting on violence as the only solution to the problem.

An overview of Kurdish history[1] would demonstrate that the states ruling over Kurdistan will not be able to eliminate Kurdish nationalism through suppression and violence. The Kurds too cannot gain their rights through armed struggle. There is a need for another solution.

Historical background

Since the 19^th century when both the Ottoman and Persian empires tried to impose direct rule over Kurdistan Kurdish history has been dominated by successive revolts against the Ottoman and Persian empires. In 1806, Abdurahman Pasha of Baban revolted against Ottoman rule in order to assert his independence and his revolt continued for three years. It was finally defeated by the co-operation of the Ottoman forces and the Kurdish tribes, who opposed the Babans.[2] Mir Muhammad occupied Southern Kurdistan in 1833. He aimed to unite all Kurdish tribal leaders who opposed the Ottoman interference. Seven years later Bedirxan, the powerful emir of Butan led a revolt. He managed to occupy several Kurdish towns but he was defeated.[3] Bedirxan's nephew, Yezdan Sher later led another uprising against the Ottoman Empire and he was also defeated.

In the late 19^th century Sheikh Ubaidullah of Nehri led the last major uprising of the 19^th century to create a Kurdish state. In his letters to Cochran (an American missionary), Ighbal ed-Dowleh (the Persian governor of Urmia), and British Vice-Consul Sheikh Ubaidullah spoke of the Kurds as a separate nation who should be granted their own nation state.[4] 

In July 1880, Sheikh Ubaidullah formed a Kurdish tribal league formed of 200 tribal and religious leaders in Nehri.[5] He previously had some clashes with the Ottoman forces but he could not fight the Ottoman and Persian governments simultaneously. He first tried to occupy the Kurdish territory under the Persian rule. After some initial success he was defeated.

In early 20^th century when World War I began the Kurds were drawn into the war and they endured huge suffer. When the war ended the Kurds were in a desperate situation both economically and psychologically. Nevertheless, the end of the war gave the Kurds some hope of achieving their statehood.

On 8 January 1918, Woodrow Wilson, the President of the United States, in a joint congress session announced a 14 Point Program for world peace. In point 12 he stated that the Turkish populated areas of the Ottoman Empire were to remain sovereign. However, the other nationalities under the Ottoman Empire were to be assured of an unmolested and secure life, and they were to be given an autonomous status.[6]

Following this promise, at the end of the World War I, the Allies started to carve up the Ottoman territories. On 10 August 1920, the Treaty of Sevres was signed by the Allies and the Ottoman Empire. The Articles 62[7] and 64[8], promised the Kurds an autonomous and eventually an independent state.

However, the Treaty of Lausanne ignored all the promises made in the Treaty of Sevres. When Mustefa Kemal emerged as the successful leader of Turkey, the Allies negotiated with him to find a peaceful solution. The result of the negotiation was what came to be the Treaty of Lausanne which was signed on 24 July 1923. According to this Treaty, the Allies recognised the new Turkish state under Mustefa Kemal Pasha. There was nothing in the treaty to secure the Kurdish rights. There was only mention of minorities; Articles 38 and 39 recognised the rights of non-Muslim minorities, and all citizens of Turkey to equal rights before the law.[9]

The Kurds in Turkey

During the Lausanne Conference the Turkish leaders told the Allies that there was no need to worry about the Kurds. They were to share the new state with the Turks as brothers, and the new government belonged to both Kurdish and Turkish peoples.[10]

The new Turkish leader, Mustefa Kemal Ataturk, promised the Kurds an autonomous state if they cooperated with him. He passed a legislation in Turkish Grand National Assembly in March 1922, in which the Kurds were given a kind of limited autonomy.[11]

When Mustefa Kemal formed the new Turkish Republic in 1923, and consolidated his position, he issued a decree on 3 March 1924, prohibiting the use of Kurdish language, banning education in Kurdish, and making illegal all Kurdish publications.[12] Some Kurdish nationalists reacted to this by revolting against the government. As a result in 1925, a Kurdish revolt began to form an independent Kurdish state. The Kurdish revolt of 1925 ended when its leader, Sheikh Sa’id, was arrested. He and 53 of other Kurdish leaders were executed on 28 June 1925, in Diyarbakir.[13] After the revolt, the Turks intensified their suppression of the Kurds and their identity. The Turks accelerated the process of deportation of the Kurds. Even those Kurdish tribes who helped the government against Kurdish revolt were deported to Turkish towns and cities. B. Shergo claimed that after the defeat of Sheikh Said, many Kurds were massacred. In one incident 25 Kurdish families in the north of Lake Van who had sought asylum in the mountains were captured by the Turkish soldiers, the heads of women and children were cut and were taken to the towns of Erjish, Adijewaz, and some other towns in order to create fear among the Kurds. He also claimed that about one million Kurds were deported to Turkish areas.[14] Many Kurdish villages were depopulated and the villagers were exiled to Turkish populated areas.

However, this suppression did not pacify the Kurds. In 1927 the Khoybun or Agri revolt began which continued to 1930. When the Khoybun revolt was suppressed the Turks again used repressive measures to eradicate the Kurds. The Turkish forces took very harsh measures such as deportations, mass arrests, and summary executions. The Kurdish villages were bombed and burnt down. In 5 May 1932, a law was passed in which four zones in Turkey were to be put under military control, three of them were in Kurdistan. One of them was to be completely evacuated and forbidden to outsiders. The law also allowed the deportation of Kurdish tribal and religious leaders from eastern parts of Turkey to Turkish populated areas.[15] The Turkish government passed a law in which it decriminalised the killing of the Kurds. Article 1, Law No.1,850 stated that from the 20^th of June 1930 to the 10^th of December every one who murdered or committed any action against the insurgents were exempt from criminal persecution.[16]

These harsh measures again could not pacify the Kurds. In fact, they triggered another revolt in Kurdistan. In 1937 the Dersim revolt began. This revolt was also suppressed. The suppression of the Dersim revolt was dreadful. Entire villages in the Dersim area were evacuated or massacred. The Turkish forces continuously used poison gas, artillery and air bombardments. The Turkish government tried to eradicate the Dersim’s identity; it changed Dersim’s name to Tunceli. The words ‘Kurds’ and ‘Kurdistan’ were prohibited and were removed from history books and publications. The government forged new history for the Kurds and called them ‘mountain Turks’.[17]

It can be said that 1938 to the 1950s were the darkest stages of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey. The Turkish state tried to assimilate the Kurds. Many Kurds had been deported to Turkish populated areas and the Turkish government wanted to change them into Turks. Kurdish youths were sent to school boards outside Kurdistan to be assimilated. The Kurdish students were ridiculed at schools. They were told that they were primitive and where their tails were[18], indicating that the Kurds were half-animals. The Kurdish students realized that they might claim to be Turks but they were not accepted as such by the Turks. They were different from the Turks and discrimination against them pushed them to search for their true identity. These educated Kurds formed the nucleus of the Turkish left and Kurdish nationalism. 

This led to the formation of many Kurdish political parties, the most successful of which was the Kurdistan Workers Party, PKK. The PKK was formally formed on 27 November 1978.^[19] By 1984, they engaged in an armed struggle against the Turkish state. The Turkish government labelled the PKK as a “terrorist” organization and adopted a very repressive policy. During its fighting with the PKK the Turkish state destroyed thousands of Kurdish villages, tortured, arrested, and imprisoned tens of thousands of Kurds. 

History of the modern Turkish Republic is a history of repression of the Kurds. While it has allowed a degree of tolerance and democracy within Turkey for Turkish population it has shown an absolute intolerance towards the Kurdish question. Identifying oneself as a Kurd is still a crime in Turkey. If one says he/she is Kurdish it is implied that they say there are other ethnic groups in Turkey, it is implied that they want to separate from Turkey. They automatically become members of the PKK and so become “terrorists”. In June 2008, several Kurdish child singers were facing prison for singing Kurdish anthem at a function in the United States. Three of them aged 15 to 17 were tried in an adult court in Diyarbekir. They faced up to five years in jail if they were convicted.[20] Since the establishment of the modern Turkish Republic millions of Kurds have been deported or forced to migrate to Turkish towns and cities or Western Europe, tens of thousands have been killed, similar numbers have been arrested, imprisoned, tortured. Thousands of Kurdish villages have been destroyed. The Kurds have gone through cultural genocide in the hope of getting assimilated. Yet, the Kurdish problem in Turkey is bigger than ever.

In Turkey the PKK was able to put the Kurdish issue on the agenda again. As Mehmet Ali Birand said,

It [the PKK] both terrified and instilled a “Kurdish” identity among our citizens of Kurdish origin. It gave courage to those who were too frightened to say, “I am a Kurd.” It brought ethnic identity to the foreground. It made Kurdish nationalism become accepted.^[21]

However, neither the PKK can win this war nor the Turkish state can eliminate Kurdish nationalism.

The Kurds in Iran 

The Iranian Kurdistan, especially areas close to Iran-Ottoman borders were the most to suffer from the effects of the World War I. It became the main battleground for the Russian and Ottoman forces. The war for the Kurds was devastating and the end of the war brought some comfort to the Kurdish populated areas. As the central government was too weak to establish its authority throughout the country, the tribes were the main authoritative powers.

This paved the way for Isma’il Agha Shikak, Simko, to establish his authority in the north of Iranian Kurdistan. The World War I, the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 in Russia, the Treaty of Sevres, the Kurdish intellectuals in Istanbul, the events in Turkey’s part of Kurdistan, and the events in Iraqi Kurdistan all helped Simko to develop a nationalist idea.[22] The government in Iran was very weak so it was a good opportunity for Simko to try to realise his objective of establishing an independent Kurdish state. The years 1919-1922 were the years of Simko’s success. He was able to capture a few towns and expand his territories.

However, in February 1921, Reza Khan in a coup came to power and abolished the Qajar dynasty. The first of his attempts was to undermine the authority of the tribal leaders and centralise the government. On 25 July 1922, Reza Khan sent a force of 8,000 to attack Simko’s forces near Salmas. Simko could not resist the Iranian army who by then were well armed and outnumbered his forces.[23] He was pushed out of Iran into Turkey. The power of Simko began to decline; he occasionally negotiated and occasionally fought against the government until he was killed by the Iranian forces in 1930.

World War II created a hope for Kurdish intellectuals in Iran to realise their long dreamt Kurdish state. In 1943, the Soviet Leader, Stalin, the American President Franklin Roosevelt, and the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill met in Teheran. They agreed to recognise the independence and territorial integrity of Iran, and withdraw soon after the War finished. However, at the end of the war the Soviets who were pushing Iran to give oil concessions refused to leave at the time set out.^[24]

The Kurdish leaders, hopeful of the Soviet support, decided to form an autonomous Kurdish state. On 16 August 1945 the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) was formed and on 22 January 1946, a Kurdish republic was proclaimed in the town of Mahabad and Qazi Muhammad was elected as the president.^[25] On 11 February 1946, Qazi Muhammad formed his cabinet of 14 ministers with Haji Baba Sheikh as the Prime Minister.^[26]

The Soviet Union was forced to leave Iran and the future of the Kurdish Republic remained in doubt. The United States’ forces left Iran on 31 December 1945 and the British followed on 2 March 1946, but the Soviet refused to do so. The Qavam government promised the Soviets some concessions, but maintained that the agreement had to be ratified by the Iranian Parliament. The government could not call the election as long as the foreign powers were present in Iran.^[27] Thus, the Soviet troops left Iran in May 1946 and the Kurds were left to the mercy of the Iranian government.

On 16 December 1946, Qazi Muhammad who knew that fighting with the government would be fruitless, went to Miandoab to facilitate the surrender of the Kurdish Republic. On 17 December 1946, Mahabad was officially handed over to the Iranian forces without any resistance.^[28] A few days after, Qazi Muhammad and some other Kurdish leaders were arrested. They were tried in a marshal court and condemned to death. On 30 March 1947, Qazi Muhammad, his cousin Seif Qazi, and his brother Sadr Qazi were hanged in Chwar Chira Square, in the same place where the Republic was proclaimed, for what the Iranian government termed treason.^[29]

The Iranian government was not satisfied with the defeat of the republic and execution of its leaders. It tried to eradicate the signs of the Kurdish Republic. Kurdish publishing press was closed, the Kurdish publications were banned, Kurdish books were burnt, and teaching in Kurdish language was prohibited.^[30] The defeat of the Kurdish Republic of 1946 had disastrous consequences for the Kurds of Iran. Muhammad Reza Shah, the Shah of Iran, consolidated his position and developed his military capacity supported by the United States, thereby becoming the strongest military power in the Middle East. Kurdish nationalists were suppressed and weakened.

The Iranian Revolution of 1979 gave the KDPI an opportunity to resume its activities and demands autonomy. It was to achieve this aim that the KDPI actively participated in the struggle against the Shah. The Shah was finally pushed out of Iran on 16 January 1979, and Khomeini returned from exile on 1 February 1979. By 16 February 1979, the Shah's regime was toppled and the Islamic Republic of Iran, IRI, was replaced.^[31]

At the beginning of the Revolution the situation seemed promising. The revolutionary government promised to support and respect the rights of minorities.^[32] The KDPI had taken over many military barracks and many Kurdish towns were being managed by the Kurds. Furthermore, the first draft of the Islamic constitution recognised some rights for the minorities. Article five of the draft constitution promised equal rights for the Persians, Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis and Turkomans. Article 21 emphasised the Persian language as the official language in schools and all official texts and correspondence. It, however, permitted the use of local vernaculars in local schools and media.^[33]

However, Khomeini had an ideological problem with the term 'ethnic groups'. In the final draft of the Islamic constitution which was approved by the Assembly of Experts, Majlis-e-Khobragan, there was no mention of equality of ethnic groups in Iran though the term 'using vernacular languages beside Persian' was kept. For Ayatollah Khomeini the term ethnicity was incompatible with the Islamic ideology; for him the term minority could only be applied to non-Muslim religious groups. Khomeini stated:

Sometimes the word minority is used to refer to people such as the Kurds, Lurs, Turks, Persians, Balouchis, and such. These people should not be called minorities, because this term assumes that there is a difference between these brothers [sic]. In Islam, such a difference has no place at all. There is no difference between Muslims who speak different languages, for instance, the Arabs or the Persians. It is very probable that such problems have been created by those who do not wish the Muslim countries to be united…They create the issues of nationalism, of pan-Arabism, pan-Turkism, and such isms, which are contrary to Islamic doctrines. Their plan is to destroy Islam and the Islamic philosophy.^[34]

In light of such a belief, therefore, there was no hope for a Kurdish autonomy.

It became evident that the new government in Tehran would not grant the Kurds autonomy so clashes between the Kurdish and government forces ensued. The Islamic regime which had not yet consolidated its position took reconciliatory measures either to buy time or to persuade the Kurds to put aside the armed struggle. In the first two years there were both fighting and negotiations between the Kurds and the government which proved to be ineffective. Khomeini, to avoid ethnicity, declared he would ask the authorities to guarantee some specific rights in the constitution for Sunni^[35] minorities.^[36] The Kurds rejected this proposal as the Kurds were both Sunnis and Shi'its. The Kurdish problem was more ethnic than religious.

The Islamic regime, realising that it could not persuade the Kurds to abandon the armed struggle, attempted to suppress them. On 19 August 1979, Khomeini proclaimed himself commander-in-chief of the armed forces and called the KDPI leadership "corrupt" and the ‘agents of Satan’. He declared a holy war^[37] against the Kurdish political parties, the KDPI and Komala. He ordered that Kurdistan be cleansed. Heavy fighting broke out; the Kurds retreated to the mountains. While fighting continued, the Kurds demanded negotiations. On 16 December 1979, after weeks of negotiations, the government announced a limited autonomy plan. Qasimlou, the KDPI leader, refused the plan on the basis that it was a decentralised administration not autonomy.^[38]

The fighting continued again and by 1984, the government managed to oust the Kurdish political parties and control Kurdistan. The Iranian government deployed about 200,000 armed forces and established about 3,000 military bases across Kurdistan.^[39] The Kurds experienced sever suppression. During the government and Kurdish fighting many atrocities were committed. In summer 1979, the government forces massacred the people in the villages of Gharna and Ghalatan.^[40] In October 1979, Ayatollah Khalkhali ordered the execution of 53 Kurds during his thirty-minute stopover at Sanandaj Airport.^[41] In 1980, the government provoked ethnic cleansing between Kurds and Azeries in which hundreds of people were killed. In 1981, Inderghash villagers were massacred. In 1982, people of Kani-Mam-Sayyid and Mahmasha were massacred.^[42]  The government began to destroy Kurdish villages and forced the Kurdish villagers to take up arms against the KDPI and Komala.

The Islamic regime has been able to drive the Kurdish forces out of Iran into Iraqi Kurdistan. The uncertainty in Iraqi Kurdistan and the reliance of Iraqi Kurdish political parties on Iranian government has made life for the KDPI and Komala very difficult. Since early 1990s, the Iraqi Kurdish parties, mainly the KDP and PUK have not allowed the KDPI and Komala to infiltrate into Iran to fight the Iranian forces. Hence, the Iranian government is able to control the Iranian Kurdistan without any difficulty.

At this stage a dialogue is not possible as Kurds have lost faith in the Islamic Republic of Iran. They are also conscious that they cannot defeat the government. The government too with all repressive measures has been unable to defeat Kurdish insurgency. Both sides have reached a political and military stalemate. The only hope can be a fundamental political change in Iran or a genuine dialogue.

In the current climate one should not be surprised if Kurdish political parties in Iran be the first to support the United States attempt to overthrow the Islamic regime of Iran.

The Kurds in Iraq

In the same time as in Turkey, the Kurds of Southern Kurdistan where it came to be a part of Iraq were struggling for a Kurdish state. The British occupied the Basra and Baghdad provinces during the World War I. It did not occupy Mosul province or Southern Kurdistan. Instead, the British sent political officers to encourage the Kurds to rise against the Ottoman Empire.

At the beginning, the intention of the British was to form an independent Kurdish state so they appointed Sheikh Mahmud as the governor of Suleimaniyeh. Col. Sir Arnold Wilson, a British political officer in Iraq, stated the intention of the British was the formation of a Kurdish independent state in Southern Kurdistan under the tutelage of the British.^[43] So, on 1 November 1918, Wilson convened a meeting of Kurdish tribal leaders and the known personalities. He stated, in the meeting, that Sheikh Mahmud would become the governor of Suleimaniyeh on behalf of the British. All tribal leaders, except a few accepted his leadership.^[44]

Soon the British government changed its view about the formation of a Kurdish state. It realised an Iraqi state could not be viable without Southern Kurdistan. C.J.Edmonds’s, a British political officer, stated , “We were now engaged upon what was for Iraq a life and death struggle which none of us had any doubt, for we were convinced that Basra and Baghdad without Mosul could, for economic and strategic reasons, never would be built up into a viable state.”^[45] King Faisal in a letter to the commission of the League of Nation wrote that Mosul to Iraq was as ‘the head to the rest of the body’. The Mosul question was not only that of fixing the borders between Turkey and Iraq, it was the question of Iraq as a whole.^[46] Thus, the British backed away on its previous decision to form a Kurdish state and incorporated Southern Kurdistan into Iraq.

The British in order to incorporate Southern Kurdistan into Iraq needed to undermine the authority of Sheikh Mahmud. Sheikh Mahmud the governor of Suleimaniyeh had the ambition of becoming the head of a Kurdish state, and the British, initially, made him to understand that he would be helped to realise his ambition. Sheikh Mahmud would not be satisfied with anything less than a complete independence. The British, to undermine his authority, used Kurdish tribal leaders against Sheikh Mahmud.^[47] Edmonds, a British officer, recounted his successful mission to Suleimaniyeh region to turn the tribal leaders against Sheikh Mahmud.^[48] Whenever, the British could not overcome Sheikh Mahmud by using the tribal leaders they would seek force against him. It was a tactic which the British officers had developed during their stay in Kurdistan. Edmonds believed that the Kurds could only be controlled by force and force was the only thing the Kurds could understand.^[49] So, the British answered the Kurdish call for self-determination by force.

Sheikh Mahmud finally had enough of the postponement of the formation of a Kurdish state by the British and its agitation of the tribes against him so he declared the formation of a Kurdish state in Southern Kurdistan and pushed the British forces out of Suleimaniyeh. He occupied Suleimaniyeh, its surroundings and the town of Halabja. His 1,500 forces engaged in a fierce fighting with the British forces in Baziyan region. Sheikh Mahmud forces were defeated, he was injured and arrested; he was then exiled to India.^[50]

The British who feared that Kurdistan, especially Mosul, might fall to the Turks had to return Sheikh Mahmud from the exile. He was returned to Kurdistan in October 1922, and was again appointed the governor of Suleimaniyeh. Sheikh Mahmud seized the opportunity and declared the formation of a Kurdish state with the town of Suleimaniyeh as its capital city. He introduced a cabinet of eight ministers. After a month, on 18 November 1922, he called himself the King of Kurdistan.^[51] He was again suppressed by the British forces. From then onwards, Sheikh Mahmud used the tactic of hit and run against the British until early 1930s. In these fightings Suleimaniyeh and some other Kurdish towns were repeatedly bombarded by the Royal Air Force. In occasions the RAF used Delayed Action Bombs in violation of the Hague convention of 1907, and the British Manual of Military law of 1914. These bombardments caused many civilian casualties.^[52]

The British even abandoned the idea of an autonomous state within Iraq. In 1930, an Anglo-Iraqi agreement was signed in which the mandatory power of the British over Iraq ended, and Iraq was given independence. In this agreement there were no provisions to secure Kurdish rights and interests.^[53] In this way the Kurds were left to the mercy of the Iraqi state. In 1931, Sheikh Mahmud protested the Anglo-Iraqi agreement and revolted against the Iraqi government.^[54] He realised that there was no chance for him to succeed. He abandoned the Kurdish cause and gave himself up to the Iraqi government. Therefore, the first episode of Kurdish revolts in Iraqi Kurdistan was ended without any outcome.

In the late 1930s and 1940s the Kurdish intellectuals in Iraq organised themselves in different political parties. Kurdish revolt was left to Mulla Mustafa Barzani who was a tribal leader and descended from a Kurdish religious and tribal family. Mulla Mustafa began a revolt in 1943, which continued to 1945. His revolt was defeated by Iraqi army assisted by the British Royal Airforce. Mulla Mustafa retreated to Iranian Kurdistan where he joined the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad. In 1946, he sent an envoy to Iraqi Kurdistan to form a Kurdish political party on the model of Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran. The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq, KDP, was formed in 1946 and Mulla Mustafa was elected as its president.

Mulla Mustafa who after the defeat of Kurdish Republic of 1946 went into exile in the Soviet Union returned to Iraq in 1958, when the Iraqi officers toppled the monarchy. The new Iraqi government was on good terms with the Kurds, but it soon became apparent that it had no intention to recognise Kurdish rights. In September 1961, clashes began between Mulla Mustafa and the Iraqi forces. These clashes continued with some breaks until 1964, when Mulla Mustafa reached an agreement with the Abd al-Salaam Arif government.

Mulla Mustafa to exert pressure on the Iraqi governments sought assistance from Iran, the United States and Israel. They helped Mulla Mustafa for their own ends. During the OPEC meeting, on 6 March 1975, the Shah of Iran and Saddam Hussein signed an agreement. Saddam Hussein agreed to recognise Iranian sovereignty over half of the Shat al-Arab, abandon the Iraqi claim of the Khuzistan province of Iran, and end the subversion of the Iranian Baluchis along the border with Pakistan. The Shah undertook to withdraw his support to Kurdish insurgency in Iraq.^[55] The Shah immediately withdrew his support and in a few days the Kurdish revolt came to its abrupt end.

The Kurds were used by Iran, the United States and Israel as an instrument to exert pressure on Iraqi government. When they fulfilled their objectives they abandoned the Kurds. The defeat of Kurdish revolt was a high price for the Iraqi Kurds. Hundreds of thousands of people became refugees, thousands of Kurds were deported to southern Iraq, hundreds of Kurdish villages were destroyed, and many people were killed. The CIA, however, considered the Kurdish revolt a success. The former United States Consul in Kirkuk, Lee Dinsmore, who was in charge of contacts with the Kurds said, ‘Still, the CIA probably counts the operation a success; it kept the Iraqis occupied for fifteen years. And nobody gives a damn about the Kurds.’^[56] Indeed, neither of the powers helping the Kurds gave a damn about them and abandoned them in a disastrous situation.

The defeat of the Kurdish revolt in Iraqi Kurdistan was not the first and it was not the last. Dozens of Kurdish revolts had previously been suppressed, but in another time another revolt mushroomed. Certainly, with the defeat of Kurdish revolt the Kurds were not quietened. As Mulla Mustafa said, ‘Where there is a people and a nation, the national movement will never end. Maybe a phase will end, but the movement will always go on.’^[57] Mulla Mustafa was right; by 1976, another phase of Kurdish movement in Iraqi Kurdistan began.

When the Kurdish revolt in Iraq collapsed in 1975, Jalal Talabani was the Kurdistan Democratic Party's, KDP, representative in Damascus, Syria. After 1975, Mulla Mustafa had gone to Iran and then to the United States so his authority had vanished. The KDP leadership was inherited by his sons, Idris and Mas'ud Barzani, and was called the KDP-Provisional Command. Jalal Talabani opposed this succession. This issue and Talabani's long rivalry with the Barzanis caused his departure from the KDP and he formed his own political party known as the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan or PUK in June 1975.^[58]

The Kurdish leaders, not learning from the experiences of 1975, again trapped in another foreign plot. Iran used them till 1988, and then abandoned them. In 1988, when Iran announced a ceasefire with Iraq, the Kurds were left to the mercy of Saddam Hussein. He ordered the destruction of hundreds of Kurdish villages. The Iraqi government began a policy of removing all civilians and livestock from Kurdish countryside close to Iranian and Turkish borders. A 'Free Fire Zone' area was established where any living creatures, human or animals, were to be shot on the sight. About three thousand Kurdish villages and hamlets were razed to the ground and about 500,000 Kurds were deported to southern Iraq.^[59]

Regardless of the price the Kurds of Iraq paid for their cooperation with Iran, the Kurdish leaders continued to collaborate. The big blow to the Kurdish civilians of Iraq came when the Kurdish forces of PUK and KDP with assistance from Iran captured the town of Halabja in mid-March 1988.^[60] On 16 March 1988, the Iraqi government retaliated by bombarding the town of Halabja with chemical weapons, mustard, nerve and cyanide gases. Within a few hours over 5,000 Kurdish civilians including children and women were dead.^[61] The Iraqi government had used chemical weapons against Kurdish villages on previous occasions but not to that extend. In the absence of international condemnation the Iraqi government found using chemical weapons the most effective and efficient way to contain Kurdish insurgency.

On 18 July 1988, Iran accepted the UN Resolution of 598, and on 20 August both sides announced a ceasefire; the eight year old war came to its end.^[62] The sudden acceptance of the UN Resolution of 598 by Iran surprised Kurdish leaders who had not prepared for such an occasion. Like in 1975, Iraq launched a major attack to dislodge the Kurdish forces from the north. This time Iraq used chemical weapons against Kurdish villages and Kurdish peshmargas. The Iraqi government planned to get rid of its Kurdish population and started what was called Anfal^[63] Campaign. In this campaign more than 180,000 Kurds were killed and over 4,000 Kurdish towns and villages were destroyed.^[64] By late 1988, the Kurdish parties were broke and were unable to continue the fighting. Iranians had withdrawn their support, Iraq had launched a major offensive complemented by poison gas, vast Kurdish populated areas were evacuated and the Anfal Campaign was continuing. In August 1988, Mas'ud Barzani ordered the fighting to stop. He stated that they could not fight chemical weapons with bare hands. He gave up the fighting to preserve the lives of his peshmargas and the civilian population.^[65] By late1988, another phase of Kurdish insurgency was over.

The most conspicuous opportunity for the Kurds came after the Gulf War in 1991. Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990. In January 1991, a US-led allied force attacked Iraqi forces and pushed them out of Kuwait. Iraqi forces were defeated but were not destroyed. The President of the Unites States, George Bush Senior, called upon the Iraqi people to rise against the Iraqi government and topple Saddam Hussein. This announcement gave the Kurds the impression that the United States would support them. The Kurds in the north and the Shi'ites in the south launched offensive attacks against Saddam's regime. In a matter of a few days the Kurds were able to free almost all Kurdistan.

But the US decided it did not want Saddam Hussein to be replaced.^[66] Therefore, when Saddam's launched a bloody repression against the Shi’ites in the south and the Kurds in the north, the US and its allies did nothing. In a matter of days Kurdish forces were defeated.  Kurdish defeat at the hands of Saddam Hussein caused widespread exodus. By the end of February 1991, over 1.5 million Kurds arrived at Iranian and Turkish borders^[67] and many others stayed on the Kurdish mountains. A human catastrophe was created.

Pictures of Kurdish refugees became the first news of world media. The US had to intervene in response to worldwide horror at the fate of Kurdish refugees. A 'safe haven' zone was established for the Kurds. On 16 April 1991, President Bush agreed for a 'safe haven' zone to be established at the 36 parallel north of Iraq. He ordered 7,000 American soldiers to join British, French and Dutch troops to secure and construct refugee camps inside Iraq.^[68] The Iraqi aircrafts were banned from flying over the 'safe haven' or 'no-fly' zone. The Kurds after assurance from the allies that they would be safe in the 'safe haven' areas returned.

From 1991 on wards a Kurdish federal state existed under the protection of the United States and Britain who imposed a no-fly zone on parts of Kurdistan in Iraq. However, this state had no legal status within Iraq or internationally. The United States invasion of Iraq on 21 March 2003, paved the way for a Kurdish federal state to be legally recognised within the Iraqi transitional laws and subsequently within Iraq’s permanent constitution.

The Kurds in Syria

The Kurds are the second largest ethnic group in Syria, after the Arabs. Kurdish population in Syria is estimated at around 2 million. They have been deprived of their basic human rights and their identity has been denied.

In 1962, in an effort to Arabise Kurdish areas and reduce the number of Kurds, the Syrian government conducted a census and stripped about 200,000 Kurds of their Syrian citizenship. This was done in an arbitrary manner. For instance, siblings from the same family, born in the same Syrian village, were classified differently. One became Syrian citizen the other became a foreigner. Father became foreigner while his son remained citizen. These Kurds do not have any legal rights; they cannot purchase any property, own a house or travel overseas.[69]

In 1965, in an effort to further Arabise Kurdish areas the Syrian government created an Arab cordon zone in the Jazira region along the Turkish border. The zone was 300 kilometers long and 10-15 kilometers wide, covering from the Iraqi border in the east to Ras Al-Ain in the west. In 1973 Bedouin Arabs were settled in these areas[70].

The Kurds in Syria have not conducted any armed struggle. However, the situation has not been without trouble. Violence flared in March 1986 when a few thousand Kurds wearing Kurdish costume celebrated Kurdish New Year, Newroz, in Damascus. The Syrian police opened fire and killed one person. In subsequent events another three people were killed.[71]

A major problem occurred on 12 March 2004, when a soccer match in Qameshli, Syria, ended in fierce fighting between the supporters of the Arab team from the Syrian town Dair el Zor, in south eastern Syria near Iraqi border, and the Kurdish spectators. The supporters of the Arab team who went to Qameshli by bus and numbered more than a thousand were carrying guns, knives and stones. They began shouting slogans in support of Saddam Hussein while insulting the Kurdish leaders in southern Kurdistan (Iraqi Kurdistan) and throwing stones at the Kurds which resulted in fighting between Kurdish and Arab spectators. The Syrian security forces entered the fighting on behalf of the Arabs. In this incident nine people were killed and more than 100 injured, three of the victims died in a stampede as fans tried to escape the fighting. Five people were shot dead by police on the next day as over 50,000 Kurds protested at the funerals of those killed a day earlier. Protests followed in other Kurdish towns, including Amouda, Derik, Serê Kanî (Ras el Ain), Kobanî (Ain el Arab), Afrin as well as other cities with large Kurdish population such as Damascus and Aleppo. Over a thousand Kurds were arrested.[72] Since, the situation has remained very tense.

As Kurdish nationalism is developing, there is increasing demands for Kurdish cultural and political rights in Syria. However, it does not seem that the Syrian government is willing to address Kurdish demands.

Conclusion

Since the 1990s, Kurdish nationalism has been developing rapidly and with it a greater demand for Kurdish self-determination. It has become evident that the states ruling over Kurdistan will not be able to assimilate the Kurds and suppress their demands for self-determination. The Kurds too cannot gain their rights through armed struggle. Therefore, dialogue is the best solution to the Kurdish question in the Middle East. 

The situation of the Kurds has changed dramatically since the 1990s. An autonomous Kurdish state was established in 1991. After the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Kurds established a legal federal Kurdish state in Iraq that has been recognised in permanent Iraqi constitution. The US invasion precipitated the development of mass Kurdish nationalism. In 2004, the Referendum Movement in Kurdistan collected over 1,700,000 signatures in support of a referendum on Kurdish self-determination and copies of those signatures were sent to the United Nations and the European Union.[73] On 30 January 2005, on the election day, the Referendum Movement in Kurdistan conducted an informal referendum beside official polling places in Kurdish areas handing out postcard-sized cards with the questions: Do you want Kurdistan be part of Iraq, or do you want an independent Kurdistan? On 2 February 2005, Reuters reported that more than 1.9 million Kurds participated in the referendum and 95 percent of those voted for an independent Kurdish state. The Referendum Movement announced that 98.8 of those voted favoured an independent Kurdish state. [74]

The developments in Iraqi Kurdistan have emboldened the Kurds in other parts. The Kurds in Turkey have escalated their demands for recognition of Kurdish identity and for more cultural rights. There are some Kurds who are demanding a federal Kurdish state in Turkey. In Iran the Kurds have changed their demands from autonomy to a federal Kurdish state. In Syria the Kurds have been more vocal in demanding their cultural and political rights.

Kurdish nationalism has immensely benefited from globalisation. Interaction and exchange of ideas with outside world, technological developments, internet, satellite tvs have all helped the emergence of pan-Kurdish nationalism, particularly among the Kurds in diaspora. Thus, elimination of Kurdish nationalism seems impossible.  It might even be late to contain Kurdish aspiration to form their own nation-state. However, there still could be an opportunity to come to an arrangement to live within the current political borders should the Kurds be treated equally and their national rights be recognized. For this to happen dialogue is needed.

In the current political climate it seems less likely that either Turkey, Iran or Syria is ready to use dialogue as an alternative solution to the Kurdish question. The onus falls on academics, intellectuals and civic society to promote a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question in the Middle East. Unfortunately, some proponents of dialogue search for it in higher places and sometimes in abstract. They promote “dialogue of civilizations”, continental or intra-states dialogue while ignoring the very society they live in. Any meaningful dialogue has to first start at home. How can one go on promote dialogue beyond their borders while they have massive problems at home that are in need of urgent solutions, knowing that dialogue is the only solution.

Looking at patterns of Kurdish history in all parts of Kurdistan two things becomes very clear: First, the Kurds cannot be silenced through suppression and force. Second, the Kurds cannot force the governments ruling over Kurdistan to grant their rights through armed struggle. Therefore, for violence to stop, the only alternative is dialogue.

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About the Author

Dr. Hussein Tahiri is currently an Honourary Research Associate with the School of Political and Social Inquiry, Monash University, Australia.